CISA, NSA, Australian cyber agencies urge early vendor readiness for PQC transition across critical systems - Industrial Cyber
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), and the National Security Agency (NSA) have released joint guidance and a quick-reference list to help organizations assess whether their vendors are ready to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). As quantum computing advances, widely used public-key cryptography will become vulnerable to compromise by cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). Organizations must therefore plan and move to PQC, which uses algorithms that can withstand both classical and quantum-enabled attacks, before CRQCs arrive.
Many organizations depend on third-party vendors for managed services, cloud capabilities, and other cryptography-dependent products. Cryptography is also embedded in hard-to-update systems with long asset lifecycles, such as industrial control systems and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which often require vendor support or replacement. A successful PQC transition therefore hinges on vendor readiness, and early, structured engagement with suppliers is critical to planning.
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CISA, NSA, Australian cyber agencies urge early vendor readiness for PQC transition across critical systems - Industrial Cyber
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The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), and the National Security Agency (NSA) have released joint guidance and a quick-reference list to help organizations assess whether their vendors are ready to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). As quantum computing advances, widely used public-key cryptography will become vulnerable to compromise by cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). Organizations must therefore plan and move to PQC, which uses algorithms that can withstand both classical and quantum-enabled attacks, before CRQCs arrive.
Many organizations depend on third-party vendors for managed services, cloud capabilities, and other cryptography-dependent products. Cryptography is also embedded in hard-to-update systems with long asset lifecycles, such as industrial control systems and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which often require vendor support or replacement. A successful PQC transition therefore hinges on vendor readiness, and early, structured engagement with suppliers is critical to planning.