Shipment-themed ZIP uses Kingsoft DLL side-loading and XOR-encoded Python to deliver PureLogs/PureRAT-linked payload
A shipment-themed ZIP archive (Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.zip) delivers a multistage chain that uses DLL side-loading, disguised utilities and XOR-encoded Python code. Unit 42 observed the activity on October 21, 2026. Its research notes are dated November 16 and credited to Shazan Khaja and Muhammet Algan. The final payload contacts infrastructure that Unit 42 associates with PureLogs and PureRAT campaigns. That association does not prove that both families ran. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was performed.
Detalhes técnicos
- A legitimate, signed 32-bit Kingsoft PDF executable (originally wpspdf.exe) is renamed Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.exe. It side-loads the malicious krpt.dll from its own directory.
- The DLL spawns a 32-bit cmd.exe that opens a decoy document.pdf while the background activity runs.
- A signed WinRAR command-line executable is disguised as a .png file (QK_참외_냉장고재고현황_2019.png). It extracts the password-protected archive OP_2023년_치킨뼈분석표_그냥요.dat into C:\Users\Public.
- The extracted package holds a Python runtime in a MicrosoftEdgeUpdate subfolder. The interpreter is renamed MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe to impersonate Microsoft's updater.
- A python -c command reads QK_2021년_치킨배달대기시간_됩니까.pdf as raw bytes. It XOR-decodes them with a repeating 20-byte key and passes the result to exec().
- The second-stage script is obfuscated. It holds a Base64 blob that, after repeating-key XOR, yields a Windows PE payload.
- The payload contacts tea.vexexo[.]com, which resolves to 185.139.214[.]102, over TLS on port 443.
- The Korean filenames are hunting context only. They do not establish attacker nationality or targeting.
Remediação
- Detect the combined behavior rather than any single filename or signature. The sequence is a signed executable running from Downloads, loading an adjacent krpt.dll, spawning cmd.exe, and unpacking Python into a public directory.
- Hunt for MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe running from C:\Users\Public.
- Hunt for a .png utility that accepts archive-password arguments.
- Hunt for Python decoding a supposed PDF before calling exec().
- Block the domain and IP listed above.
Linha do tempo
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Shipment-themed ZIP uses Kingsoft DLL side-loading and XOR-encoded Python to deliver PureLogs/PureRAT-linked payload
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
A shipment-themed ZIP archive (Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.zip) delivers a multistage chain that uses DLL side-loading, disguised utilities and XOR-encoded Python code. Unit 42 observed the activity on October 21, 2026. Its research notes are dated November 16 and credited to Shazan Khaja and Muhammet Algan. The final payload contacts infrastructure that Unit 42 associates with PureLogs and PureRAT campaigns. That association does not prove that both families ran. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was performed.
Technical Details
- A legitimate, signed 32-bit Kingsoft PDF executable (originally wpspdf.exe) is renamed Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.exe. It side-loads the malicious krpt.dll from its own directory.
- The DLL spawns a 32-bit cmd.exe that opens a decoy document.pdf while the background activity runs.
- A signed WinRAR command-line executable is disguised as a .png file (QK_참외_냉장고재고현황_2019.png). It extracts the password-protected archive OP_2023년_치킨뼈분석표_그냥요.dat into C:\Users\Public.
- The extracted package holds a Python runtime in a MicrosoftEdgeUpdate subfolder. The interpreter is renamed MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe to impersonate Microsoft's updater.
- A python -c command reads QK_2021년_치킨배달대기시간_됩니까.pdf as raw bytes. It XOR-decodes them with a repeating 20-byte key and passes the result to exec().
- The second-stage script is obfuscated. It holds a Base64 blob that, after repeating-key XOR, yields a Windows PE payload.
- The payload contacts tea.vexexo[.]com, which resolves to 185.139.214[.]102, over TLS on port 443.
- The Korean filenames are hunting context only. They do not establish attacker nationality or targeting.
Remediation
- Detect the combined behavior rather than any single filename or signature. The sequence is a signed executable running from Downloads, loading an adjacent krpt.dll, spawning cmd.exe, and unpacking Python into a public directory.
- Hunt for MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe running from C:\Users\Public.
- Hunt for a .png utility that accepts archive-password arguments.
- Hunt for Python decoding a supposed PDF before calling exec().
- Block the domain and IP listed above.