SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA compromise mobile operators to intercept calls and SMS; GTPDoor v3 hides in GTP-U
Telecom security firm Enea published research on two threat actors inside mobile networks: LIMINAL PANDA, previously known, and SilentAir, newly identified and active in operators since before 2025. Enea suspects a China nexus for both but with low confidence for SilentAir, and a link between the two is possible but unconfirmed. Enea's GTP firewall blocked several hundred covert GTPDoor sessions from Q1 2026. Enea sees or suspects 5 to 10 infected operators and believes there may be several dozen worldwide, mostly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. SilentAir runs SS7 and Diameter attacks from compromised nodes in at least six Asian countries. Its main target is Taiwan, including political figures and government officials. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was done.
Detalhes técnicos
- GTPDoor is Unix-based malware that receives hidden commands over GTP-C. The sessions carried commands to start and stop tunnels, move laterally, launch SSH, check the malware's health, and delete files and alter timestamps. Half the tunnels lasted under 21 minutes, and a few lasted over 24 hours.
- GTPDoor v3 hides in GTP-U, which is also used in 5G. It keeps the same XOR key and uses libpcap, so it is less visible to netstat and lsof.
- SilentAir interception moves the target's registered location to a node the attacker controls. Interception makes up 18.30% of its activity, against 2.07% for typical surveillance vendors. Enea saw 2FA codes arrive right after interception, which suggests the goal is account takeover.
- Silent SMS, mostly sent to Taiwanese subscribers around midnight, probably tests whether interception still works.
- The China-nexus judgment rests on state-level behavior, the Taiwan focus, no targeting of Chinese networks and a UTC+8 working pattern.
- The SCTPE trojan is tied to LIMINAL PANDA. SilentAir answers transactions that SCTPE cannot handle.
Remediação
- Deploy GTP-C and GTP-U firewalls that share information with SS7 and Diameter security tools.
- Monitor internal network traffic, where tools such as SIGTRANslator and Cordscan can go unnoticed.
- Treat the IPX interface as untrusted.
- Integrate telecom security with regular IT security.
- Enea says it helped customers remove LIMINAL PANDA activity and warned operators infected by SilentAir. It says both groups have been stopped for now.
Linha do tempo
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SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA compromise mobile operators to intercept calls and SMS; GTPDoor v3 hides in GTP-U
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Telecom security firm Enea published research on two threat actors inside mobile networks: LIMINAL PANDA, previously known, and SilentAir, newly identified and active in operators since before 2025. Enea suspects a China nexus for both but with low confidence for SilentAir, and a link between the two is possible but unconfirmed. Enea's GTP firewall blocked several hundred covert GTPDoor sessions from Q1 2026. Enea sees or suspects 5 to 10 infected operators and believes there may be several dozen worldwide, mostly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. SilentAir runs SS7 and Diameter attacks from compromised nodes in at least six Asian countries. Its main target is Taiwan, including political figures and government officials. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was done.
Technical Details
- GTPDoor is Unix-based malware that receives hidden commands over GTP-C. The sessions carried commands to start and stop tunnels, move laterally, launch SSH, check the malware's health, and delete files and alter timestamps. Half the tunnels lasted under 21 minutes, and a few lasted over 24 hours.
- GTPDoor v3 hides in GTP-U, which is also used in 5G. It keeps the same XOR key and uses libpcap, so it is less visible to netstat and lsof.
- SilentAir interception moves the target's registered location to a node the attacker controls. Interception makes up 18.30% of its activity, against 2.07% for typical surveillance vendors. Enea saw 2FA codes arrive right after interception, which suggests the goal is account takeover.
- Silent SMS, mostly sent to Taiwanese subscribers around midnight, probably tests whether interception still works.
- The China-nexus judgment rests on state-level behavior, the Taiwan focus, no targeting of Chinese networks and a UTC+8 working pattern.
- The SCTPE trojan is tied to LIMINAL PANDA. SilentAir answers transactions that SCTPE cannot handle.
Remediation
- Deploy GTP-C and GTP-U firewalls that share information with SS7 and Diameter security tools.
- Monitor internal network traffic, where tools such as SIGTRANslator and Cordscan can go unnoticed.
- Treat the IPX interface as untrusted.
- Integrate telecom security with regular IT security.
- Enea says it helped customers remove LIMINAL PANDA activity and warned operators infected by SilentAir. It says both groups have been stopped for now.