SilentAir, a suspected China-nexus actor, hijacks Asian telecom nodes to intercept Taiwanese calls and SMS 2FA codes
Matéria consolidada. Reúne 7 matérias que o Tifon tinha publicado separadamente sobre a mesma história. A IA reescreveu o relatório com o que as 5 fontes trouxeram em 17/11/2026 00:01; os links antigos trazem para cá.
Fontes: securityonline.info ↗ securityaffairs.com ↗ securityweek.com ↗ thehackernews.com ↗ infosecurity-magazine.com ↗
Enea has identified SilentAir, a previously unknown state-level threat actor that intercepts calls and SMS messages, including SMS-based two-factor authentication (2FA) codes, by compromising mobile operator equipment. It primarily targets Taiwanese subscribers, among them political and government VIPs (thehackernews.com, securityweek.com, securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info). Enea has tracked the activity since early 2025, and securityaffairs.com and securityonline.info say SilentAir traffic has come from compromised nodes in at least six Asian countries since before 2025. Some operations extend to East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe (securityweek.com). Attribution to China is made with low confidence only, based on the Taiwan focus, attack timing that matches China work hours (UTC+8), and the absence of Chinese targets (securityweek.com, thehackernews.com, securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info). The related but separate group Liminal Panda is deploying the GTPDoor backdoor in operator networks. Enea says it has blocked several of its access attempts; securityaffairs.com and securityonline.info say Enea blocked several hundred covert GTPDoor sessions from Q1 2026, and securityonline.info says Liminal Panda infections are confirmed at 5 to 10 operators, with several dozen carriers possibly compromised worldwide, mostly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The coverage was published on 12-13 November 2026, with further reports on 16 and 17 November 2026 (securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info).
Detalhes técnicos
- SS7 and Diameter abuse: SilentAir uses hijacked operator nodes to run signaling attacks, mainly over SS7 and occasionally Diameter. These reroute incoming calls and SMS through attacker-controlled nodes, expose subscriber details and track locations (securityweek.com). Within the trusted IPX network, it diverts traffic with fraudulent UpdateLocation messages (thehackernews.com). The interception moves the target's registered location to a node the attacker controls (securityaffairs.com).
- Traffic breakdown: 74.27% of SilentAir traffic was silent SMS, 18.30% was call/SMS interception via malicious UpdateLocation, and 0.22% was location queries (securityonline.info). Interception makes up 18.30% of SilentAir's activity, against 2.07% for typical surveillance vendors (securityaffairs.com).
- Silent SMS: The group sends large-scale silent SMS campaigns, mainly in Taiwan, presumably to verify that diversions are working (thehackernews.com, securityweek.com). They are mostly sent to Taiwanese subscribers around midnight and probably test whether interception still works (securityaffairs.com). The messages used benign English wellness phrases so that victims would dismiss them as spam (securityonline.info).
- Activity pattern and opsec: The attacks come in bursts separated by prolonged gaps, and the group shows advanced operational security (thehackernews.com).
- Aim of 2FA bypass: The campaign shows signs of an ambition to bypass 2FA for account takeovers (infosecurity-magazine.com). Enea saw 2FA codes arrive right after interception, which suggests the goal is account takeover (securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info).
- GTPDoor: GTPDoor is a Unix backdoor that tunnels command-and-control traffic through GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP). A new variant uses GTP-U, which is less monitored and prevalent in 5G environments (infosecurity-magazine.com). Liminal Panda uses it over the IPX network (securityweek.com).
- GTPDoor over GTP-C: v1 and v2 use GTP-C on UDP 2123 (securityonline.info). The blocked sessions carried commands to start and stop tunnels, move laterally, launch SSH, check the malware's health, and delete files and alter timestamps. Half the tunnels lasted under 21 minutes, and a few lasted over 24 hours (securityaffairs.com).
- GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U-Door): It hides an XOR-encrypted payload in GTP-U user-plane traffic on UDP 2152, which is also used in 5G, whereas GTP-C is not. It keeps the same XOR key and uses libpcap, so the listener is less visible to netstat and lsof (securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info).
