OPTIMJACK: Optimizely signup-flow flaw abused to inject crypto clipper, card skimmer and iOS Coruna/DarkSword loaders into 178 orgs
Matéria consolidada. Reúne 14 matérias que o Tifon tinha publicado separadamente sobre a mesma história. A IA reescreveu o relatório com o que as 11 fontes trouxeram em 17/11/2026 12:06; os links antigos trazem para cá.
Fontes: malwarebytes.com ↗ infosecurity-magazine.com ↗ hackread.com ↗ helpnetsecurity.com ↗ securityweek.com ↗ securityaffairs.com ↗ thehackernews.com ↗ infostealers.com ×2 ↗ gbhackers.com ↗ bleepingcomputer.com ×2 ↗ securityonline.info ↗
On November 16, 2026, an attacker injected malicious JavaScript into the Project JavaScript of many unrelated Optimizely Web customer accounts. The code was served from the trusted Optimizely CDN and reached visitors of well-known sites such as BBC, Zoom, GitLab, HSBC, CNN, Salesforce, Fox News, IKEA, Equifax, Ledger, Air France-KLM and Peacock. The campaign, tracked as OPTIMJACK (securityonline.info; the name is credited to Amirul Iman by hackread.com), combined a cryptocurrency address clipper, a payment card skimmer, cookie and screenshot theft, and loaders that send iOS visitors to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit-kit infrastructure. Optimizely told BleepingComputer (bleepingcomputer.com) and confirmed on its status page on November 17 (securityweek.com) that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to add the code to some customer projects. The company says it fixed the flaw, removed the injected code and secured the affected accounts. No CVE has been assigned, and Optimizely has not said how many projects were changed. Report URI saw all monitored files clean by 23:11 UTC on November 16 (malwarebytes.com, infosecurity-magazine.com). Hudson Rock (infostealers.com) saw related poisoned scripts from other providers, namely minute-ly, Kissmetrics and StorifyMe. Successful iPhone exploitation has not been demonstrated.
Entenda a falha
A vulnerabilidade
Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects of Optimizely Web. No CVE or CVSS score has been assigned, and the articles give no affected or fixed versions, nor what the attacker needed (authentication, configuration). The result was write access to the Project JavaScript field of many unrelated accounts, so attacker code ran on the sites of 178 organizations (Report URI count), including BBC, Zoom, GitLab and HSBC. Optimizely says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix and removed the injected code.
Como funciona
Optimizely Web sites load a snippet from cdn.optimizely.com, or from a customer's own domain, which includes an optional Project JavaScript field that runs on every page. Through the signup-flow flaw, the attacker wrote a loader into that field and left the rest of the snippet untouched. The CDN served exactly what it was given (Report URI says this was not cache poisoning), with Optimizely's certificate, so browsers ran it as trusted code. The loader fetched track.js from a .cc server, with plain, Base64 and embedded-fallback variants. That script swapped crypto addresses, skimmed card data, took cookies and screenshots, and sent iPhones to the Coruna and DarkSword kits.
Por que é vulnerável
Optimizely has not explained the root cause: it gave no detail on how the signup-flow bug worked, how long it existed or when the fix went in. Report URI initially said it did not know how the attacker got write access to so many customer projects, and Smartsheet's snippet was re-infected after cleaning, suggesting the attacker kept access for a while. The impact was amplified by design, since a custom-code field running on every page and served from a trusted CDN gives injected code wide reach. The fix, per the vendor, blocked the vulnerable path.
Onde está
Optimizely names only the Experimentation account signup flow; no file, function or commit is public.
Como foi descoberta
Scott Helme of Report URI uncovered the malicious code, finding it in 188 of 1,611 snippets checked, and believes the real number is higher. The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on November 16 in the BBC snippet, and Report URI saw all monitored files clean by 23:11 UTC. Optimizely says it identified the incident itself and confirmed it in a notice at 01:02 UTC on November 17, later attributing it to a signup-flow vulnerability. The articles do not say how the flaw itself was found. Hudson Rock linked the actor to earlier injections via Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly from November 13.
Explicação gerada por IA a partir da matéria e dos artigos, em 17/11/2026 12:22.
Detalhes técnicos
- Root cause and vendor response: the flaw was in the Experimentation account signup flow (bleepingcomputer.com, infostealers.com). Optimizely has given no detail on how it worked, how long it existed, the number of projects changed or the fix timing (thehackernews.com, securityaffairs.com). Report URI says this was not CDN cache poisoning (securityaffairs.com, hackread.com). Optimizely's incident was listed as Monitoring (infostealers.com). Equifax told Reuters it had stopped using Optimizely and found no compromise of its own systems. Salesforce was investigating and disabling the scripts (infostealers.com, bleepingcomputer.com).
- Delivery: malicious code sat in customer projectJS files on the Optimizely CDN (infostealers.com). The attacker wrote it into the Project JavaScript field and left the rest of each snippet untouched. It was served from cdn.optimizely.com with the vendor's certificate (securityaffairs.com). Snippets self-hosted on customers' own domains were also affected, because the code sat in the same Optimizely project (securityaffairs.com). Loader variants were a plain script tag pointing to a .cc server on Google Cloud, a Base64 variant decoded with atob(), and an inline eval fallback used when CSP blocks external scripts (securityonline.info).
