Retadup USB worm C2 domains revived since 2024 to deliver SmokeLoader and CoffeeLoader; ~15,000 blocked infection attempts in 2026
Unidentified operators have re-registered command-and-control domains of Retadup, the AutoIt/AutoHotkey USB worm disrupted by French authorities in 2019. They use the domains to push CoffeeLoader. Researchers say the infrastructure first served SmokeLoader (packed with the 32-bit Armoury packer) and switched to CoffeeLoader in early 2025. A new variant was detected in August 2026. Researchers recorded about 15,000 blocked infection attempts in the first three quarters of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. This is a count of blocked attempts, not of active bots. Researchers could not tell whether the original developer or an unrelated actor reclaimed the infrastructure. This analysis rests on the article alone. No vendor advisory or primary report was researched.
Detalhes técnicos
- Retadup spreads through hidden files and deceptive shortcuts on USB and external drives. Its C2 protocol is simple: commands are Base64-encoded, then converted to hex. A 2017 variant still talked to the revived servers in 2026.
- The infection chain starts with an NSIS installer. The installer drops a modified 7z.dll containing self-decrypting Armoury shellcode and runs it through rundll32.exe.
- The updated Armoury packer decrypts with XOR on the GPU through OpenGL compute shaders (earlier versions used OpenCL). This complicates analysis in virtual environments.
- The decrypted output is an intermediate CoffeeLoader downloader. It handles installation, persistence, process injection and retrieval of the main Trojan.
- Persistence: the DLL is copied into %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% subdirectories. Names use eight hex digits derived from system-volume information. A Run key calls the SetCodecs export via rundll32.exe, and StartupApproved\Run is modified so the entry cannot be disabled in Task Manager.
- Injection targets: dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe and AtBroker.exe.
- Payload retrieval: encrypted shellcode is fetched over HTTPS from /payload?md5=. The first request sends an all-zero hash, and later requests send the hash of the previous payload. The data starts with a 16-byte XOR key. The downloader verifies the X-Signature header with an embedded public key and checks the payload against X-Content-MD5.
- The CoffeeLoader main module keeps three execution options: process injection, executable launch, and DLL execution via rundll32.exe. The marker 0xC0FFEE42 is replaced by 0xD1D57871, and signed C2 responses replace certificate validation.
- Kaspersky documented CoffeeLoader's Armoury GPU-assisted unpacking. The article notes CoffeeLoader has been seen delivering Rhadamanthys elsewhere, but this is not established for this campaign.
Remediação
The article gives no remediation steps. Reasonable measures: restrict autorun and USB use, hunt for the persistence artifacts above, and block the revived Retadup C2 domains. The article does not list the domains.
Linha do tempo
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Retadup USB worm C2 domains revived since 2024 to deliver SmokeLoader and CoffeeLoader; ~15,000 blocked infection attempts in 2026
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Unidentified operators have re-registered command-and-control domains of Retadup, the AutoIt/AutoHotkey USB worm disrupted by French authorities in 2019. They use the domains to push CoffeeLoader. Researchers say the infrastructure first served SmokeLoader (packed with the 32-bit Armoury packer) and switched to CoffeeLoader in early 2025. A new variant was detected in August 2026. Researchers recorded about 15,000 blocked infection attempts in the first three quarters of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. This is a count of blocked attempts, not of active bots. Researchers could not tell whether the original developer or an unrelated actor reclaimed the infrastructure. This analysis rests on the article alone. No vendor advisory or primary report was researched.
Technical Details
- Retadup spreads through hidden files and deceptive shortcuts on USB and external drives. Its C2 protocol is simple: commands are Base64-encoded, then converted to hex. A 2017 variant still talked to the revived servers in 2026.
- The infection chain starts with an NSIS installer. The installer drops a modified 7z.dll containing self-decrypting Armoury shellcode and runs it through rundll32.exe.
- The updated Armoury packer decrypts with XOR on the GPU through OpenGL compute shaders (earlier versions used OpenCL). This complicates analysis in virtual environments.
- The decrypted output is an intermediate CoffeeLoader downloader. It handles installation, persistence, process injection and retrieval of the main Trojan.
- Persistence: the DLL is copied into %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% subdirectories. Names use eight hex digits derived from system-volume information. A Run key calls the SetCodecs export via rundll32.exe, and StartupApproved\Run is modified so the entry cannot be disabled in Task Manager.
- Injection targets: dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe and AtBroker.exe.
- Payload retrieval: encrypted shellcode is fetched over HTTPS from /payload?md5=. The first request sends an all-zero hash, and later requests send the hash of the previous payload. The data starts with a 16-byte XOR key. The downloader verifies the X-Signature header with an embedded public key and checks the payload against X-Content-MD5.
- The CoffeeLoader main module keeps three execution options: process injection, executable launch, and DLL execution via rundll32.exe. The marker 0xC0FFEE42 is replaced by 0xD1D57871, and signed C2 responses replace certificate validation.
- Kaspersky documented CoffeeLoader's Armoury GPU-assisted unpacking. The article notes CoffeeLoader has been seen delivering Rhadamanthys elsewhere, but this is not established for this campaign.
Remediation
The article gives no remediation steps. Reasonable measures: restrict autorun and USB use, hunt for the persistence artifacts above, and block the revived Retadup C2 domains. The article does not list the domains.