- Tooling: The operators used modified SGSNemu and EchoBackdoor to build GTP-U tunnels between infected carriers, exfiltrate data and clean up traces (securityonline.info).
- SCTPE: The SCTPE trojan is tied to Liminal Panda. SilentAir answers transactions that SCTPE cannot handle (securityaffairs.com).
- China-nexus basis: The judgment rests on state-level behavior, the Taiwan focus, no targeting of Chinese networks and a UTC+8 working pattern (securityaffairs.com). Non-silent signaling also paused on Chinese holidays (securityonline.info). Earlier reports from CrowdStrike and Palo Alto Networks (CL-STA-0969) tied Liminal Panda to China with low-to-moderate confidence, and POST Luxembourg first reported live GTPDoor detection in July 2026 (securityonline.info).
Remediação
- Enhance signaling protocol defenses and treat IPX networks, including the IPX interface, as untrusted (thehackernews.com, securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info).
- Audit for hijacked nodes and secure signaling infrastructure (securityweek.com).
- Deploy GTP-C and GTP-U firewalls that share information with SS7 and Diameter security tools (securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info). This also covers monitoring for GTP-U-based command-and-control, since the v3 variant targets a less-monitored protocol.
- Monitor internal network and control-plane traffic, where lateral movement tools such as SIGTRANslator and Cordscan can go unnoticed (securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info).
- Integrate telecom security with regular IT security, including feeding core signaling alerts into the IT SOC (securityaffairs.com, securityonline.info).
- Enea has assisted affected operators and blocked several Liminal Panda access attempts, but warns that the risks persist (infosecurity-magazine.com, securityweek.com). securityaffairs.com says Enea helped customers remove Liminal Panda activity, warned operators infected by SilentAir, and considers both groups stopped for now.
Relatos divergentes
- Link to Liminal Panda: infosecurity-magazine.com says the groups are linked via similar infrastructure. thehackernews.com says SilentAir differs from Liminal Panda, with some activity overlaps. securityweek.com says the ties are inconclusive. securityaffairs.com says a link is possible but unconfirmed. securityonline.info (the most recent) says Enea has not confirmed a direct link between the two clusters. The two groups should be treated as separate, with an unproven relationship.
- Account takeovers: infosecurity-magazine.com points to an ambition to bypass 2FA for account takeovers, and securityaffairs.com and securityonline.info say 2FA codes arrived right after interception, suggesting account takeover as the goal. thehackernews.com (the more specific source) says there is no confirming evidence of account takeovers and that no malware samples were uncovered. Account takeover remains an inference, not a confirmed outcome.
- Liminal Panda timeline: securityweek.com says it has been active since early 2026. securityaffairs.com calls it previously known and says Enea's firewall has blocked GTPDoor sessions since Q1 2026, so the early 2026 date may reflect only when blocking started. securityonline.info adds that CrowdStrike and Palo Alto Networks (CL-STA-0969) had already reported on the group earlier, and that POST Luxembourg first reported live GTPDoor detection in July 2026, which also suggests the group predates 2026 reporting.
- SilentAir start date: Enea's tracking dates to early 2025, while securityaffairs.com and securityonline.info say SilentAir has been active in operators since before 2025. The earlier activity is more recent reporting but is not detailed.
- Scale of GTPDoor blocking: Earlier coverage speaks of several blocked access attempts. securityaffairs.com and securityonline.info (the most recent) give several hundred covert GTPDoor sessions blocked from Q1 2026.
- Number of infected operators: securityaffairs.com says Enea sees or suspects 5 to 10 infected operators, while securityonline.info (the most recent) says Liminal Panda infections at 5 to 10 operators are confirmed. Both estimate several dozen carriers may be compromised worldwide.
- Current status: infosecurity-magazine.com and securityweek.com warn that the risks persist. securityaffairs.com says Enea considers both groups stopped for now.
- Confidence: securityweek.com assesses with high confidence that SilentAir is a new state-level actor. Every source agrees the China link is low confidence. securityaffairs.com says Enea suspects a China nexus for both groups, with low confidence for SilentAir. securityonline.info notes that earlier CrowdStrike and Palo Alto Networks reports gave low-to-moderate confidence for Liminal Panda. securityonline.info states that its record is based on the Enea article alone, with no additional research.
