SANSAR (REF3364): Linux GPU cryptomining campaign uses exposed Ray job agents, kernel rootkit, NVML spoofing and Ethereum-based C2
Matéria consolidada. Reúne 6 matérias que o Tifon tinha publicado separadamente sobre a mesma história. A IA reescreveu o relatório com o que as 4 fontes trouxeram em 17/11/2026 12:01; os links antigos trazem para cá.
Fontes: securityonline.info ↗ thehackernews.com ↗ gbhackers.com ↗ elastic.co ↗
Elastic Security Labs (elastic.co, 12 Nov 2026) analyzed SANSAR, a Linux cryptomining toolkit that manages CPU and GPU miners through a Rust-based orchestrator and Tor. GBHackers (gbhackers.com, 13 Nov 2026) describes the ongoing campaign as REF3364. The Hacker News (thehackernews.com, 16 Nov 2026), citing Elastic, calls REF3364 a financially motivated cluster observed in late October 2026. SecurityOnline (securityonline.info, 17 Nov 2026) adds that three Linux GPU hosts were compromised between 22 and 25 October 2026. The attackers gained root on Linux GPU hosts, many used for AI workloads, by abusing an exposed Ray job agent that accepted unauthenticated job submissions. The toolkit hides itself with a kernel rootkit (acpi_thermal_mgr) and a wrapper around NVIDIA's Management Library (NVML) that falsifies GPU telemetry. A backdoor named netns looks up its C2 address in an Ethereum smart contract. The sources warn that GPU telemetry alone can't be trusted to verify host hygiene, because kernel-level and user-space indicators are compromised at the same time. Attribution is unconfirmed: Turkish-language comments were found in the rootkit source (thehackernews.com), and Turkish-language artifacts suggest a Turkish-speaking developer or operator (securityonline.info). None of the sources mentions a CVE; the entry point is an exposed, unauthenticated service.
Detalhes técnicos
- Initial access (T1190): The Ray job agent was reachable externally even though the dashboard listened only on loopback (gbhackers.com). Elastic's cluster covers three compromised GPU hosts, with activity between 22 and 25 October 2026 (securityonline.info). The attacker probed the agent on 22 Oct, ran nvidia-smi on 24 Oct, and used a Python reverse shell and an authorized_keys SSH key on 25 Oct (securityonline.info). The attackers ran commands such as nvidia-smi to probe the host and collect the GPU inventory, and opened a Python reverse shell (thehackernews.com). They then escalated to root (gbhackers.com) and planted SSH keys for persistence (elastic.co); the key was added to authorized_keys (thehackernews.com).
- Staging: SANSAR components are deployed under /opt/vadi_ (elastic.co, gbhackers.com, thehackernews.com, securityonline.info).
- Rootkit: The ftrace/function-tracer-based kernel module acpi_thermal_mgr (acpi_thermal_mgr.ko) hides mining processes, files and network sockets by intercepting system calls (elastic.co, gbhackers.com, thehackernews.com). The ftrace hooks cover getdents64, openat and kill (securityonline.info). It is built and installed via DKMS, which makes it persistent (gbhackers.com, thehackernews.com); the source is placed in /usr/src/acpi_thermal_mgr-1.0/ (securityonline.info). An initramfs loader also reloads the rootkit at boot (thehackernews.com, securityonline.info).
- NVML wrapper: libnvidia-ml.so.1 is replaced with a wrapper that intercepts NVML calls. It reports zero GPU utilization while randomizing temperature and power values (gbhackers.com, elastic.co, securityonline.info). The random values are 36–46 °C for temperature and 100–200 W for power (thehackernews.com). The original library is kept as a hidden backup, /usr/lib/.libnvidia-ml.so.1.backup (securityonline.info).
- Miners: The CPU miner is XMRig (6.25.0 per thehackernews.com and securityonline.info) renamed kurt. The GPU miner is SRBMiner-MULTI (3.6.9 per elastic.co, thehackernews.com and securityonline.info) renamed tilki (gbhackers.com, elastic.co, securityonline.info).
