Operation ShadowCloud: MeshAgent abused to deploy GitDoor and GraphDoor cloud-C2 backdoors against Asian and African governments
Matéria consolidada. Reúne 3 matérias que o Tifon tinha publicado separadamente sobre a mesma história. A IA reescreveu o relatório com o que as 2 fontes trouxeram em 17/11/2026 12:04; os links antigos trazem para cá.
Kaspersky describes Operation ShadowCloud, an active campaign identified in early 2026 that mainly targets government organizations in Asia and Africa, with one Taiwanese organization named (securelist.com, thehackernews.com). The actor abuses the legitimate MeshAgent (MeshCentral) utility to drop two previously undocumented modular backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. Both hide C2 traffic in GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint (via the Microsoft Graph API) and Ably cloud services. The initial access vector is unknown; Kaspersky suggests reuse of an earlier infection already on the network. No CVE or vendor advisory is involved. Attribution is not definitive. Kaspersky sees overlaps with Chinese-speaking or China-nexus groups, but sources differ on how they are framed (see Conflicting Reports). The reports were published on 2026-11-17 and rely on Kaspersky's analysis alone.
Detalhes técnicos
- MeshAgent stage: the MeshCentral Agent (MD5 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b) is hard-coded to contact wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx (securelist.com, thehackernews.com). Through it the actor drops three staged items: a legitimate binary, a malicious loader DLL and an encrypted payload (config.ini).
- DLL sideloading: the loaders are jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll and libcef.dll. They are sideloaded by javaw.exe, Sandboxie start.exe, pythonw.exe and zoomit.exe, started as a Windows service (securelist.com).
- Loaders: Type 1 decodes the payload with custom Base64, then RC4, then XOR, and abuses the RtlEthernetAddressToStringA and RtlEthernetStringToAddressA APIs. Type 2 uses XOR only. They resolve APIs by CRC32 or FNV-1 hashing, run anti-debugging checks, and inject the decoded payload into the current process's memory (securelist.com, thehackernews.com).
- Obfuscation: both backdoors use control flow flattening and nested wrapper functions.
- GitDoor C2: it takes commands and plug-ins from the GitHub repository LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo and returns results to LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix. Havo is public and Trix private, and repository creation dates suggest preparation since at least late 2024 (thehackernews.com). It opens a GitHub issue per victim and uploads encrypted host data as main..js.map to GitHub and to Ably (rest.ably.io), using AES-256-ECB and XOR (securelist.com).
- GitDoor capabilities: 26 commands (thehackernews.com), including file management, keylogging, proxying, scload (COFF loading) and smload (PE or shellcode injection). Plug-ins include scr.ts (screenshots), pr.ts (process enumeration), and channel.ts and abchannel.ts proxies. Shellcode modules cover:
- process injection (CreateRemoteThread, SetThreadContext, NtQueueApcThread, KernelCallbackTable)
- service, registry, task and user management
- Netstat, ARP and firewall rules
- Procdump and upload to gofile.io
- a WinPTY reverse shell
- CookieKatz cookie theft from Chrome and Edge, Mimikatz LSASS dumping, WhatsApp database key extraction and forced NTLM authentication (thehackernews.com)
- A %APPDATA%\log.lock marker file is used for keylogger persistence (securelist.com).
- GraphDoor C2: it authenticates to login.microsoftonline.com as a malicious application and uses the Microsoft Graph API to exchange data and commands through a SharePoint site (buildersemp.sharepoint[.]com). Command files must use one of the extensions .js, .swp, .tmp, .kmap, .pmap or .apmap. Host data (OS version, machine GUID, current directory, process list) is AES-encrypted, Base64-encoded and uploaded as main..js.map (securelist.com).
- GraphDoor internals: it opens the named pipe \.\pipe\p, resolves APIs by DJB2 hash and calls them through a vectored exception handler. Plug-ins are a loader stub followed by a COFF object with entry point
go. - GraphDoor commands and plug-ins: two commands are new compared with GitDoor:
shell(cmd.exe /C) andadsmload(payload encoded as MAC-address strings). Plug-ins are kl.ts (keylogger), pr.ts, scr.ts, moveDir.ts, channel.ts, abchannel.ts and ab2channel.ts (SOCKS5 over Ably's Pusher-compatible WebSocket service), plus a patched Erfrp (frpc) client. The C2 host is not hard-coded and is delivered through the proxy plug-in or Ably. The keylogger writes XOR-encrypted data to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat (securelist.com). - Follow-on tooling: Cobalt Strike beacons were found on GraphDoor victims, using the domains twnic[.]top and ekmt[.]tw (securelist.com).
- Overlaps: the FamousSparrow overlap involved a renamed Avast executable sideloading wtsapi32.dll, with an RC4 key previously linked to FamousSparrow. The CopperTurtle overlap involved pdfset.exe injecting the PLEAD RAT. Both groups shared staging directories with GitDoor and deployed implants within one day of it (securelist.com).