- Start of the injection: the first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on November 16 in the BBC snippet, where it loaded the earlier injector webshell[.]lol (thehackernews.com, securityaffairs.com, malwarebytes.com). The clean BBC snippet was seen at 02:21 UTC, and the main payload was loading on bbc.com by 08:28 UTC (malwarebytes.com). The loader domain was registered the morning of the attack (helpnetsecurity.com). Earlier responses referenced webshell[.]lol/get.js, and later Optimizely files delivered 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Both connect to mobile-router infrastructure using channel 02111110 (infostealers.com).
- Scope: Scott Helme (Report URI) inspected 1,611 snippets and found 188 infected files belonging to 178 organizations in 20 sectors, and said the real number is likely higher (infosecurity-magazine.com). Banking and finance was the largest sector, with 32 organizations (securityonline.info, helpnetsecurity.com). Hudson Rock documented 21 named web properties (infostealers.com). BuiltWith detects Optimizely on about 190,000 sites, which is overall usage and not the number affected (malwarebytes.com). The exposure window exceeded 13 hours.
- Payload build: a 30 KB script (29,882 bytes, infostealers.com) rebuilt 26 times during the day through a 15-second cache header (securityonline.info).
- Clipper: hardcoded replacement addresses for EVM, BTC, TRON, TON, SOL, LTC, BCH and DOGE, using a mutation observer and a 50 ms scan interval (infostealers.com). It swaps only addresses that pass their chain's checksum and sit near payment wording, across page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests (thehackernews.com, gbhackers.com). The attacker's wallets received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on November 16, and the funds were swept to HitBTC (securityonline.info) and emptied early the next day (infosecurity-magazine.com). One wallet dates to March 2026, and the same injection code appeared on Turkish sites in September (helpnetsecurity.com). This is not a confirmed total loss figure (infostealers.com).
- Fallback: the BBC and HSBC UAE specimens embed a 24,392-byte Base64 payload. It runs if the remote track.js fetch fails or exceeds 2.5 seconds, so blocking the attacker domain does not stop local address swapping (infostealers.com). Optimizely's recommended eval setting let a backup copy run on HSBC (helpnetsecurity.com).
- Card skimmer: hooks forms, fetch and XHR, applies Luhn and prefix checks, and sends n/e/c/u through navigator.sendBeacon() to 1688360[.]cc/card.php (infostealers.com, gbhackers.com). It was added at 13:43 UTC (securityonline.info). It cannot read cross-origin payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen hosted frames (securityaffairs.com, malwarebytes.com).
- hit.php: conditional exfiltration of JavaScript-readable cookies, page URL, original wallet addresses and an html2canvas viewport image. HttpOnly cookies are not reachable (infostealers.com, gbhackers.com).
- iOS branch: two boot.js loads with channel marker 02111110, plus JIUJIU888/weifile.html for iOS 18.6 and below, with secondary stages from webshell[.]lol and .icu routers (infostealers.com). Hidden frames deliver the exploit chains, and pages reloaded every 60 seconds on iOS 18.6 and older (helpnetsecurity.com). Router markers are ds_vk, __DAILI_CFG, chainFrame, data-daili-gate=v1 and entry paths /A8/a.html, /D11/b.html, /D12/b.html and /C10/b.html. Other domains are 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu. Coruna targets iOS 13–17, DarkSword targets iOS 18.x up to 18.6, and the iOS 26 route only fingerprints the device (securityonline.info, thehackernews.com). Ohey (Kirk) reports DarkSword D11 stages (post_exploit.js, keychain-2.db uploads, seed phrase and private key collection), which were not reproduced by Hudson Rock (infostealers.com, helpnetsecurity.com). The C10 chain's own log says usable_grade=DEAD weaponized=false (infostealers.com).
- Related providers: Hudson Rock and Kirk (Ohey) traced poisoned scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly (Minute Media) with a small loader leading to the same iOS infrastructure. The earliest observation is November 13, and how those scripts were compromised is unclear (securityweek.com, helpnetsecurity.com).
- Persistence: Smartsheet's snippet was re-infected after cleaning, so the attacker kept write access during remediation (securityonline.info, gbhackers.com). The last snippet still infected at 21:52 UTC belonged to TalkTalk (gbhackers.com).
- Defenses: only 24 of 256 tested hosts (15%) fully blocked the payload with a strict script-src allowlist, and 68 had no CSP. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com gave no protection, and sites using strict-dynamic or unsafe-eval did not block it (securityonline.info, securityaffairs.com, helpnetsecurity.com).
- Limits: the URLScan captures used headless Chrome with a spoofed iOS user-agent, so they show delivery only. The C10 (iOS 26) route is not shown to work, and no mining code was found (infostealers.com). BleepingComputer independently confirmed the injected code through urlscan.io scans (bleepingcomputer.com). The reviewed evidence does not establish backend breaches of the affected brands (infostealers.com).
