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Malicious Baileys and libsignal-node npm forks force WhatsApp Channel follows from installers' accounts

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 09/08/2026 21:00 · coletado há 1 dia

SafeDep reports a growing npm campaign in which forks of Baileys, the WhatsApp Web library for Node.js, abuse the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to silently follow attacker-controlled channels. Confirmed malicious packages total 82 Baileys-based package names (375 versions) and 15 libsignal-node impersonators (38 versions), out of 4,250 Baileys-named and 112 libsignal-node-named packages monitored. The activity is non-consensual social abuse and advertising, not credential theft. Evidence points to independent operators reusing the same forced-follow technique, with only one overlapping channel between mamz-baileys and the removed diezyyasha-baileys. The confirmed count is a lower bound and the campaign continues to grow.

Technical Details

  • @neykoor/baileys follows a hardcoded newsletter (120363401404146384@newsletter) on every connection.update open event, using a fire-and-forget WMex query and an empty catch to hide errors.
  • lupy4u fetches a follow list from a public GitHub file (LevviCodeID/Levi4than, levvleys.json), follows each channel, then mutes it to hide the subscription. The operator can change targets without republishing.
  • mamz-baileys follows a fixed channel and injects an advertising URL (hxxps://fiora[.]nixel[.]my[.]id/), built via String.fromCharCode to evade text search, as sourceUrl into every image and video sent.
  • @cikikomo/baileys forges forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo channel attribution on outgoing messages and sets noSelfSync: true so the sent message is not synced to the victim's own devices.
  • @prototypevip/baileys hides a base64-obfuscated authorisation gate in lib/Store/prototype-store.js; if the key does not match the author's (gintoki), it sends a message from the victim's account and throws a "Blocked" error to halt message handling.
  • Publishers: prototype1006, cikikomo, neykoor, mamzhandsome, lupy4u, diezyyasha. Operator site: levvicode[.]cloud. npm removed @diezyyasha/libsignal-node before analysis.

Remediation

  • Audit dependencies for Baileys forks and libsignal-node look-alikes; treat packages outside the confirmed list as unverified, not safe.
  • Prefer the upstream Baileys library and verified publishers.
  • Review WhatsApp accounts used by bots for unexpected channel follows or sent messages, and block the listed publishers, URLs and newsletter IDs.

Linha do tempo

  1. safedep.io ↗ · pub. 09/08/2026 21:00 · coletado 19/10 18:03 primeiro registro

    Malicious Baileys and libsignal-node npm forks force WhatsApp Channel follows from installers' accounts

    ler a análise desta fonte

    SafeDep reports a growing npm campaign in which forks of Baileys, the WhatsApp Web library for Node.js, abuse the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to silently follow attacker-controlled channels. Confirmed malicious packages total 82 Baileys-based package names (375 versions) and 15 libsignal-node impersonators (38 versions), out of 4,250 Baileys-named and 112 libsignal-node-named packages monitored. The activity is non-consensual social abuse and advertising, not credential theft. Evidence points to independent operators reusing the same forced-follow technique, with only one overlapping channel between mamz-baileys and the removed diezyyasha-baileys. The confirmed count is a lower bound and the campaign continues to grow.

    Technical Details

    • @neykoor/baileys follows a hardcoded newsletter (120363401404146384@newsletter) on every connection.update open event, using a fire-and-forget WMex query and an empty catch to hide errors.
    • lupy4u fetches a follow list from a public GitHub file (LevviCodeID/Levi4than, levvleys.json), follows each channel, then mutes it to hide the subscription. The operator can change targets without republishing.
    • mamz-baileys follows a fixed channel and injects an advertising URL (hxxps://fiora[.]nixel[.]my[.]id/), built via String.fromCharCode to evade text search, as sourceUrl into every image and video sent.
    • @cikikomo/baileys forges forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo channel attribution on outgoing messages and sets noSelfSync: true so the sent message is not synced to the victim's own devices.
    • @prototypevip/baileys hides a base64-obfuscated authorisation gate in lib/Store/prototype-store.js; if the key does not match the author's (gintoki), it sends a message from the victim's account and throws a "Blocked" error to halt message handling.
    • Publishers: prototype1006, cikikomo, neykoor, mamzhandsome, lupy4u, diezyyasha. Operator site: levvicode[.]cloud. npm removed @diezyyasha/libsignal-node before analysis.

    Remediation

    • Audit dependencies for Baileys forks and libsignal-node look-alikes; treat packages outside the confirmed list as unverified, not safe.
    • Prefer the upstream Baileys library and verified publishers.
    • Review WhatsApp accounts used by bots for unexpected channel follows or sent messages, and block the listed publishers, URLs and newsletter IDs.