- SANSAR orchestrator: The Rust orchestrator (client version 0.1.3 per securityonline.info) checks TracerPid to detect debugging (thehackernews.com; elastic.co also reports anti-debugging). It decodes an onion address, communicates with the Tor onion service through Arti and launches the miners (thehackernews.com, securityonline.info). The lyrebird Tor proxy is also delivered (thehackernews.com); securityonline.info names Lyrebird 0.8.1 with WebTunnel and obfs4 bridges as an option.
- C2 over Tor: SANSAR supports miner start/stop/configuration, interactive shell sessions and direct TCP traffic tasks (elastic.co). It supports 16 message types, including miner control, Bash pseudo-terminals and TCP SYN flood tasks (securityonline.info). The traffic task is a TCP SYN traffic task (thehackernews.com).
- netns backdoor: It is registered as a systemd service (thehackernews.com, securityonline.info). It calls Ethereum JSON-RPC eth_call to read an encoded IPv4 C2 address from a smart contract. It then connects directly over TCP and receives reverse shell commands without authentication (elastic.co, gbhackers.com). The connection uses TCP port 8080 (thehackernews.com). SecurityOnline says it listens on TCP 8080 for SHELL commands that spawn reverse shells (securityonline.info). The contract address is 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349 (elastic.co, thehackernews.com).
Remediação
- Restrict access to management APIs such as the Ray job agent, enforce authentication, and limit exposure of public-facing services (elastic.co). Restrict who can submit jobs to Ray (thehackernews.com). Never expose Ray job agents or dashboards to the internet without authentication and network controls (securityonline.info).
- Correlate several indicators rather than relying on GPU telemetry: Ray job submissions, unexpected SSH keys, modified NVIDIA libraries, DKMS and boot image artifacts, and unusual active services (gbhackers.com). Check whether GPU monitoring libraries have been tampered with (thehackernews.com). Verify the integrity of libnvidia-ml.so.1 (securityonline.info).
- Hunt for /opt/vadi_, /usr/src/acpi_thermal_mgr-1.0/, unexpected initramfs entries and /usr/lib/.libnvidia-ml.so.1.backup (securityonline.info).
- Add out-of-band monitoring and integrity checks for critical libraries and kernel modules (gbhackers.com). Watch for kernel module anomalies and GPU telemetry inconsistencies (elastic.co).
- Monitor for Tor traffic (including Tor bridge connections), Ethereum smart-contract queries (including public Ethereum RPC calls) and suspicious direct TCP connections (elastic.co, gbhackers.com, securityonline.info).
- Use Elastic Security's YARA rules for SANSAR and netns (elastic.co).
Relatos divergentes
The sources do not contradict each other on the core facts, but they differ on some details. Tor transport: Elastic (elastic.co, earlier) says Tor can run in direct or bridge mode using the Lyrebird pluggable transport. GBHackers (gbhackers.com) says SANSAR uses the Arti Rust implementation of Tor with obfs4 and WebTunnel transports. The Hacker News (thehackernews.com) says the orchestrator talks to the onion service through Arti and that the lyrebird proxy is delivered alongside it. SecurityOnline (securityonline.info, most recent) says Arti is used, optionally via Lyrebird 0.8.1 with WebTunnel and obfs4 bridges, which supports reading the descriptions as complementary. netns direction: Elastic and GBHackers (elastic.co, gbhackers.com) say the backdoor connects out to the C2 IP retrieved from the contract, whereas SecurityOnline (securityonline.info, most recent) says it listens on TCP 8080 for SHELL commands; the sources do not settle which is accurate, and the Elastic Security Labs analysis remains the primary technical source. Attribution: the Turkish-language indicators are described as comments in the rootkit source (thehackernews.com) and as artifacts suggesting a Turkish-speaking developer or operator (securityonline.info); neither source confirms attribution.
Linha do tempo
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REF3364 deploys SANSAR Linux malware on AI GPU servers via unauthenticated Ray job agent, with Tor C2 and NVML spoofing
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Elastic Security Labs tracks an intrusion cluster, REF3364, that compromised three Linux GPU hosts through an internet-exposed, unauthenticated Ray job agent. Between October 22 and 25, 2026, the attacker ran jobs through Ray, including a reverse shell, added an SSH key and escalated to root. The attacker then deployed the SANSAR toolkit to mine cryptocurrency with XMRig and SRBMiner-MULTI. The toolkit hides the miners with a kernel rootkit and a spoofed NVML library that reports 0% GPU utilization. Attribution is unconfirmed: Turkish-language artifacts suggest a Turkish-speaking developer or operator. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was done.
