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Russian-speaking actor uses Claude Code to build XaocMail, Phantom53 DoH C2 and Havoc chain for ClickFix attacks worldwide

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 17/11/2026 02:08 · coletado há 12 horas

A Russian-speaking threat actor built a phishing and command-and-control toolkit with help from Anthropic's Claude Code, according to SOCRadar STRU. The campaign chains the XaocMail phishing platform, the Phantom53 DNS-over-HTTPS C2 framework and the Havoc post-exploitation framework. It remains active. Nearly 1,000 personalized lure pages were identified, targeting Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia and Spain, mainly in technology/IT, finance, education, government, logistics and manufacturing. Preparation began in October 2025 and the operation launched in August 2026. This summary rests on the article alone; no vendor or primary sources were consulted.

Detalhes técnicos

  • Delivery: XaocMail is self-hosted at 185[.]224[.]132[.]148:8585. It sends document-sharing lures that link to ClickFix pages on Cloudflare Workers. The pages spoof Google Docs, Adobe Acrobat, Office365 and SecuredDocs. Each victim gets a unique linkId, which maps to one of ten MSI payloads stored in Cloudflare KV.
  • Execution: the victim pastes a command into the Windows Run dialog, using PowerShell, mshta or msiexec (msiexec preferred). The MSI impersonates Visual Studio Tools, Python or Node.js. It installs an isolated Python 3.11 runtime, and malicious .pyd files masquerade as OpenCV, NumPy, PIL or lxml modules.
  • Persistence: scheduled tasks named after Edge, OneDrive, Defender and Adobe updaters run the beacon every 12 minutes and the watcher every 3 minutes.
  • C2: Phantom53 hides commands in the IPv6 answers to DNS AAAA queries, sent through Google, Cloudflare and ControlD DoH resolvers. It falls back to UDP/53. A sandbox gate delays beaconing, a cookie handshake blocks replay, and a weekly SHA256 DGA yields .xyz fallback domains validated with Ed25519.
  • Payload: the watcher decrypts an AES-256-GCM Havoc Demon blob and loads it reflectively in memory, so nothing is written to disk.
  • Operator console: the Go-based adminka console sends Telegram alerts. Its aliases deliver PowerShell stealers for password-manager extensions, VPN configs, AI-tool secrets (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor), Chrome data, SSH keys, GitHub CLI tokens, crypto wallets and seed phrases, and WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal data. Other aliases install Level RMM, bypass UAC via fodhelper and attempt SMB password guessing against the local Administrator account. Exfiltration goes to 145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125, and the HavoX panel is on port 8000 of the same host.
  • AI use: the codebase has a .claude/ directory, 143 numbered task files and a 117 KB arch.md. A Russian-language prompt, framed as an "authorized red team" task, directs an agent to test an MSI on a VM named "NoAV".

STRU has not confirmed the attackers' intent. Footholds in technology firms could expose downstream clients to supply-chain risk.

Remediação

  • Restrict the Run dialog and block unsigned MSI execution from remote URLs.
  • Monitor for pythonw.exe launching from user-writable folders and for scheduled tasks that imitate updaters.
  • Alert on workers.dev landing pages and on high-entropy base36 DNS queries to public DoH resolvers.
  • Train staff on ClickFix-style copy-and-paste prompts.
  • Treat developer secrets, tokens and browser-stored passwords on an infected host as compromised.

Linha do tempo

  1. gbhackers.com ↗ · pub. 17/11/2026 02:08 · coletado 17/11 04:00 primeiro registro

    Russian-speaking actor uses Claude Code to build XaocMail, Phantom53 DoH C2 and Havoc chain for ClickFix attacks worldwide

    ler a análise desta fonte

    A Russian-speaking threat actor built a phishing and command-and-control toolkit with help from Anthropic's Claude Code, according to SOCRadar STRU. The campaign chains the XaocMail phishing platform, the Phantom53 DNS-over-HTTPS C2 framework and the Havoc post-exploitation framework. It remains active. Nearly 1,000 personalized lure pages were identified, targeting Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia and Spain, mainly in technology/IT, finance, education, government, logistics and manufacturing. Preparation began in October 2025 and the operation launched in August 2026. This summary rests on the article alone; no vendor or primary sources were consulted.

    Technical Details

    • Delivery: XaocMail is self-hosted at 185[.]224[.]132[.]148:8585. It sends document-sharing lures that link to ClickFix pages on Cloudflare Workers. The pages spoof Google Docs, Adobe Acrobat, Office365 and SecuredDocs. Each victim gets a unique linkId, which maps to one of ten MSI payloads stored in Cloudflare KV.
    • Execution: the victim pastes a command into the Windows Run dialog, using PowerShell, mshta or msiexec (msiexec preferred). The MSI impersonates Visual Studio Tools, Python or Node.js. It installs an isolated Python 3.11 runtime, and malicious .pyd files masquerade as OpenCV, NumPy, PIL or lxml modules.
    • Persistence: scheduled tasks named after Edge, OneDrive, Defender and Adobe updaters run the beacon every 12 minutes and the watcher every 3 minutes.
    • C2: Phantom53 hides commands in the IPv6 answers to DNS AAAA queries, sent through Google, Cloudflare and ControlD DoH resolvers. It falls back to UDP/53. A sandbox gate delays beaconing, a cookie handshake blocks replay, and a weekly SHA256 DGA yields .xyz fallback domains validated with Ed25519.
    • Payload: the watcher decrypts an AES-256-GCM Havoc Demon blob and loads it reflectively in memory, so nothing is written to disk.
    • Operator console: the Go-based adminka console sends Telegram alerts. Its aliases deliver PowerShell stealers for password-manager extensions, VPN configs, AI-tool secrets (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor), Chrome data, SSH keys, GitHub CLI tokens, crypto wallets and seed phrases, and WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal data. Other aliases install Level RMM, bypass UAC via fodhelper and attempt SMB password guessing against the local Administrator account. Exfiltration goes to 145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125, and the HavoX panel is on port 8000 of the same host.
    • AI use: the codebase has a .claude/ directory, 143 numbered task files and a 117 KB arch.md. A Russian-language prompt, framed as an "authorized red team" task, directs an agent to test an MSI on a VM named "NoAV".

    STRU has not confirmed the attackers' intent. Footholds in technology firms could expose downstream clients to supply-chain risk.

    Remediation

    • Restrict the Run dialog and block unsigned MSI execution from remote URLs.
    • Monitor for pythonw.exe launching from user-writable folders and for scheduled tasks that imitate updaters.
    • Alert on workers.dev landing pages and on high-entropy base36 DNS queries to public DoH resolvers.
    • Train staff on ClickFix-style copy-and-paste prompts.
    • Treat developer secrets, tokens and browser-stored passwords on an infected host as compromised.