Remediação
Neither source gives vendor remediation guidance; the following defender actions are drawn from the reports.
- Hunt for the listed hashes, the C2 IP 27.102.66[.]162, the GitHub accounts and repositories, the SharePoint site and the domains twnic[.]top and ekmt[.]tw.
- Treat unexpected MeshCentral Agent installations as suspicious.
- Review sideloaded DLLs next to javaw.exe, start.exe, pythonw.exe and zoomit.exe, and services launching them.
- Monitor endpoints for unexpected Microsoft Graph, SharePoint, GitHub and Ably traffic.
- Look for the Intel_Log directory, logs.dat, log.lock and \.\pipe\p artifacts.
Relatos divergentes
- Attribution: thehackernews.com says attribution is unknown. It notes overlap with the China-nexus Bronze Sandcastle cluster (Sophos naming) and tactical similarities with FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle (BlackTech), but not a proven direct link. securelist.com says Kaspersky cannot attribute definitively, but points to links with Chinese-speaking groups, naming FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle. Both agree there is no confirmed attribution. The Bronze Sandcastle mention appears only in thehackernews.com.
- Intel_Log location: securelist.com gives C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log<GUID>, while thehackernews.com says an Intel_Log directory in AppData. The primary Kaspersky text (securelist.com) is the more specific.
- Keylogger file: thehackernews.com ties logs.dat to GitDoor's keylogging, while securelist.com attributes logs.dat to GraphDoor's keylogger and a log.lock marker to GitDoor's. Treat both artifacts as relevant to the campaign.
- Type 1 loader: thehackernews.com describes RC4 plus XOR, while securelist.com adds a custom Base64 step first. The securelist.com description is more detailed.
Linha do tempo
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Operation ShadowCloud: GitDoor and GraphDoor Backdoors Use GitHub, SharePoint and Ably for C2 Against Asian and African Governments
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Kaspersky reports an active campaign, Operation ShadowCloud, that has targeted government sectors in Asia and Africa since early 2026. It abuses the legitimate MeshAgent (MeshCentral) utility to drop two previously undocumented modular backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. The backdoors hide C2 traffic in GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint (via the Microsoft Graph API) and Ably. Attribution is unknown. Kaspersky sees overlap with the China-nexus Bronze Sandcastle cluster (Sophos naming) and tactical similarities with FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle (BlackTech), but says this does not prove a direct link. This record is based on the article alone; no web research was performed, so no vendor advisory or other primary source was checked.
Technical Details
- A MeshCentral Agent is the starting point. It is configured to contact the hard-coded C2 wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx and fetches three staged payloads: a legitimate binary for DLL sideloading (start.exe, pythonw.exe, zoomit.exe), a rogue loader DLL (jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll, libcef.dll) and an encrypted core payload.
- Loader Type 1 decodes the payload with RC4 plus an XOR mask. Type 2 uses XOR only. The decoded payload is injected into the current process's memory.
- The initial install method is unknown. Kaspersky suggests reuse of a prior infection already on the network. One Taiwanese organization is named as a target.
- GitDoor takes commands from the public GitHub repository LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo and uploads results to the private repository LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix. Repository creation dates suggest preparation since at least late 2024. It supports 26 commands, including shellcode and COFF loading. Through shellcode modules it can do the following: APC process injection, service, registry, task and user management, keylogging to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat, CookieKatz cookie theft from Chrome and Edge, Mimikatz LSASS dumping, screenshots, WhatsApp database key extraction and forced NTLM authentication.
- GraphDoor creates an "Intel_Log" directory in AppData and authenticates to login.microsoftonline.com with a malicious application. It then uses the Graph API to stage data on a SharePoint drive. Its plugins are kl.ts, pr.ts, scr.ts, moveDir.ts, channel.ts, abchannel.ts and ab2channel.ts (a SOCKS5 proxy over Ably). It adds cmd.exe and MZ executable execution to the shellcode commands.
- Traffic is proxied through a modified Erfrp client and Ably-based plugins. Both backdoors use control flow flattening and nested helper functions to hinder analysis.
Remediation
The article gives no remediation guidance. Defenders can hunt for unexpected MeshAgent installs, DLL sideloading with the listed binary and DLL names, the listed C2 IP and GitHub repositories, and anomalous Graph API or Ably usage.
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Operation ShadowCloud: MeshAgent abused to deploy GitDoor and GraphDoor cloud-C2 backdoors against Asian and African government targets
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Kaspersky's Securelist describes Operation ShadowCloud, an active intrusion campaign identified in early 2026. The actor abuses the legitimate MeshAgent (MeshCentral) utility to drop two new backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. Both hide C2 traffic in GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint and Ably cloud services. Victims were found in Asia and Africa, mainly in government, and the report cites a Taiwanese organization. Part 2 of the report points to links with Chinese-speaking threat groups. This summary is based on the article alone, because no web research was performed. No vendor advisory or CVE is involved.