- Hashes (infostealers.com): track.js f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40; fallback c2a34c579e4c2e8802752c93b3a9cca0230610f3e4dd6688f4272459c7c7c162; GitLab Optimizely file a87a2eaea9cfb74aae7283d15fbdb499b5a8ebc3fab4c453df7d62e503996240.
Remediação
- Vendor actions: Optimizely says it blocked the vulnerable path and deployed a fix. It also removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts and blocked code delivery in Cloudflare. It notified affected customers and posts updates on its status page (bleepingcomputer.com, infostealers.com). Salesforce is disabling Optimizely scripts on its preview and production instances (bleepingcomputer.com).
- Preserve response bytes, hashes, historical script versions and project revisions, then remove injected code from Project JavaScript and experiment code. Audit for unauthorized script tags and atob() calls, and verify what visitors actually receive, including cached copies and embedded payloads, not just calls to the attacker's domain. Removing the script does not undo earlier exposure (infostealers.com, securityweek.com).
- Rotate Optimizely credentials and API tokens, and review users, publishing history and integrations. Ask Optimizely which project IDs were modified (securityaffairs.com).
- Block 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol and the .icu router hosts. Review CSP reports and logs for connections to the .cc and .icu domains, searching back through the incident window.
- Hunt for card.php and hit.php POSTs and for boot/entry-stage requests, and identify which sensitive pages loaded the affected assets.
- Place card fields in cross-origin payment iframes, keep third-party tags off checkout pages, and avoid unsafe-eval in CSP headers. Use a strict CSP that does not rely on trusting the vendor domain.
- Treat cards entered on November 16 as exposed. Users should monitor their accounts and contact their card issuer if they see suspicious activity (bleepingcomputer.com, malwarebytes.com).
- Rotate session tokens stored in non-HttpOnly cookies, and invalidate sessions where evidence supports it.
- Verify crypto recipients independently and on hardware wallet screens. Anyone who made transfers on November 16 should review them.
- Update iOS and iPadOS to 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later (securityonline.info, infosecurity-magazine.com).
Relatos divergentes
- Initial access: the earlier reports (securityonline.info, gbhackers.com, thehackernews.com early text, malwarebytes.com) said the access method was unknown. Optimizely's statement relayed by bleepingcomputer.com (later), infostealers.com, securityweek.com, helpnetsecurity.com and securityaffairs.com attributes it to a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow. The vendor statement is the most authoritative version, though the technical details of the flaw remain undisclosed.
- Scope: infostealers.com documented 21 named web properties (Hudson Rock) alongside Report URI's 178 organizations and 188 infected files, which is the broader figure. infosecurity-magazine.com says Report URI believes the real number is likely higher. The 178 figure comes from Report URI, not from Optimizely (hackread.com).
- Cleanup completion: securityonline.info (Nov 17) reports cleanup starting around 20:40 UTC with one infected snippet left at 21:52 UTC. malwarebytes.com and infosecurity-magazine.com (later) report all monitored files clean by 23:11 UTC on November 16, which is the more recent status.
- Attacker wallet receipts: about $7,040 (Report URI, relayed by several outlets) versus about $6,600 (StepSecurity, per thehackernews.com and securityaffairs.com). infostealers.com notes that neither is a confirmed loss figure, and bleepingcomputer.com says some wallets were active before the attack.
- Log search window: thehackernews.com advises searching logs back to 08:00 UTC Monday, but the first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC (malwarebytes.com, securityaffairs.com, infosecurity-magazine.com), so the search should start earlier.
- Attribution: infostealers.com says the operator is not established. securityonline.info, securityaffairs.com and infosecurity-magazine.com say Report URI links the activity to the actor behind earlier waves through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media. helpnetsecurity.com says Hudson Rock and Kirk (Ohey) state that this does not prove a single operator or the same entry method. Treat the link as not independently verified.
- iOS exploitation: infostealers.com and securityweek.com (Hudson Rock) state the evidence shows delivery only, with no proof of successful exploitation or a zero-day. securityonline.info describes delivery of working Coruna and DarkSword kits but likewise gives no confirmed victim compromise. Ohey's DarkSword post-exploitation findings were not independently reproduced, and the C10 chain log says weaponized=false.
Linha do tempo
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Optimizely supply-chain attack injects skimmer, crypto-swapper and iOS exploit kits into sites of 178 organizations incl. BBC, CNN, Zoom
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On 16 November, researcher Scott Helme and Report URI identified malicious JavaScript in Optimizely snippet files tied to 178 organizations, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce and GitLab. The code could redirect cryptocurrency payments, skim payment card details, steal some cookies and deliver exploit kits aimed at vulnerable iPhones and iPads. Optimizely confirmed the incident and says it fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code. Report URI saw all monitored files clean by 23:11 UTC on 16 November. The article does not say how the attackers got into Optimizely, name an actor, or give CVEs or IOCs. A search found no additional primary sources (no Optimizely advisory or Report URI write-up was retrieved), so these details come from the article alone.
Technical Details
- Report URI's timeline for the BBC shows a clean snippet at 02:21 UTC, an injected version at 04:21 UTC, and the main payload loading on bbc.com by 08:28 UTC (malwarebytes.com).
