Retadup USB worm revived via re-registered C2 domains to spread CoffeeLoader with new OpenGL-based Armoury packer
Matéria consolidada. Reúne 3 matérias que o Tifon tinha publicado separadamente sobre a mesma história. A IA reescreveu o relatório com o que as 3 fontes trouxeram em 16/11/2026 12:03; os links antigos trazem para cá.
Fontes: thehackernews.com ↗ gbhackers.com ↗ securelist.com ↗
Kaspersky (securelist.com) reports that in August 2026 it detected a new variant of the CoffeeLoader loader, spread by the Retadup USB worm. French law enforcement dismantled Retadup in 2019 (August 2019 per thehackernews.com), and securelist.com says more than 850,000 machines were disinfected. Since 2024 an unidentified party has re-registered its old C2 domains and used them to push third-party malware. The domains first served SmokeLoader packed with Armoury, and from early 2025 they served CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky blocked about 15,000 infection attempts in the first three quarters of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia (securelist.com, gbhackers.com, thehackernews.com). The scale is far below the original botnet. None of the sources says whether the original author or an unrelated actor is behind the revival. No CVEs are named. Operational risk is assessed as moderate and mostly concerns removable-media hygiene and loader detection (securelist.com).
Detalhes técnicos
- Infection chain: an NSIS installer drops a patched 7-Zip
7z.dlland runs it withrundll32.exe. The DLL holds self-decrypting shellcode, which is a new version of the Armoury packer. It still decrypts on the GPU but moved from OpenCL to OpenGL (securelist.com). gbhackers.com adds that decryption is XOR via OpenGL compute shaders, which complicates analysis in virtual environments. - Intermediate stage: the packer now delivers intermediate shellcode instead of a DLL (thehackernews.com). This is the CoffeeLoader downloader, which combines dropper and stager functions with a downloader (securelist.com). It handles installation, persistence, process injection and retrieval of the main Trojan (gbhackers.com).
- Persistence:
7z.dllis copied to subfolders of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, and a Run registry key is added. Folder, library and value names are eight hex digits derived from system volume information. The Run key calls the SetCodecs export via rundll32.exe, and StartupApproved\Run is modified so autorun cannot be disabled through Task Manager (gbhackers.com). - Injection targets: dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe and AtBroker.exe.
- Payload retrieval: the payload is fetched over HTTPS from
/payload?md5=. The md5 value is zeros on the first request and the hash of the previous payload afterwards. The payload is XOR-encrypted with the first 16 bytes as the key. X-Signature is checked against an embedded public key and X-Content-MD5 against the decrypted body. Signed C2 responses replace C2 certificate validation. - Main body: largely unchanged. New C2 request and response keys are A21251838432306F2CD2540593656B9E and 2026F751079659CF71C7BA64B345C12A. The protocol magic value changed from 0xC0FFEE42 to 0xD1D57871. The same three execution options remain: process injection, run as an EXE, or run as a DLL via rundll32.
- Retadup: written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey, it copies itself to USB and external drives as hidden files and LNK shortcuts. Its C2 protocol is plaintext commands encoded in Base64 then hex, so it is easy to impersonate. A 2017 variant still talked to the revived C2 in 2026. Historically it dropped cryptominers, Stop ransomware and the Arkei stealer (thehackernews.com).
- Background: Zscaler ThreatLabz first documented CoffeeLoader in March 2025, and it is assessed to share source code similarities with SmokeLoader (thehackernews.com). gbhackers.com notes CoffeeLoader has delivered Rhadamanthys elsewhere, but this is not established for this campaign.
Remediação
No source gives formal remediation guidance. Based on the technical details, defenders can restrict autorun and USB use, block the revived Retadup C2 domains and hosting URLs, and hunt for the listed hashes. They can also look for 7z.dll execution via rundll32.exe and the Run key and StartupApproved persistence described above. securelist.com lists the domains and hashes, while gbhackers.com says its article does not list the domains.
Relatos divergentes
- Meaning of the 15,000 figure: securelist.com says Kaspersky blocked infection attempts on about 15,000 systems. gbhackers.com stresses it is a count of blocked attempts, not active bots. thehackernews.com says around 15,000 systems were blocked from infection. The figure counts blocked attempts, not confirmed compromises. securelist.com, as the primary Kaspersky publication, is the most authoritative.
- Start of the revival: securelist.com says domains have been re-registered since 2024. thehackernews.com says about two years ago, which is broadly consistent.
- Attribution: all three sources say it is unclear who operates the revived infrastructure.
Linha do tempo
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Retadup worm C2 domains re-registered to spread CoffeeLoader with new Armoury packer variant, per Kaspersky
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Kaspersky disclosed a new variant of the CoffeeLoader malware loader, which is being distributed through the Retadup USB worm. French law enforcement disrupted Retadup in August 2019. About two years ago, someone began re-registering the domains Retadup had used as C2 servers. They first used them to push SmokeLoader, and in early 2025 the same servers began serving CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky said it blocked around 15,000 systems from infection by the resurrected worm, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. It is unclear whether Retadup's original author or another actor is behind the revival. This summary is based only on the article. No web research was done, and no vendor advisory, CVE or IOC is cited.
Technical Details
- An NSIS-based installer drops a patched 7z.dll, a trojanized 7-Zip library, and runs it through rundll32.exe. The DLL carries self-decrypting shellcode that is a new version of the Armoury packer.
- The new packer version still uses the GPU for decryption but switches from OpenCL to OpenGL. It delivers intermediate downloader shellcode instead of a DLL, and that shellcode fetches CoffeeLoader.
