ARTEX open-source AI pentest framework abused by Storm-0940/UNC7228 and other actors against identity providers, M365 and software vendors

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1. gbhackers.com ↗ · pub. 02/11/2026 02:32 · coletado 02/11 03:00

   Threat actors weaponize ARTEX AI pentest framework to automate intrusions; GTIG tracks UNC7228 overlapping Storm-0940

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   Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant report that financially motivated extortion groups and suspected cyberespionage operators have used ARTEX, an autonomous AI penetration-testing framework, since late August 2026. Operators delegate post-compromise work to coordinated AI agents, compressing execution sequences into seconds. One campaign is tracked as UNC7228, which overlaps with Microsoft's China-linked Storm-0940, and victims include software, industrial automation, semiconductor and telecommunications organizations in the United States and Europe. The activity is noisy and often error-prone, but it shortens the time from initial account compromise to deep access to about four hours, and in one case 15 minutes.

   Technical Details

   • ARTEX is written in Go with an embedded Next.js console and translates operator objectives into commands through six specialized sub-agents.
   • Capabilities cover Active Directory reconnaissance, cloud permission discovery, credential harvesting, privilege escalation and custom webshell deployment.
   • Execution bursts last about 2 to 25 seconds; one case logged 27 events in 23 seconds during AWS permission probing.
   • Against an internet-facing Weaver OA server, ARTEX issued SQL commands through authenticated application APIs and tried to abuse MySQL logging to drop JSP webshells in web-accessible directories. It generated 240 log events and iterated on compilation errors until some files returned valid command output.
   • Wiz independently documented overlapping activity against IT and software vendors, including Okta, Microsoft Entra ID, AWS Cognito and Microsoft 365 integrations. It combined application mapping, authentication probing, password spraying, account-recovery abuse and cross-tenant access testing. Agents extracted API routes from source maps. Some sessions lasted 24-30 hours, though most attempts failed.
   • Mandiant observed database extraction, mass blob reads, directory enumeration and preparation of cloud storage for exfiltration. Command output was sent through rotating webhook.site endpoints.
   • The ARTEX developer announced closure and ended maintenance on October 8 after malicious abuse, but existing copies and forks remain.

   Remediation

   • Correlate rapid permission checks, repeated authorization failures, unexpected administrative accounts, webshell creation, unusual snapshot activity and outbound webhook traffic.
   • Do not rely on filenames or generic user agents for attribution; they are noisy indicators.
   • Use isolated management planes, short-lived credentials, least privilege, segmentation and behavioral detection that can trigger rapid containment.
2. wiz.io ↗ · pub. 22/10/2026 10:05 · coletado 22/10 11:02 primeiro registro

   Storm-0940 actor uses ARTEX AI pentest agent against IT and software vendors' identity providers and M365 integrations

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   Throughout October 2026, Wiz observed an actor using tooling associated with ARTEX, an open-source autonomous AI penetration-testing framework, against multiple IT and software vendors. The activity targeted identity providers (Okta, Entra ID, AWS Cognito) and Microsoft 365 integrations, with repeated attempts to bypass authentication, enumerate APIs and reach customer data. Wiz says the activity overlaps with Microsoft's reporting on Storm-0940, a Chinese-state aligned actor linked to a supply-chain attack involving stolen vendor credentials and downstream M365 tenants. Wiz also saw the same infrastructure and tooling used against the wider sector and expanded into other software sectors. Most attempts failed, but the persistent, adaptive automation is the main concern.

   Technical Details

   • Tool background: ARTEX was published on GitHub in July 2026 by a Chinese developer and went closed-source on October 8 after more than 12,000 forks. ARTEX artifacts have also appeared in attacks on South Korean banks (late September) and Japanese companies (October). Microsoft and Zscaler tie it to two separate actors.
   • Reconnaissance: the agent downloaded JS bundles, source maps, /assets/config.json, /env.js and Swagger/OpenAPI docs, then called internal API routes by name minutes later.
   • Authentication probing: fabricated OAuth codes and malformed state parameters against Microsoft callback endpoints (/sign_in/oauth/microsoft/callback), and unsigned JWTs (alg:none, email [email protected]) sent to more than 60 SSO route variations in two minutes.
   • Account recovery abuse: username validation (/Account/ValidateUserName), password-reset token generation and /forgot_password. On Cognito, InitiateAuth, ForgotPassword, ResendConfirmationCode and SignUp events were seen.
   • Tenant isolation tests: sign-up with disposable email, account confirmation, then access to other companies' data (e.g. /company/1/logins, which returned 403) and role-manipulation attempts.
   • Password spraying: against Okta and Entra ID, in bursts of 20-60 minutes with one user agent per burst and a median one-second gap. It targeted hundreds of users, mainly software engineers, with some users hit more than a dozen times.
   • Evasion: IP rotation within minutes of blocks, more than 15 user-agent strings (Python clients, curl, truncated Chrome, headless browsers, ReconProbe/1.0, boto, python-urllib), switching endpoints when rate-limited, and sessions lasting 24-30 hours.
   • Many user agents are not unique to this actor and are noisy if hunted alone.

   Remediation

   • Hunt for the patterns above in identity provider and HTTP logs: mass failed logins across users, password spray from single IPs, Okta password spray, and mass access-denied activity (Wiz cites existing rules for these).
   • Remove exposed source maps, runtime configs and API documentation from production, and harden OAuth/SSO callback handling, JWT validation (reject unsigned tokens), account-recovery endpoints and sign-up flows.
   • Apply rate limiting, and monitor for anomalous Cognito, Entra and Okta events.