- Card details entered in separately hosted payment forms (Stripe, Adyen) were out of the skimmer's reach.
- BuiltWith detects Optimizely on about 190,000 sites. That is overall usage, not the number affected.
- The article does not establish that the BBC's own servers were breached.
Remediation
- Update iOS and iPadOS to the latest version.
- Verify cryptocurrency destination addresses with the recipient.
- Monitor payment card activity.
- Review accounts for unexpected sessions, since some cookies could be stolen.
- Site operators should monitor third-party scripts and restrict the scripts and connections they can introduce, for example with CSP.
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Optimizely Experimentation flaw exploited to inject crypto-swapper, card skimmer and iOS exploit kits into 178 organizations' websites
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An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Experimentation, the website testing platform, to add malicious JavaScript to the Project JavaScript of customer projects. The code reached visitors of 178 organizations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab and IKEA. Report URI (Scott Helme) found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it checked, and said the real number is likely higher. Optimizely confirmed the incident in a November 17 notice, saying it had fixed the flaw, removed the injected code and secured affected user accounts. The attacker has not been named. This summary is based on the article alone; no web research was run, so no CVE, CVSS score or advisory details are available.
Technical Details
- The attacker inserted code into the Project JavaScript field, a custom-code field that runs on every page, and left the rest of each snippet untouched. The files were still served from Optimizely's trusted CDN with its certificate.
- The JavaScript swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's own. Those wallets received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on November 16 and were emptied early the next day.
- It also acted as a card skimmer on sites' own forms (hosted payment iframes were out of its reach) and stole some cookies and page screenshots.
- On iPhones and iPads it delivered two iOS exploit kits, identified by Report URI as Coruna and DarkSword.
- The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on November 16, and all infected files were cleaned by 23:11 UTC.
- Report URI said one of the attacker's wallets had been in use since March 2026 and linked the same actor to an earlier wave of injections through other third-party scripts.
Remediation
- Report URI advised visitors to update iOS to 18.7.3 or later, or to 26.3 or later.
- Optimizely says it fixed the flaw and cleaned the injected code. Customers should review their Project JavaScript and account security.
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Optimizely platform abused to inject card-stealing, crypto-swapping and iOS exploit JavaScript into 178 organisations' sites (OPTIMJACK)
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Attackers abused Optimizely Web to modify the Project JavaScript field in customer projects, so legitimate Optimizely-delivered scripts loaded attacker code from 1688360.cc. Report URI checked 1,611 scripts and found 188 infected files tied to 178 organisations, including Zoom, CNN, BBC, Fox News, HSBC, Ledger, Equifax, Salesforce, IKEA and Air France-KLM. Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and secured affected accounts (notice of Nov 17, 01:02 UTC). Salesforce told Reuters it was investigating and had disabled the scripts. The article does not establish that the brands' internal networks were breached, nor how many visitors or payment records were affected. The 178 figure comes from Report URI, not from Optimizely. This write-up is based on the article alone; no web research was performed.
Technical Details
- The code replaced cryptocurrency addresses, harvested card number, expiry and CVV on submission, and sent cookies, the page URL and a screenshot after an address swap.
- Cross-origin payment-provider iframes and HttpOnly cookies were out of its reach.
- iPhone and iPad visitors were redirected to further infrastructure that delivered Coruna and DarkSword exploits, chosen by iOS version (Report URI).
- StepSecurity confirmed the Apple-specific loading but did not analyse the exploit files. Amirul Iman named the campaign OPTIMJACK.
- Report URI says this was not CDN cache poisoning.
- The initial compromise vector is not stated.
Remediation
- Review the Optimizely project change history and script versions for the incident window.
- Check historical browser and network records for the malicious domain.
- Card users who paid on affected pages should contact their card provider.
- Verify crypto destination addresses independently.
- Install iOS updates.
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Optimizely Experimentation flaw abused to inject crypto-stealing, card-skimming JavaScript and iOS exploit kits into 178 organizations' sites
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On 16 November 2026 an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's Experimentation (Web) platform and added malicious JavaScript to the "Project JavaScript" field of customer projects, the company confirmed. The code was served from Optimizely's own CDN, so browsers treated it as trusted. Security researcher Scott Helme (Report URI) reports 178 affected organizations, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected accounts and added protections. No CVE has been named, and this record rests on the article alone, with no vendor advisory opened.
Technical Details
- The kit swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed payment cards (numbers, expiry, CVV) from a site's own forms, and stole cookies and screenshots. On iOS 18.6 and older it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, and pages reloaded every 60 seconds.
- The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day. It loaded from a domain registered the morning of the attack.
- Helme's team checked 1,611 snippets and found 188 infected. Banks and financial firms were the largest group (32).
- Attacker wallets received about $7,040. One wallet dates to March 2026, and the same injection code appeared on Turkish sites in September.
- Hudson Rock and Kirk (Ohey) traced poisoned scripts to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly from 13 November. The researchers say this does not prove a single operator or the same entry method. Later iOS stages that steal keychain data and seed phrases were not independently reproduced.