Technical Details
- Entry point: the entry point is unknown. The evidence suggests reuse of an earlier infection already on the network. The MeshCentral Agent (MD5 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b) was hard-coded to reach wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx.
- Dropped files: through the agent, the actor drops a legitimate binary, a malicious loader DLL and an encrypted payload (config.ini).
- DLL sideloading: the loaders are jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll and libcef.dll. They are sideloaded by javaw.exe, Sandboxie start.exe, pythonw.exe and zoomit.exe, which the actor started as a Windows service.
- Loader decryption: the Type 1 loader decodes the payload with custom Base64, then RC4, then XOR. It also abuses the RtlEthernetAddressToStringA and RtlEthernetStringToAddressA APIs. The Type 2 loader uses XOR only. The loaders resolve APIs through CRC32 or FNV-1 hashing. They run anti-debugging checks and use native APIs for memory allocation and thread creation.
- Obfuscation: GitDoor and GraphDoor use control flow flattening and nested wrapper functions.
- GitDoor C2: GitDoor uses GitHub repositories LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo, for commands and plug-ins, and LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix, for results. It opens a GitHub issue per victim and uploads encrypted host data as main..js.map to GitHub and to Ably (rest.ably.io). Data is encrypted with AES-256-ECB and XOR.
- Plug-ins and commands: it downloads the plug-ins scr.ts (screen capture) and pr.ts (process enumeration), plus channel.ts and abchannel.ts proxies. Commands cover file management, keylogging, proxying, scload (COFF loading) and smload (PE or shellcode injection). Persistence for the keylogger is a %APPDATA%\log.lock marker file.
- Shellcode families: process injection (CreateRemoteThread, SetThreadContext, NtQueueApcThread, KernelCallbackTable), service and file management, Netstat, ARP, firewall rules, Procdump, upload to gofile.io, and a WinPTY reverse shell.
Remediation
The article text provided gives no remediation. Reasonable defender actions are to hunt for the listed hashes, the C2 IP and the GitHub accounts. Defenders should also review unexpected MeshAgent installs and sideloaded DLLs next to javaw.exe, zoomit.exe and similar binaries.
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Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor backdoor abuses Microsoft Graph/SharePoint and Ably for C2 against government networks, China-nexus overlaps
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Kaspersky's second report on Operation ShadowCloud covers the GraphDoor backdoor, the sibling of GitDoor. GraphDoor authenticates to login.microsoftonline.com as a malicious application. It then uses the Microsoft Graph API to exchange data and commands through a SharePoint site. The actors also load plug-ins: a keylogger, process listing, screenshot capture, directory move, and patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plug-ins. Kaspersky cannot attribute the activity definitively. It sees overlaps with Chinese-speaking groups FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle, which shared staging directories with GitDoor and deployed implants within one day of it. The campaign's title, as given in the article, describes cloud-based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. This summary is based on the article alone, because no web research was done.
Technical Details
- The backdoor opens a named pipe,
\\.\pipe\p<PID>, and createsC:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\<GUID>. - It resolves APIs by DJB2 hash and calls them through a vectored exception handler.
- It collects the OS version, a machine GUID, the current directory and the process list. It encrypts these with AES, Base64-encodes them, and uploads them to SharePoint as
main.<code>.js.map. - Plug-ins and commands are fetched from SharePoint lists (site buildersemp.sharepoint[.]com). Command files must have one of these extensions: .js, .swp, .tmp, .kmap, .pmap, .apmap.
- Two commands are new compared with GitDoor:
shell(runs cmd.exe /C) andadsmload(loads a payload encoded as MAC-address strings). - Plug-ins are a loader stub followed by a COFF object, with entry point
go. - The keylogger writes XOR-encrypted data to
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat. - The proxy plug-ins are Erfrp-based (frpc) and Ably-based, including a SOCKS5 proxy over Ably's Pusher-compatible WebSocket service.
- The C2 host is not hard-coded. It is delivered through the proxy plug-in or Ably.
- Cobalt Strike beacons were found on GraphDoor victims, using the domains twnic[.]top and ekmt[.]tw.
- The FamousSparrow overlap involved a renamed Avast executable side-loading wtsapi32.dll, with the RC4 key previously linked to FamousSparrow.
- The CopperTurtle overlap involved pdfset.exe injecting the PLEAD RAT.
Remediation
- Hunt for the listed IOCs.
- Monitor for unexpected Microsoft Graph, SharePoint and Ably traffic from endpoints.
- Treat unexpected MeshCentral Agent installations as suspicious.
- Look for the Intel_Log directory and the logs.dat keylogger file.
- The backdoor opens a named pipe,