- For persistence, 7z.dll is copied to subfolders of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, and a Run registry key is used for autorun. The subfolder, library and registry value are named with eight hex digits derived from system volume information. A further registry key stops the user from disabling autorun through Task Manager.
- The malware injects into a legitimate process (dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe) and downloads shellcode from a hard-coded C2 server.
- CoffeeLoader supports three ways to run the next stage: process injection, saving it as an executable, or saving it as a DLL run via rundll32.exe.
- Zscaler ThreatLabz first documented CoffeeLoader in March 2025. It is assessed to share source code similarities with SmokeLoader.
- Retadup spreads via infected USB drives. Historically it dropped cryptominers, Stop ransomware and the Arkei stealer.
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Retadup USB worm C2 domains revived since 2024 to deliver SmokeLoader and CoffeeLoader; ~15,000 blocked infection attempts in 2026
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Unidentified operators have re-registered command-and-control domains of Retadup, the AutoIt/AutoHotkey USB worm disrupted by French authorities in 2019. They use the domains to push CoffeeLoader. Researchers say the infrastructure first served SmokeLoader (packed with the 32-bit Armoury packer) and switched to CoffeeLoader in early 2025. A new variant was detected in August 2026. Researchers recorded about 15,000 blocked infection attempts in the first three quarters of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. This is a count of blocked attempts, not of active bots. Researchers could not tell whether the original developer or an unrelated actor reclaimed the infrastructure. This analysis rests on the article alone. No vendor advisory or primary report was researched.
Technical Details
- Retadup spreads through hidden files and deceptive shortcuts on USB and external drives. Its C2 protocol is simple: commands are Base64-encoded, then converted to hex. A 2017 variant still talked to the revived servers in 2026.
- The infection chain starts with an NSIS installer. The installer drops a modified 7z.dll containing self-decrypting Armoury shellcode and runs it through rundll32.exe.
- The updated Armoury packer decrypts with XOR on the GPU through OpenGL compute shaders (earlier versions used OpenCL). This complicates analysis in virtual environments.
- The decrypted output is an intermediate CoffeeLoader downloader. It handles installation, persistence, process injection and retrieval of the main Trojan.
- Persistence: the DLL is copied into %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% subdirectories. Names use eight hex digits derived from system-volume information. A Run key calls the SetCodecs export via rundll32.exe, and StartupApproved\Run is modified so the entry cannot be disabled in Task Manager.
- Injection targets: dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe and AtBroker.exe.
- Payload retrieval: encrypted shellcode is fetched over HTTPS from /payload?md5=. The first request sends an all-zero hash, and later requests send the hash of the previous payload. The data starts with a 16-byte XOR key. The downloader verifies the X-Signature header with an embedded public key and checks the payload against X-Content-MD5.
- The CoffeeLoader main module keeps three execution options: process injection, executable launch, and DLL execution via rundll32.exe. The marker 0xC0FFEE42 is replaced by 0xD1D57871, and signed C2 responses replace certificate validation.
- Kaspersky documented CoffeeLoader's Armoury GPU-assisted unpacking. The article notes CoffeeLoader has been seen delivering Rhadamanthys elsewhere, but this is not established for this campaign.
Remediation
The article gives no remediation steps. Reasonable measures: restrict autorun and USB use, hunt for the persistence artifacts above, and block the revived Retadup C2 domains. The article does not list the domains.
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Retadup USB worm revived via re-registered C2 domains to spread new CoffeeLoader variant with OpenGL-based Armoury packer
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Kaspersky (Securelist) reports that in August 2026 it detected a new CoffeeLoader variant spread by the Retadup USB worm. Retadup was dismantled by French law enforcement in 2019, when more than 850,000 machines were disinfected. Since 2024, someone has re-registered its old C2 domains and used them to push third-party malware. The domains first served SmokeLoader packed with Armoury, and from early 2025 they served CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems in the first three quarters of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. The scale is much smaller than the original botnet. The article does not say who is behind the revival. Operational risk is moderate and mostly concerns removable-media hygiene and loader detection. The article names no CVEs.
Technical Details
- An NSIS installer drops a patched 7-Zip
7z.dlland runs it withrundll32.exe. The DLL holds self-decrypting shellcode, which is a new Armoury packer version that decrypts with the GPU through OpenGL (the old version used OpenCL). - A new intermediate shellcode, the CoffeeLoader downloader, combines the dropper and stager functions with a downloader.
- Persistence:
7z.dllis copied to subfolders of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, and a Run registry key is added. The folder, library and value names are eight hex digits derived from system volume information. A registry key is also created to block disabling autorun through Task Manager. - The downloader injects into dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe. It fetches the payload over HTTPS from
/payload?md5=, where the md5 value is zeros on the first request and the hash of the previous payload afterwards. - The payload is XOR-encrypted, with the first 16 bytes as the key. The X-Signature header is checked against an embedded public key, and X-Content-MD5 is checked against the decrypted body. Signature verification replaces C2 certificate validation.
- The main body is largely unchanged. It has new C2 request and response keys (A21251838432306F2CD2540593656B9E and 2026F751079659CF71C7BA64B345C12A). The protocol magic value changed from 0xC0FFEE42 to 0xD1D57871. The same three payload execution commands remain: process injection, run as an EXE, or run as a DLL via rundll32.
- Retadup is written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey. It copies itself to USB and external drives as hidden files and LNK shortcuts. Its C2 protocol is plaintext commands encoded in Base64 and then hex, so it is easy to impersonate. A 2017 variant still talks to its C2 in 2026.
Remediation
The article gives no remediation guidance. Defenders can block the listed C2 domains and hosting URLs and hunt for the listed hashes. They can also look for the
7z.dllrundll32 execution and the Run key persistence described above. - An NSIS installer drops a patched 7-Zip