- Only 24 organizations (15%) had a CSP strict enough to block the attack. 68 had no CSP. Allowing Optimizely's domain gave no protection. Optimizely's recommended eval setting let a backup copy run on HSBC.
Remediation
Use a strict CSP that does not rely on trusting the vendor domain, and avoid unsafe-eval. Review Project JavaScript in Optimizely projects and audit third-party scripts. Update iOS devices.
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Optimizely Experimentation flaw exploited to inject malicious JavaScript into 178 organizations' sites, incl. BBC, CNN, HSBC
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Optimizely confirmed on its status page on November 17 that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation (Web Experimentation) to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company says it has fixed the flaw, removed the injected code and secured affected accounts. It has not said how many customers were affected. Report URI examined 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organizations. Names on the list include the BBC, CNN, Zoom, GitLab, Salesforce, Equifax, HSBC and IKEA. Because the scripts were served from Optimizely's CDN, the sites that loaded them treated them as trusted. This summary rests on the article alone. No web research was performed, so no CVE, CVSS score, or vendor advisory was checked.
Technical Details
- Report URI says the malicious code was placed in an optional field meant for a customer's own JavaScript, which runs on every page.
- Its timeline puts the first injection at November 16, 04:21 UTC. By 21:52 UTC only one infected script had yet to be cleaned.
- The malware could swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skim payment card details, and collect cookies and page screenshots. About $7,000 in cryptocurrency had reached the attacker by Monday evening.
- Report URI says iPhone and iPad users were served the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. Hudson Rock confirmed links to the exploit-kit infrastructure but said successful exploitation has not been demonstrated. It said the evidence does not establish a zero-day.
- Hudson Rock's report, which includes findings from an Ohey researcher, says scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute-ly also served a small loader leading to the same iOS-targeting infrastructure. The earliest observation is from November 13. How the code got into those providers' scripts is unclear.
- Some poisoned Optimizely scripts embedded a full copy of the payload, so blocking the attacker's domain may not be enough.
Remediation
Optimizely says it has fixed the flaw and cleaned the affected projects. Defenders should review which third-party scripts their sites load. They should also check customer-JavaScript fields in Optimizely projects for unexpected code. They should check pages for embedded payloads, not just for calls to the attacker's domain.
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OPTIMJACK: Optimizely Web Experimentation hijacked to inject crypto-swapping, card-skimming and iOS exploit-kit JavaScript on 178 sites
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On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through Optimizely Web Experimentation, in a campaign some researchers call OPTIMJACK. Report URI found the code in 188 of 1,611 snippets it checked. Affected sites included Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. It says it fixed the flaw and removed the injected code. This summary draws only on the article. No independent research was done, and no vendor advisory beyond the notice quoted in the article was reviewed.
Technical Details
- The attacker wrote code into the Project JavaScript section of customer projects. The rest of each snippet was untouched. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely's certificate. Report URI says this was not cache poisoning.
- Snippets self-hosted on customers' own domains were also affected, because the code sat in the same Optimizely project.
- There were three loader variants: a plain script tag pointing to 1688360[.]cc/track.js, a Base64-hidden version, and a fully inline version. An earlier injector loaded webshell[.]lol. It first appeared at 04:21 UTC in the BBC's snippet. Report URI ties it to the same actor, who had also used Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts.
- track.js swapped wallet addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. A card skimmer added at 13:43 UTC stole the card number, expiry and CVV from a site's own form fields. It could not read Stripe or Adyen hosted frames. The script also sent cookies without HttpOnly and screenshots.
- On iOS, scripts from two .icu domains delivered the Coruna kit (iOS 13-17) and the DarkSword kit (iOS 18). A separate chain for iOS 26 only collected device details. No real iPhone compromise has been reported.
- Losses were small: about $7,040 in the attacker's wallets (Report URI) or about $6,600 (StepSecurity).
- Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then reinfected, which suggests the attacker kept access. Optimizely has not said how the flaw worked, how many projects were affected or whether access persists.
- Of 256 hosts checked, 68 had no CSP and 24 blocked the payload. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com does not protect a site. 'strict-dynamic' and 'unsafe-eval' can also let the code run.
Remediation
- Check the Project JavaScript and experiment custom code in every project. Look for 1688360, atob( or any unrecognised script.
- Review account access and rotate credentials.
- Treat cards entered on 16 November as exposed.
- Replace session tokens stored in cookies without HttpOnly.
- Notify affected customers.
- Ask Optimizely which project IDs were modified.
- Avoid third-party scripts on checkout pages.
- Update iOS to 18.7.3 or later, or 26.3 or later.
- Verify wallet addresses on a hardware wallet.
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Optimizely Web Experimentation flaw abused to inject crypto-address swapper, card skimmer and iOS exploit kits into 178+ sites
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An attacker exploited an unspecified vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation and added malicious JavaScript to the Project JavaScript of customer projects. Visitors to at least 178 organizations received the code on Monday, including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax and Ledger, according to Report URI. The payload swaps crypto wallet addresses and skims card data. On iOS it also loads the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, but no successful iPhone compromise has been reported. Optimizely says it fixed the flaw and removed the code. Its notice gives no details on the flaw, the number of projects changed, the fix timing or customer actions. These details come from the article only, because no outside research was done.
