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Retadup USB worm revived via re-registered C2 domains to spread new CoffeeLoader variant with OpenGL-based Armoury packer

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 16/11/2026 04:00 · coletado há 23 minutos

Kaspersky (Securelist) reports that in August 2026 it detected a new CoffeeLoader variant spread by the Retadup USB worm. Retadup was dismantled by French law enforcement in 2019, when more than 850,000 machines were disinfected. Since 2024, someone has re-registered its old C2 domains and used them to push third-party malware. The domains first served SmokeLoader packed with Armoury, and from early 2025 they served CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems in the first three quarters of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. The scale is much smaller than the original botnet. The article does not say who is behind the revival. Operational risk is moderate and mostly concerns removable-media hygiene and loader detection. The article names no CVEs.

Detalhes técnicos

  • An NSIS installer drops a patched 7-Zip 7z.dll and runs it with rundll32.exe. The DLL holds self-decrypting shellcode, which is a new Armoury packer version that decrypts with the GPU through OpenGL (the old version used OpenCL).
  • A new intermediate shellcode, the CoffeeLoader downloader, combines the dropper and stager functions with a downloader.
  • Persistence: 7z.dll is copied to subfolders of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, and a Run registry key is added. The folder, library and value names are eight hex digits derived from system volume information. A registry key is also created to block disabling autorun through Task Manager.
  • The downloader injects into dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe. It fetches the payload over HTTPS from /payload?md5=, where the md5 value is zeros on the first request and the hash of the previous payload afterwards.
  • The payload is XOR-encrypted, with the first 16 bytes as the key. The X-Signature header is checked against an embedded public key, and X-Content-MD5 is checked against the decrypted body. Signature verification replaces C2 certificate validation.
  • The main body is largely unchanged. It has new C2 request and response keys (A21251838432306F2CD2540593656B9E and 2026F751079659CF71C7BA64B345C12A). The protocol magic value changed from 0xC0FFEE42 to 0xD1D57871. The same three payload execution commands remain: process injection, run as an EXE, or run as a DLL via rundll32.
  • Retadup is written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey. It copies itself to USB and external drives as hidden files and LNK shortcuts. Its C2 protocol is plaintext commands encoded in Base64 and then hex, so it is easy to impersonate. A 2017 variant still talks to its C2 in 2026.

Remediação

The article gives no remediation guidance. Defenders can block the listed C2 domains and hosting URLs and hunt for the listed hashes. They can also look for the 7z.dll rundll32 execution and the Run key persistence described above.

Linha do tempo

  1. securelist.com ↗ · pub. 16/11/2026 04:00 · coletado 16/11 05:02 primeiro registro

    Retadup USB worm revived via re-registered C2 domains to spread new CoffeeLoader variant with OpenGL-based Armoury packer

    ler a análise desta fonte

    Kaspersky (Securelist) reports that in August 2026 it detected a new CoffeeLoader variant spread by the Retadup USB worm. Retadup was dismantled by French law enforcement in 2019, when more than 850,000 machines were disinfected. Since 2024, someone has re-registered its old C2 domains and used them to push third-party malware. The domains first served SmokeLoader packed with Armoury, and from early 2025 they served CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems in the first three quarters of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. The scale is much smaller than the original botnet. The article does not say who is behind the revival. Operational risk is moderate and mostly concerns removable-media hygiene and loader detection. The article names no CVEs.

    Technical Details

    • An NSIS installer drops a patched 7-Zip 7z.dll and runs it with rundll32.exe. The DLL holds self-decrypting shellcode, which is a new Armoury packer version that decrypts with the GPU through OpenGL (the old version used OpenCL).
    • A new intermediate shellcode, the CoffeeLoader downloader, combines the dropper and stager functions with a downloader.
    • Persistence: 7z.dll is copied to subfolders of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, and a Run registry key is added. The folder, library and value names are eight hex digits derived from system volume information. A registry key is also created to block disabling autorun through Task Manager.
    • The downloader injects into dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe. It fetches the payload over HTTPS from /payload?md5=, where the md5 value is zeros on the first request and the hash of the previous payload afterwards.
    • The payload is XOR-encrypted, with the first 16 bytes as the key. The X-Signature header is checked against an embedded public key, and X-Content-MD5 is checked against the decrypted body. Signature verification replaces C2 certificate validation.
    • The main body is largely unchanged. It has new C2 request and response keys (A21251838432306F2CD2540593656B9E and 2026F751079659CF71C7BA64B345C12A). The protocol magic value changed from 0xC0FFEE42 to 0xD1D57871. The same three payload execution commands remain: process injection, run as an EXE, or run as a DLL via rundll32.
    • Retadup is written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey. It copies itself to USB and external drives as hidden files and LNK shortcuts. Its C2 protocol is plaintext commands encoded in Base64 and then hex, so it is easy to impersonate. A 2017 variant still talks to its C2 in 2026.

    Remediation

    The article gives no remediation guidance. Defenders can block the listed C2 domains and hosting URLs and hunt for the listed hashes. They can also look for the 7z.dll rundll32 execution and the Run key persistence described above.