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Opinion: Organizations Risk Exposure by Delaying Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 05/11/2026 07:17 · coletado há 1 hora

This is an opinion piece by Tim Hudson, President of OpenSSL Corporation, arguing that organisations should not wait for cryptographically-relevant quantum computers to arrive before preparing their cryptographic infrastructure. The author stresses that cryptographic discovery (identifying where and how cryptography is used) is the first and most time-consuming step, and that 'harvest now, decrypt later' attacks mean encrypted data captured today could be exposed once quantum computing matures. The piece references OpenSSL Library 3.5's support for NIST-standardised ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA algorithms, discusses hybrid classical/post-quantum approaches, and advocates for building long-term cryptographic agility rather than targeting a single migration date. There is no specific vulnerability, incident, exploitation, or breach described; this is a strategic/awareness article aimed at CISOs and security architects.

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  1. itsecurityguru.org ↗ · pub. 05/11/2026 07:17 · coletado 05/11 08:00 primeiro registro

    Opinion: Organizations Risk Exposure by Delaying Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration

    ler a análise desta fonte

    This is an opinion piece by Tim Hudson, President of OpenSSL Corporation, arguing that organisations should not wait for cryptographically-relevant quantum computers to arrive before preparing their cryptographic infrastructure. The author stresses that cryptographic discovery (identifying where and how cryptography is used) is the first and most time-consuming step, and that 'harvest now, decrypt later' attacks mean encrypted data captured today could be exposed once quantum computing matures. The piece references OpenSSL Library 3.5's support for NIST-standardised ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA algorithms, discusses hybrid classical/post-quantum approaches, and advocates for building long-term cryptographic agility rather than targeting a single migration date. There is no specific vulnerability, incident, exploitation, or breach described; this is a strategic/awareness article aimed at CISOs and security architects.