Technical Details
- The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on Monday in the BBC snippet. It loaded the injector webshell[.]lol. A mass cleanup began at about 20:40 UTC.
- The loader was written into Project JavaScript, so the code was served from cdn.optimizely.com with the vendor's certificate. It came in three variants: a direct load of 1688360[.]cc/track.js, a base64-hidden address, and a full embedded payload fallback.
- track.js replaces wallet addresses that pass their chain's checksum and sit near payment wording. It covers page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests.
- A card skimmer added at 13:43 UTC captures the card number, expiry and CVV from form fields. It cannot read cross-origin payment iframes. Cookies without HttpOnly and page screenshots are exfiltrated.
- On iOS, boot.js is loaded from two .icu domains. It launches Coruna (iOS 13 to 17) or DarkSword (iOS 18) in a hidden iframe. For iOS 26 it only collects device details. iOS 18.7.3 or later and iOS 26.3 or later are patched.
- Smartsheet was re-infected after cleanup, which suggests the attacker kept access. Report URI found code in 188 of 1,611 snippets. Attacker wallets received about $7,040 (Report URI) or about $6,600 (StepSecurity).
- The injector was also planted through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts. Some researchers call the campaign OPTIMJACK.
Remediation
- Audit Project JavaScript and experiment custom code for 1688360, atob( and unknown scripts. Review and rotate users, API tokens and integrations.
- Treat cards entered on Monday and non-HttpOnly cookies as exposed.
- Deploy a strict CSP. Use cross-origin payment iframes, and keep third-party tags off checkout pages.
- Update iOS devices to 18.7.3 or later, or 26.3 or later. Block the IOCs and search logs back to 08:00 UTC Monday.
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Optimizely signup flaw abused to inject malicious JavaScript into customer sites; related poisoned scripts on Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, minute-ly
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Optimizely said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow and added malicious JavaScript to customer projects. The code was served through legitimate Optimizely snippets to visitors of sites including BBC, GitLab, HSBC UAE and Fox Sports. Hudson Rock documented 21 named web properties. Report URI (Scott Helme) counted 188 poisoned snippets across 178 organizations. Similar poisoned responses were observed from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly, but how those were compromised is not explained. Impact depends on the page and the visitor's actions, and the reviewed evidence does not establish backend breaches of the affected brands.
Technical Details
- Earlier responses referenced webshell[.]lol/get.js. Later Optimizely files delivered 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Both connect to mobile-router infrastructure using channel 02111110.
- The recovered track.js (29,882 bytes) replaces cryptocurrency destinations and watches for complete card details in accessible submissions. It can collect JavaScript-readable cookies and a rendered page image. It does not extract HttpOnly cookies or bypass isolated cross-origin payment frames.
- Later BBC and HSBC UAE files embed a 24,392-byte fallback payload that runs if the remote payload fails or does not arrive within about 2.5 seconds.
- The mobile delivery was linked to Coruna and DarkSword. Ohey (Kirk) reports DarkSword D11 stages (post_exploit.js, uploads of keychain-2.db, seed phrase and private key collection). The C10 chain's own log says usable_grade=DEAD weaponized=false. Successful iOS exploitation is unproven and not reproduced by Hudson Rock.
- Report URI reported about $7,040 in wallet receipts by 19:25 UTC on Nov 16. This is not a confirmed loss figure. One of its snippets was still infected at 21:52 UTC on Nov 16.
- Equifax told Reuters it had stopped using Optimizely and found no compromise of its own systems. Salesforce was investigating and disabling scripts.
- Hashes: track.js f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40; fallback c2a34c579e4c2e8802752c93b3a9cca0230610f3e4dd6688f4272459c7c7c162; GitLab Optimizely file a87a2eaea9cfb74aae7283d15fbdb499b5a8ebc3fab4c453df7d62e503996240.
Remediation
Optimizely says it patched the vulnerable path, removed injected code, ended sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. Its incident was listed as Monitoring. Website operators should preserve historical script versions, verify project code and cached copies, review collection-destination requests and identify which sensitive pages loaded the affected assets. Removing the script does not undo earlier exposure.
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Optimizely Web Project JavaScript Abused to Inject Crypto-Clipper, Card Skimmer and iOS Exploits Into 178 Organizations' Sites
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Attackers injected malicious JavaScript into Optimizely Web projects used by 178 organizations on November 16, 2026. The code exposed site visitors to cryptocurrency address swapping, payment card skimming and delivery of iOS exploit chains. Affected brands included Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger and Peacock. Researchers found 188 infected snippets among 1,611 examined. This points to a compromise of a trusted third-party dependency, not confirmed breaches of each organization's own infrastructure. The initial access method is unknown. No vendor advisory, CVE or fix was reviewed, and no web research was performed for this record. All details come from the article, which relays the Report URI investigation.
