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Suspected Kimsuky Uses Reply-Based Spearphishing and aNotepad C2 to Deliver XenoRAT and New NodeLinkRAT Against South Korean Target

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 16/11/2026 22:00 · coletado há 17 horas

Genians Security Center (GSC) reports a campaign that ran from June to October 2026. It is linked with moderate confidence to North Korea's Kimsuky group. On September 12, 2026, an actor impersonating an aide to a South Korean National Assembly member emailed a seminar attendee and deliberately omitted the attachment. After the victim replied that nothing was attached, the actor sent a ZIP archive containing a malicious .hwp.lnk shortcut. The shortcut started a chain that polled anotepad.com for Base64 commands. By editing the note, the operators switched payloads five times, from XenoRAT to cloud-exfiltration scripts and finally to the Node.js implant NodeLinkRAT on October 16. This article is the only source, and no vendor advisory or other source was consulted.

Detalhes técnicos

  • The LNK's remote icon path points to the GitHub repository norrisk983/hukushima. It runs a hidden PowerShell that rebuilds an obfuscated command, then uses curl.exe to fetch a second stage from epaper.dothome.co.kr.
  • The script opens an HWP decoy, deletes the LNK, and drops the VBScript j1u3ulqPQeRHnA.Jcu and the PowerShell script UPA.ps1 into %APPDATA%.
  • A scheduled task named CommonMaintenanceHost runs UPA.ps1 every 38 minutes. It pulls Base64 text between the markers 887wgJs8 and nfJgcBI from anotepad.com and runs it in memory.
  • On June 18 the note delivered an in-memory XenoRAT variant disguised as MSOfficeServer (Updater.exe), with C2 at 103.81.116.10.
  • On September 18 and 27 the scripts enumerated antivirus products, Telegram folders and recent files. They uploaded the results to Dropbox and MEGA via an unattended MEGAcmd install.
  • On September 28 the note switched to stealing Office, PDF, HWP and image files, sent to oppsite.dothome.co.kr.
  • On October 16 NodeLinkRAT was deployed. It downloads node-v24.21.0-win-x64.zip from nodejs.org into C:\Users\Public\Musicjs and installs the npm packages socket.io-client, screenshot-desktop and ps-node. It creates the marker unins000.dat and drops teamview.js.
  • NodeLinkRAT connects to 207.148.112.166:3000 over Socket.IO with a hardcoded AES-256-GCM key. It supports shell commands, file theft and screenshots.
  • Attribution rests on four points. A Dropbox account was registered to [email protected], which was used in 2025 phishing. NAVER MYBOX phishing kits on 185.27.134.0/24 matched a December 2024 Kimsuky campaign. The three XenoRAT samples share the project GUID 200b1ad6-f1ff-49de-aa9c-b07d2615cdec. The operators also used the NAVER-lookalike domain nid.weffm.p-e.kr.
  • Three victim identifiers on the September 18 note page indicate several victims were managed at once.

Remediação

  • Hunt for the CommonMaintenanceHost scheduled task.
  • Check %LOCALAPPDATA%\MEGAcmd for unauthorized installs.
  • Audit C:\Users\Public\Music for njs folders, unins000.dat and teamview.js.
  • Retain PowerShell logs.
  • Use behavior-based EDR to flag scripts that periodically poll note-sharing sites such as anotepad.com.

Linha do tempo

  1. securityonline.info ↗ · pub. 16/11/2026 22:00 · coletado 16/11 23:00 primeiro registro

    Suspected Kimsuky Uses Reply-Based Spearphishing and aNotepad C2 to Deliver XenoRAT and New NodeLinkRAT Against South Korean Target

    ler a análise desta fonte

    Genians Security Center (GSC) reports a campaign that ran from June to October 2026. It is linked with moderate confidence to North Korea's Kimsuky group. On September 12, 2026, an actor impersonating an aide to a South Korean National Assembly member emailed a seminar attendee and deliberately omitted the attachment. After the victim replied that nothing was attached, the actor sent a ZIP archive containing a malicious .hwp.lnk shortcut. The shortcut started a chain that polled anotepad.com for Base64 commands. By editing the note, the operators switched payloads five times, from XenoRAT to cloud-exfiltration scripts and finally to the Node.js implant NodeLinkRAT on October 16. This article is the only source, and no vendor advisory or other source was consulted.

    Technical Details

    • The LNK's remote icon path points to the GitHub repository norrisk983/hukushima. It runs a hidden PowerShell that rebuilds an obfuscated command, then uses curl.exe to fetch a second stage from epaper.dothome.co.kr.
    • The script opens an HWP decoy, deletes the LNK, and drops the VBScript j1u3ulqPQeRHnA.Jcu and the PowerShell script UPA.ps1 into %APPDATA%.
    • A scheduled task named CommonMaintenanceHost runs UPA.ps1 every 38 minutes. It pulls Base64 text between the markers 887wgJs8 and nfJgcBI from anotepad.com and runs it in memory.
    • On June 18 the note delivered an in-memory XenoRAT variant disguised as MSOfficeServer (Updater.exe), with C2 at 103.81.116.10.
    • On September 18 and 27 the scripts enumerated antivirus products, Telegram folders and recent files. They uploaded the results to Dropbox and MEGA via an unattended MEGAcmd install.
    • On September 28 the note switched to stealing Office, PDF, HWP and image files, sent to oppsite.dothome.co.kr.
    • On October 16 NodeLinkRAT was deployed. It downloads node-v24.21.0-win-x64.zip from nodejs.org into C:\Users\Public\Musicjs and installs the npm packages socket.io-client, screenshot-desktop and ps-node. It creates the marker unins000.dat and drops teamview.js.
    • NodeLinkRAT connects to 207.148.112.166:3000 over Socket.IO with a hardcoded AES-256-GCM key. It supports shell commands, file theft and screenshots.
    • Attribution rests on four points. A Dropbox account was registered to [email protected], which was used in 2025 phishing. NAVER MYBOX phishing kits on 185.27.134.0/24 matched a December 2024 Kimsuky campaign. The three XenoRAT samples share the project GUID 200b1ad6-f1ff-49de-aa9c-b07d2615cdec. The operators also used the NAVER-lookalike domain nid.weffm.p-e.kr.
    • Three victim identifiers on the September 18 note page indicate several victims were managed at once.

    Remediation

    • Hunt for the CommonMaintenanceHost scheduled task.
    • Check %LOCALAPPDATA%\MEGAcmd for unauthorized installs.
    • Audit C:\Users\Public\Music for njs folders, unins000.dat and teamview.js.
    • Retain PowerShell logs.
    • Use behavior-based EDR to flag scripts that periodically poll note-sharing sites such as anotepad.com.