Technical Details
- Initial access: the Ray job agent accepted job submissions without authentication. The attacker probed it on Oct 22, ran nvidia-smi on Oct 24, and used a Python reverse shell and an authorized_keys SSH key on Oct 25.
- Components are staged in /opt/vadi_. XMRig 6.25.0 is named kurt, and SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9 is named tilki.
- A modified libnvidia-ml.so.1 wrapper reports 0% GPU use and random temperature and power values. The original library is kept as a hidden backup.
- The kernel module acpi_thermal_mgr.ko is installed via DKMS with an initramfs loader for persistence. It uses ftrace hooks on getdents64, openat and kill to hide processes, files and sockets.
- sansar is a Rust client (v0.1.3) with anti-debug checks. It decodes an onion address and reaches Tor through the Arti library, optionally via Lyrebird 0.8.1 with WebTunnel and obfs4 bridges. It supports 16 message types: miner control, Bash pseudo-terminals and TCP SYN flood tasks.
- The netns systemd backdoor retrieves a controller IP from an Ethereum smart contract through eth_call. It then listens on TCP 8080 for SHELL commands that spawn reverse shells.
Remediation
- Never expose Ray job agents or dashboards to the internet without authentication and network controls.
- Hunt for /opt/vadi_, /usr/src/acpi_thermal_mgr-1.0/, unexpected initramfs entries and /usr/lib/.libnvidia-ml.so.1.backup.
- Verify the integrity of libnvidia-ml.so.1.
- Monitor GPU nodes for Tor bridge connections and public Ethereum RPC calls.
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REF3364 deploys SANSAR Linux cryptominer with rootkit and NVML wrapper hiding GPU activity via exposed Ray job agents
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A financially motivated cluster tracked as REF3364 was observed in late October 2026 running a Linux cryptomining operation built on the SANSAR toolkit, according to Elastic Security Labs. Initial access came through an exposed Ray job agent that allowed command execution. The actor then installed a kernel rootkit, a modified NVML wrapper that falsifies GPU readings, and the netns backdoor. Attribution is unknown, but Turkish-language comments were found in the rootkit source. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was run.
Technical Details
- Access: Jobs on the exposed Ray agent ran nvidia-smi to collect the GPU inventory. A Python reverse shell job followed, and an SSH key was added to authorized_keys for persistence.
- Install: After obtaining root, the actor staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module through DKMS and added an initramfs loader so the rootkit reloads at boot.
- NVML wrapper: It hooks NVML calls so that GPU utilization reads 0%. Temperature is replaced with random values of 36–46 °C and power with random values of 100–200 W.
- SANSAR: This Rust orchestrator checks TracerPid to detect debugging. It communicates with a TOR onion service through Arti and launches the miners. The CPU branch runs kurt (XMRig 6.25.0) and the GPU branch runs tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9). It can also spawn shells and launch a TCP SYN traffic task. The lyrebird TOR proxy is also delivered.
- Rootkit: It uses ftrace to hide processes, files and sockets by intercepting system calls.
- netns: This systemd-registered backdoor reads the controller IP from an Ethereum smart contract (0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349). It then opens a reverse shell over TCP port 8080.
Remediation
Elastic advises restricting who can submit jobs to Ray and checking whether GPU monitoring libraries have been tampered with.
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Advanced Linux Cryptomining Campaign Uses NVIDIA GPU Telemetry Manipulation and Kernel Rootkit for Stealth
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An ongoing Linux cryptomining campaign, tracked as REF3364, leverages a sophisticated toolkit that manipulates NVIDIA GPU monitoring to conceal mining activities across compromised GPU hosts. Attackers exploited an exposed Ray job agent API, which accepted unauthenticated submissions, to deploy malicious workloads. The intrusion chain includes privilege escalation to root, installation of a Rust-based orchestrator named SANSAR, and deployment of a kernel rootkit (acpi_thermal_mgr.ko) to hide mining processes, files, and sockets. The operation subverts NVIDIA's Management Library by replacing libnvidia-ml.so.1 with a wrapper that filters telemetry data, reporting zero GPU utilization while randomizing temperature and power metrics. Communication with the operators is maintained through encrypted Tor channels and Ethereum smart-contracts for controller discovery, complicating detection and remediation. This campaign highlights the risk of relying solely on GPU telemetry for host hygiene verification, as both kernel and user-space indicators are compromised concurrently.