Technical Details
- The attackers abused Optimizely's Project JavaScript feature. They added a loader to this field and left the surrounding snippet code untouched. Browsers fetched it through the trusted Optimizely CDN.
- The loaders fetched
track.jsfrom 1688360[.]cc. They used plain script references, Base64 URLs decoded with atob(), or inline payloads run through eval(). - The clipper replaced Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana, Litecoin and Dogecoin addresses in page content, form fields, clipboard operations, network requests and navigation. It used checksum validation to find genuine addresses. About $7,040 reached the associated wallets in roughly nine hours, which does not establish the full financial impact.
- A payment module added at 13:43 UTC watched form submissions and outgoing POST requests for card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs. It checked card numbers with the Luhn algorithm and sent records through navigator.sendBeacon() to 1688360[.]cc/card.php. Separately hosted payment iframes were out of its reach.
- The malware also collected page URLs, accessible cookies (HttpOnly cookies were not readable), original wallet addresses and html2canvas screenshots.
- On iPhones and iPads, hidden frames delivered version-selected Coruna and DarkSword exploit chains through two routing domains. Researchers saw repeated exploitation attempts on older iOS versions. An iOS 26 route only fingerprinted the device.
- Smartsheet's snippet was reportedly reinfected after cleaning, which suggests the attacker kept access. Researchers distinguished the incident from CDN cache poisoning.
- By 21:52 UTC, only one of the 188 snippets (TalkTalk) still held malicious code.
Remediation
- Inspect Project JavaScript and preserve suspicious snippets.
- Investigate unexpected destinations and monitor script changes.
- Enforce a Content Security Policy to restrict script loading and connections.
- Update vulnerable iPhones and iPads.
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Optimizely supply chain attack injects crypto-hijacking, card-skimming and iOS exploit-kit JavaScript into CNN, BBC, Salesforce and other sites
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A supply chain attack on Optimizely put malicious JavaScript on many high-profile websites, including Zoom, CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce and GitLab. Optimizely told BleepingComputer that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Researcher Scott Helme found 188 infected Optimizely JavaScript files belonging to 178 organizations, out of 1,611 scripts analyzed. The earliest injection he observed was in the early morning of November 16. The article does not say how long the flaw existed or how many visitors were exposed. No CVE is given. This summary is based on the article alone, because no web research was done.
Technical Details
- The injected code loads a second-stage script from
https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. Some files reference the URL directly. Others hide it with Base64 andatob(). One variant runs an embedded copy of the code if the remote script is blocked. - track.js replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones. Wallets in the script had received about $7,000 as of November 16, but some were active before the attack.
- It skims card numbers, expiry dates and security codes and sends them to
https://1688360[.]cc/card.php. - It loads the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which target different iOS versions.
- It can also collect cookies, page URLs and screenshots.
Remediation
- Optimizely says it blocked the vulnerable path and deployed a fix. It also removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts, and blocked code delivery in Cloudflare. It notified affected customers and is posting updates at status.optimizely.com.
- Salesforce is disabling Optimizely scripts on its preview and production instances.
- As of 21:52 UTC on November 16, one of the 188 files still contained malicious code.
- Visitors on November 16 should review any cryptocurrency transfers made that day.
- Anyone who entered card details should monitor their accounts and contact their card issuer if they see suspicious activity.
- iPhone and iPad users should update iOS and iPadOS.
- The injected code loads a second-stage script from
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Optimizely supply chain attack injects crypto-hijacking, card-skimming and iOS exploit-kit JavaScript into major brand sites
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A suspected supply chain attack on Optimizely led to malicious JavaScript being served from its CDN to visitors of many well-known sites, including Zoom, CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce and GitLab. Researcher Scott Helme reported that 188 infected Optimizely JavaScript files belonging to 178 organizations were found among 1,611 scripts analyzed. BleepingComputer independently confirmed the injected code through urlscan.io scans. The payload steals cryptocurrency and payment card data and delivers iOS exploit kits. The initial compromise method is unknown, and Optimizely had not responded at the time of the article. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was done.
Technical Details
- Attackers inserted code into Optimizely customer projects. Some files reference the loader URL directly, while others hide it with Base64 and
atob(). One variant runs an embedded copy of the payload if the remote script is blocked. - The injected code loads a second-stage script from
https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. - The script replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones. Helme saw about $7,000 in transactions to those wallets on Nov 16.
- It skims card numbers, expiry dates and security codes and sends them to
https://1688360[.]cc/card.php. - It loads the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which target different iOS versions.
- It can also collect cookies, page URLs and screenshots.
- The earliest hijack was traced to the early morning of Nov 16. As of 21:52 UTC on Nov 16, only 1 of the 188 files still contained malicious code.
Remediation
- Block the domain 1688360[.]cc.
- Audit Optimizely-hosted scripts for injected code, including
atob()-obfuscated URLs. - Review CDN-loaded third-party scripts.
- Check for card or crypto fraud among users who visited affected sites on Nov 16.