Linha do tempo
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LIMINAL PANDA deploys GTPDoor v3 over GTP-U; SilentAir runs SS7 interception and silent SMS campaign against Taiwan
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Enea reports two suspected China-nexus actors operating inside global mobile roaming (IPX) networks. LIMINAL PANDA uses a new Linux variant, GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U-Door), and SilentAir is a newly named state-level actor that abuses SS7 and Diameter signaling to intercept calls, SMS and 2FA codes. Enea blocked hundreds of covert C2 sessions from Q1 2026. It confirmed LIMINAL PANDA infections at 5-10 operators and estimates several dozen carriers are compromised across Asia, Africa and Latin America. SilentAir targeted political and government VIPs, mainly in Taiwan. This record is based on the article alone, and no additional research was performed. Enea has not confirmed a direct link between the two clusters.
Technical Details
- GTPDoor v1 and v2 use GTP-C on UDP 2123. v3 hides an XOR-encrypted payload in GTP-U user-plane traffic on UDP 2152. It uses libpcap, so the listener does not show in netstat or lsof. GTP-U is reused in 5G, whereas GTP-C is not.
- The operators used modified SGSNemu and EchoBackdoor to build GTP-U tunnels between infected carriers, exfiltrate data and clean up traces. Half of the tunnels lasted under 21 minutes.
- SilentAir traffic came from compromised nodes in at least six Asian countries since before 2025. 74.27% was silent SMS, 18.30% was call/SMS interception via malicious UpdateLocation, and 0.22% was location queries. The silent SMS used benign English wellness phrases so that victims would dismiss them as spam. Intercepted 2FA codes were observed immediately after interception.
- Attribution: non-silent signaling followed UTC+8 working hours, paused on Chinese holidays and avoided Chinese carriers. Enea has low confidence in the China-nexus link. Earlier reports from CrowdStrike and Palo Alto Networks (CL-STA-0969) tied LIMINAL PANDA to China with low-to-moderate confidence. POST Luxembourg first reported live GTPDoor detection in July 2026.
Remediation
- Treat the IPX interface as untrusted.
- Deploy GTP-C and GTP-U firewalls that share intelligence with SS7 and Diameter security systems.
- Monitor internal control-plane protocols for lateral movement tools such as SIGTRANslator and Cordscan.
- Feed core signaling alerts into the IT SOC.
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SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA compromise mobile operators to intercept calls and SMS; GTPDoor v3 hides in GTP-U
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Telecom security firm Enea published research on two threat actors inside mobile networks: LIMINAL PANDA, previously known, and SilentAir, newly identified and active in operators since before 2025. Enea suspects a China nexus for both but with low confidence for SilentAir, and a link between the two is possible but unconfirmed. Enea's GTP firewall blocked several hundred covert GTPDoor sessions from Q1 2026. Enea sees or suspects 5 to 10 infected operators and believes there may be several dozen worldwide, mostly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. SilentAir runs SS7 and Diameter attacks from compromised nodes in at least six Asian countries. Its main target is Taiwan, including political figures and government officials. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was done.
Technical Details
- GTPDoor is Unix-based malware that receives hidden commands over GTP-C. The sessions carried commands to start and stop tunnels, move laterally, launch SSH, check the malware's health, and delete files and alter timestamps. Half the tunnels lasted under 21 minutes, and a few lasted over 24 hours.
- GTPDoor v3 hides in GTP-U, which is also used in 5G. It keeps the same XOR key and uses libpcap, so it is less visible to netstat and lsof.
- SilentAir interception moves the target's registered location to a node the attacker controls. Interception makes up 18.30% of its activity, against 2.07% for typical surveillance vendors. Enea saw 2FA codes arrive right after interception, which suggests the goal is account takeover.
- Silent SMS, mostly sent to Taiwanese subscribers around midnight, probably tests whether interception still works.
- The China-nexus judgment rests on state-level behavior, the Taiwan focus, no targeting of Chinese networks and a UTC+8 working pattern.