Technical Details
The initial access vector was unauthenticated job submissions via the Ray distributed computing framework's job agent, which was reachable externally despite the dashboard listening only on loopback. The attackers executed commands (e.g., nvidia-smi) to probe the environment and established a Python reverse shell before escalating privileges and planting their toolkit under /opt/vadi_. The focal evasion technique is the replacement of libnvidia-ml.so.1 with a wrapper intercepting NVIDIA Management Library calls, effectively hiding GPU mining activity from tools relying on NVML. The ftrace-based rootkit installed via DKMS (acpi_thermal_mgr.ko) ensures persistent hiding of processes and kernel artifacts. SANSAR orchestrates CPU (XMRig renamed kurt) and GPU (SRBMiner-MULTI renamed tilki) miners, communicating over the Tor network utilizing the Arti Rust implementation with multiple pluggable transports (obfs4, WebTunnel). A backdoor named netns uses Ethereum smart-contract calls to retrieve the controller's IPv4 address, then initiates direct TCP connections for command-and-control.
Remediation
Detection efforts must include correlation of multiple indicators such as Ray job submissions, unexpected SSH keys, modifications to NVIDIA libraries, DKMS and boot image artifacts, and unusual active services. Reliance on GPU telemetry alone is insufficient given the manipulation of core monitoring components. Establishing out-of-band monitoring and integrity checks for critical libraries and kernel modules is essential for identifying such sophisticated concealment. Network monitoring should focus on Tor traffic and suspicious TCP connections possibly involving blockchain-based controller discovery.
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SANSAR Linux cryptomining toolkit uses kernel rootkit, Tor C2, and Ethereum-based backdoor
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Elastic Security Labs analyzed the SANSAR Linux cryptomining malware, a sophisticated toolkit managing CPU and GPU miners via Tor with a Rust-based orchestrator. The attacker exploited an exposed Ray job agent without authentication to gain root access on Linux GPU hosts. The malware includes a kernel rootkit to hide processes/files, an NVML wrapper to falsify GPU telemetry, and a backdoor named netns that retrieves its command-and-control (C2) address from an Ethereum smart contract. SANSAR communicates over Tor, supporting interactive shell access and miner management. The use of Ethereum for C2 discovery exemplifies novel threat actor techniques complicating detection. GPU infrastructure used for AI workloads may be vulnerable to such cryptojacking, impacting operational costs and capacity.
Technical Details
The intrusion began with exploiting an exposed Ray job agent API (MITRE T1190), allowing command execution without authentication. The attacker established persistence by planting SSH keys and deploying SANSAR components under /opt/vadi_. The kernel rootkit module acpi_thermal_mgr hides mining-related processes and network sockets using function tracer hooks. The NVML wrapper intercepts GPU monitoring calls, returning falsified utilization and temperature to evade detection. The netns backdoor uses Ethereum JSON-RPC eth_call to fetch an encoded IPv4 C2 address from a smart contract, connecting directly over TCP to receive reverse shell commands without authentication.
SANSAR's Tor-based C2 channel supports miners start/stop/configuration, shell sessions, and direct TCP traffic tasks. The miner binaries include an SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9 GPU miner (tilki) clone. Tor connection can run in direct or bridge mode using Lyrebird pluggable transport to evade network filters. Anti-debugging techniques are implemented. The Ethereum contract address is 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349.
Remediation
Organizations running GPU clusters, especially for AI, should restrict access to management APIs like Ray job agents, enforce authentication, monitor for kernel module anomalies and GPU telemetry inconsistencies. Detection can leverage Elastic Security's YARA rules for SANSAR and netns. Network monitoring for Tor traffic and Ethereum smart contract queries may aid detection. Regular patching and limiting exposure of public-facing services are critical.