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CyberStrikeAI used in 16-day AWS intrusion: 8 stolen identities, 56 EC2 userData scripts read in 141 ms

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 15/11/2026 23:00 · coletado há 5 horas

Between September 30 and October 16, 2026, an actor ran the open-source AI offensive framework CyberStrikeAI against four AWS accounts. It used eight stolen identities: five IAM service users and three EC2 instance roles. Elastic Security Labs reported the activity. The source IP 43.240.29.11 read 56 EC2 userData scripts in 141 ms. It then went dormant for 14 days, which defeated fixed correlation windows. Elastic has not linked the activity to a named group. It says the tool attribution is high confidence, but it cannot prove an LLM agent made the decisions. It also does not know how the credentials were obtained. This is reported as the first observed use of CyberStrikeAI against AWS. The facts come from a single news article, and no web research was done.

Detalhes técnicos

  • Phase 1 (Sep 30): GetCallerIdentity calls against four service accounts within 51 minutes.
  • Phase 2 (Sep 30): a compromised EC2 role used Secrets Manager GetSecretValue, then made 56 DescribeInstanceAttribute calls in 141 ms to pull userData.
  • Phase 3 (Oct 1-2): the actor revalidated keys and pivoted to a third EC2 role. That role decrypted an SSM SecureString parameter and issued SSM SendCommand within 29 seconds.
  • Phase 4 (Oct 16): the actor returned, revalidated credentials and accessed a fourth account for the first time.
  • The instance role session names were EC2 instance IDs. Elastic concluded the credentials were stolen from running VMs, likely via SSRF or host compromise.
  • The actor triggered 78 alerts across six rules, all low or medium severity, and 65 of them fired on day one. The alerts only made sense once correlated by source IP.
  • FOFA data from Sep 29 showed 43.240.29.11 serving the default CyberStrikeAI panel on port 8080 in AS133199 (SonderCloud, Hong Kong).
  • Neighbouring IPs 43.240.29.28 and 43.240.29.33 presented the same self-signed certificate, serial 3356730520974368630.

Remediação

  • Contain the identities: deactivate access keys with iam:UpdateAccessKey, revoke temporary tokens with an aws:TokenIssueTime deny policy, and quarantine the user. Elastic demonstrated this as a Lambda workflow.
  • Replace compromised EC2 instances rather than only rotating keys.
  • Move secrets out of userData into Secrets Manager.
  • Restrict ec2:DescribeInstanceAttribute with IAM or SCPs.
  • Hunt in CloudTrail for more than 20 userData reads in 10 minutes, multi-account GetCallerIdentity calls from one external IP, and the three IPs above.

Linha do tempo

  1. securityonline.info ↗ · pub. 15/11/2026 23:00 · coletado 16/11 00:00 primeiro registro

    CyberStrikeAI used in 16-day AWS intrusion: 8 stolen identities, 56 EC2 userData scripts read in 141 ms

    ler a análise desta fonte

    Between September 30 and October 16, 2026, an actor ran the open-source AI offensive framework CyberStrikeAI against four AWS accounts. It used eight stolen identities: five IAM service users and three EC2 instance roles. Elastic Security Labs reported the activity. The source IP 43.240.29.11 read 56 EC2 userData scripts in 141 ms. It then went dormant for 14 days, which defeated fixed correlation windows. Elastic has not linked the activity to a named group. It says the tool attribution is high confidence, but it cannot prove an LLM agent made the decisions. It also does not know how the credentials were obtained. This is reported as the first observed use of CyberStrikeAI against AWS. The facts come from a single news article, and no web research was done.

    Technical Details

    • Phase 1 (Sep 30): GetCallerIdentity calls against four service accounts within 51 minutes.
    • Phase 2 (Sep 30): a compromised EC2 role used Secrets Manager GetSecretValue, then made 56 DescribeInstanceAttribute calls in 141 ms to pull userData.
    • Phase 3 (Oct 1-2): the actor revalidated keys and pivoted to a third EC2 role. That role decrypted an SSM SecureString parameter and issued SSM SendCommand within 29 seconds.
    • Phase 4 (Oct 16): the actor returned, revalidated credentials and accessed a fourth account for the first time.
    • The instance role session names were EC2 instance IDs. Elastic concluded the credentials were stolen from running VMs, likely via SSRF or host compromise.
    • The actor triggered 78 alerts across six rules, all low or medium severity, and 65 of them fired on day one. The alerts only made sense once correlated by source IP.
    • FOFA data from Sep 29 showed 43.240.29.11 serving the default CyberStrikeAI panel on port 8080 in AS133199 (SonderCloud, Hong Kong).
    • Neighbouring IPs 43.240.29.28 and 43.240.29.33 presented the same self-signed certificate, serial 3356730520974368630.

    Remediation

    • Contain the identities: deactivate access keys with iam:UpdateAccessKey, revoke temporary tokens with an aws:TokenIssueTime deny policy, and quarantine the user. Elastic demonstrated this as a Lambda workflow.
    • Replace compromised EC2 instances rather than only rotating keys.
    • Move secrets out of userData into Secrets Manager.
    • Restrict ec2:DescribeInstanceAttribute with IAM or SCPs.
    • Hunt in CloudTrail for more than 20 userData reads in 10 minutes, multi-account GetCallerIdentity calls from one external IP, and the three IPs above.