- The SCTPE trojan is tied to LIMINAL PANDA. SilentAir answers transactions that SCTPE cannot handle.
Remediation
- Deploy GTP-C and GTP-U firewalls that share information with SS7 and Diameter security tools.
- Monitor internal network traffic, where tools such as SIGTRANslator and Cordscan can go unnoticed.
- Treat the IPX interface as untrusted.
- Integrate telecom security with regular IT security.
- Enea says it helped customers remove LIMINAL PANDA activity and warned operators infected by SilentAir. It says both groups have been stopped for now.
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SilentAir State-Level Actor Intercepts Calls and SMS via Compromised Mobile Networks
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Enea has identified a previously unknown state-level threat actor, SilentAir, actively intercepting phone calls and SMS messages by compromising mobile operator network nodes primarily targeting Taiwan. SilentAir conducts signaling attacks mainly through SS7 and occasionally Diameter protocols to reroute communications through hijacked nodes, exfiltrating subscriber details and tracking locations. Monitoring began in early 2025, revealing multiple Asian countries and other global regions under attack, with high-profile political and government figures as targets. A possibly related group, Liminal Panda, has been exploiting mobile operator interconnect networks with backdoors, though ties between the two groups remain inconclusive.
Technical Details
SilentAir utilizes hijacked mobile network nodes to conduct SS7 and Diameter signaling attacks that intercept incoming calls and SMS. The group also sends silent SMS messages to verify interception success. The attackers have targeted operators in at least six Asian countries, with some operations extending to East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Liminal Panda, active since early 2026, exploits the IPX network using the GTPDoor backdoor to communicate with command-and-control servers.
Attribution
SilentAir is assessed with high confidence as a new state-level actor, suspected with low confidence to have China nexus due to targeting Taiwan, attack times aligned with China work hours, and lack of Chinese targets. Liminal Panda is similarly linked with low confidence to China.
Remediation
Enea has detected and blocked several attempts by Liminal Panda to access operator networks, indicating active defense. Mobile operators should audit for hijacked nodes and secure signaling infrastructure to mitigate such interceptions.
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SilentAir Group Exploits Compromised Telecom Equipment to Intercept SMS 2FA Codes Targeting Taiwanese Users
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
The espionage group SilentAir has been observed infiltrating telecom operators across at least six Asian countries, primarily targeting Taiwanese users by intercepting their SMS-based two-factor authentication (2FA) codes and messages. By compromising internal telecom equipment, SilentAir manipulated SS7 and Diameter protocols within the trusted IPX network to divert calls and texts through fraudulent UpdateLocation messages. This allowed them to spy on political and government VIPs among other targets. The attacks, characterized by bursts and prolonged gaps, included large-scale silent SMS campaigns mainly in Taiwan, presumably to verify active diversions. Though Enea, the cybersecurity firm that identified SilentAir, links the group to a state-level actor with low confidence to China based on timing and targeting patterns, no confirming evidence of account takeovers or malware samples was uncovered. The group shows advanced operational security and differs from other known actors like Liminal Panda, though some activity overlaps were noted. Telecom operators were advised to enhance signaling protocol defenses and treat IPX networks as untrusted to mitigate such threats.
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Threat Actor SilentAir Uses Compromised Asian Telcos to Intercept Taiwanese Communications
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
The state-level threat actor SilentAir has been identified conducting sophisticated interception of calls and texts primarily targeting Taiwanese subscribers by exploiting compromised mobile operators in Asia. Enea has tracked the actor's SS7 and Diameter protocol-based attacks since early 2025, involving hijacked operator equipment across multiple countries. The campaign features waves of surveillance and silent SMS targeting, with indications of an ambition to bypass two-factor authentication for account takeovers. Concurrently, the Liminal Panda group, linked via similar infrastructure and attributed to China-nexus operations with low confidence, is deploying a Unix backdoor named GTPDoor that covertly tunnels command-and-control communications through GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP), including a new variant leveraging the less-monitored GTP-U protocol prevalent in 5G environments. Enea has assisted affected operators to mitigate these threats but warns of persistent risks.