- Attackers inserted code into Optimizely customer projects. Some files reference the loader URL directly, while others hide it with Base64 and
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OPTIMJACK supply-chain attack injects crypto clipper, card skimmer and iOS exploit kits via Optimizely CDN into 178 organizations
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On November 16, 2026, an attacker gained write access to the Project JavaScript field in dozens of unrelated Optimizely Web customer accounts. The attacker injected a loader, served from the trusted cdn.optimizely.com, that affected visitors of 178 organizations. Victims included Zoom, CNN, the BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, IKEA and Ledger. The campaign is tracked as OPTIMJACK. The exposure window exceeded 13 hours. The payload combined a cryptocurrency clipper, a payment card skimmer, screenshot and cookie theft, and redirection of iOS users to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Attribution to the actor behind earlier waves through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media is technically confirmed. How the attacker obtained access to Optimizely is unknown. This report is based only on the article, and no vendor advisory or other source was consulted.
Technical Details
- Scope: Scott Helme (Report URI) inspected 1,611 snippets and found 188 infected files belonging to 178 organizations in 20 sectors. Banking and finance was the largest sector, with 32 organizations.
- Loader variants: a plain script tag pointing to a .cc server on Google Cloud, a Base64 variant decoded with atob(), and an inline eval fallback used when CSP blocks external scripts.
- Persistence: Smartsheet's snippet was re-infected after it was cleaned, which shows the attacker kept write access during remediation.
- Payload: a 30 KB script rebuilt 26 times during the day through a 15-second cache header. It runs four modules:
- A clipper that swaps wallet addresses for BTC, ETH/EVM, TRON, SOL, TON, LTC, BCH and DOGE. The attacker's wallets received about $6.6k–$7k, which was swept to HitBTC.
- A screenshot and cookie exfiltration module that posts to /hit.php.
- A card skimmer, added at 13:43 UTC, that sends data to /card.php.
- An iOS exploit loader that delivers Coruna (iOS 13–17), DarkSword (iOS 18.x up to 18.6) and fingerprinting for iOS 26, from .icu domains.
- Defenses: only 24 of 256 tested hosts blocked the payload completely with a strict script-src allowlist. Sites using strict-dynamic or unsafe-eval did not.
- Cleanup: Optimizely began cleaning snippets around 20:40 UTC and had one infected snippet left by 21:52 UTC.
Remediation
- Audit Project JavaScript and experiment code for unauthorized script tags and atob() calls.
- Rotate Optimizely credentials and API tokens.
- Review CSP reports for connections to the .cc and .icu domains.
- Place card fields in cross-origin payment iframes.
- Avoid unsafe-eval in CSP headers.
- Rotate session tokens stored in non-HttpOnly cookies.
- Verify crypto recipients on hardware wallet screens.
- Update iOS to 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later.
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Poisoned third-party scripts on BBC, Zoom, GitLab and other sites deliver crypto/card stealer and iOS exploit-kit loaders
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Hudson Rock (published on infostealers.com) reports that malicious JavaScript was served from third-party provider endpoints, chiefly Optimizely customer projectJS files. Other affected providers include minute-ly, Kissmetrics and StorifyMe. At least 21 named web properties are linked, including BBC, Zoom, GitLab, HSBC UAE, Hootsuite, CNN, Salesforce and Fox News. The payload substitutes cryptocurrency addresses and skims card data to 1688360[.]cc. For iOS visitors it loads secondary stages from webshell[.]lol and .icu routers tied to Coruna and DarkSword exploit-kit infrastructure. The evidence shows delivery only. It does not show successful iPhone exploitation, a zero-day, the initial access method, the operator, or the number of victims.
Technical Details
- The BBC and HSBC UAE specimens embed a 24,392-byte Base64 fallback payload. It runs if the remote track.js fetch fails or takes longer than 2.5 seconds, so blocking the attacker domain does not stop local wallet-address swapping.
- Wallet module: hardcoded replacement addresses for EVM, BTC, TRON, TON, SOL, LTC, BCH and DOGE. It uses a mutation observer and a 50 ms scan interval.
- Card module: hooks forms, fetch and XHR, applies Luhn and prefix checks, and sends n/e/c/u to 1688360[.]cc/card.php.
- hit.php: conditional exfiltration of JavaScript-readable cookies, page URL and an html2canvas viewport image. HttpOnly cookies are not reachable.
- iOS branch: two boot.js loads with channel marker 02111110, plus JIUJIU888/weifile.html for iOS 18.6 and below.
- Router markers: ds_vk, __DAILI_CFG, chainFrame, data-daili-gate=v1, entry paths /A8/a.html, /D11/b.html, /D12/b.html and /C10/b.html.
- Other domains: 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu.
- Limits: the URLScan captures used headless Chrome with a spoofed iOS user-agent, so they show delivery only. The C10 (iOS 26) route is not shown to work. No mining code was found.
Remediation
- Preserve the response bytes, hashes and project revisions, then remove the injected project code. Verify what visitors actually receive.
- Block 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol and the router hosts.
- Hunt for card.php and hit.php POSTs and for boot/entry-stage requests.
- Review Optimizely publishing history, API credentials and integrations.
- Scope the exposure of sensitive pages and devices. Keep iOS devices patched, and invalidate sessions where evidence supports it.