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Amazon: China-linked AI agents (ARTEX) hunt LiteLLM, Dify, One API for stored AI provider keys

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 16/11/2026 04:34 · coletado há 25 minutos

Amazon Threat Intelligence captured records from its MadPot decoy network showing attacker AI agents, assessed with moderate confidence to run on the open-source pentest tool ARTEX, scanning internet-exposed AI apps such as LiteLLM, One API, Dify, Langflow and RAGFlow. They steal and verify AI provider keys and pool them, and the stolen keys then power the agents' own models. Amazon assesses, with moderate confidence, that the operators are separate China-linked groups. It cannot verify the outcomes the agents reported, and it notified AWS customers who may have been affected. This summary draws on the article alone. No vendor advisory or other source was consulted.

Detalhes técnicos

  • The playbook lists default admin credentials (such as the LiteLLM default master key), unfinished installs that an outsider could take over, and known flaws in Langflow and RAGFlow.
  • It also lists unauthenticated management endpoints, an authentication bypass through the isCliRequest header in One API family systems, SSRF through URL-fetch features to reach cloud metadata services, and secrets left in client-side JavaScript, source maps, debug routes and env files.
  • Agents searched for leaked keys on GitHub, npm, PyPI, container layers, paste sites, Telegram, certificate transparency logs and scanning services.
  • Cloudflare saw ARTEX use an account-level CI/CD API token with no IP restriction or expiry. It created Worker scripts named artex-, artex-pgrecon-, artex-pgw-* and artex-do-*, ran more than 69 requests per minute, made 400 database dump requests in an hour, and tried persistence. The root cause was static CI/CD tokens that never expire.
  • The FBI issued a FLASH alert summarizing 11 earlier reports of ARTEX use since August.
  • A second campaign used deepfakes against two cryptocurrency exchanges' identity checks.
  • Cisco Talos published Snort rules 7:76-78 and 1:67494-67496.

Remediação

  • Change default credentials and finish new installs.
  • Scan for embedded secrets and rotate any that are exposed.
  • Give Cloudflare tokens an expiry and IP restrictions.
  • Hunt for the artex-* Workers and the published IPs.
  • Monitor for unexpected spend or unusual usage.
  • Deploy the Snort rules.

Linha do tempo

  1. thehackernews.com ↗ · pub. 16/11/2026 04:34 · coletado 16/11 05:00 primeiro registro

    Amazon: China-linked AI agents (ARTEX) hunt LiteLLM, Dify, One API for stored AI provider keys

    ler a análise desta fonte

    Amazon Threat Intelligence captured records from its MadPot decoy network showing attacker AI agents, assessed with moderate confidence to run on the open-source pentest tool ARTEX, scanning internet-exposed AI apps such as LiteLLM, One API, Dify, Langflow and RAGFlow. They steal and verify AI provider keys and pool them, and the stolen keys then power the agents' own models. Amazon assesses, with moderate confidence, that the operators are separate China-linked groups. It cannot verify the outcomes the agents reported, and it notified AWS customers who may have been affected. This summary draws on the article alone. No vendor advisory or other source was consulted.

    Technical Details

    • The playbook lists default admin credentials (such as the LiteLLM default master key), unfinished installs that an outsider could take over, and known flaws in Langflow and RAGFlow.
    • It also lists unauthenticated management endpoints, an authentication bypass through the isCliRequest header in One API family systems, SSRF through URL-fetch features to reach cloud metadata services, and secrets left in client-side JavaScript, source maps, debug routes and env files.
    • Agents searched for leaked keys on GitHub, npm, PyPI, container layers, paste sites, Telegram, certificate transparency logs and scanning services.
    • Cloudflare saw ARTEX use an account-level CI/CD API token with no IP restriction or expiry. It created Worker scripts named artex-, artex-pgrecon-, artex-pgw-* and artex-do-*, ran more than 69 requests per minute, made 400 database dump requests in an hour, and tried persistence. The root cause was static CI/CD tokens that never expire.
    • The FBI issued a FLASH alert summarizing 11 earlier reports of ARTEX use since August.
    • A second campaign used deepfakes against two cryptocurrency exchanges' identity checks.
    • Cisco Talos published Snort rules 7:76-78 and 1:67494-67496.

    Remediation

    • Change default credentials and finish new installs.
    • Scan for embedded secrets and rotate any that are exposed.
    • Give Cloudflare tokens an expiry and IP restrictions.
    • Hunt for the artex-* Workers and the published IPs.
    • Monitor for unexpected spend or unusual usage.
    • Deploy the Snort rules.