Suspected Kimsuky Uses Reply-Based Spearphishing and aNotepad C2 to Deliver XenoRAT and New NodeLinkRAT Against South Korean Target
Genians Security Center (GSC) reports a campaign that ran from June to October 2026. It is linked with moderate confidence to North Korea's Kimsuky group. On September 12, 2026, an actor impersonating an aide to a South Korean National Assembly member emailed a seminar attendee and deliberately omitted the attachment. After the victim replied that nothing was attached, the actor sent a ZIP archive containing a malicious .hwp.lnk shortcut. The shortcut started a chain that polled anotepad.com for Base64 commands. By editing the note, the operators switched payloads five times, from XenoRAT to cloud-exfiltration scripts and finally to the Node.js implant NodeLinkRAT on October 16. This article is the only source, and no vendor advisory or other source was consulted.
Detalhes técnicos
- The LNK's remote icon path points to the GitHub repository norrisk983/hukushima. It runs a hidden PowerShell that rebuilds an obfuscated command, then uses curl.exe to fetch a second stage from epaper.dothome.co.kr.
- The script opens an HWP decoy, deletes the LNK, and drops the VBScript j1u3ulqPQeRHnA.Jcu and the PowerShell script UPA.ps1 into %APPDATA%.
- A scheduled task named CommonMaintenanceHost runs UPA.ps1 every 38 minutes. It pulls Base64 text between the markers 887wgJs8 and nfJgcBI from anotepad.com and runs it in memory.
- On June 18 the note delivered an in-memory XenoRAT variant disguised as MSOfficeServer (Updater.exe), with C2 at 103.81.116.10.
- On September 18 and 27 the scripts enumerated antivirus products, Telegram folders and recent files. They uploaded the results to Dropbox and MEGA via an unattended MEGAcmd install.
- On September 28 the note switched to stealing Office, PDF, HWP and image files, sent to oppsite.dothome.co.kr.
- On October 16 NodeLinkRAT was deployed. It downloads node-v24.21.0-win-x64.zip from nodejs.org into C:\Users\Public\Musicjs and installs the npm packages socket.io-client, screenshot-desktop and ps-node. It creates the marker unins000.dat and drops teamview.js.
- NodeLinkRAT connects to 207.148.112.166:3000 over Socket.IO with a hardcoded AES-256-GCM key. It supports shell commands, file theft and screenshots.
- Attribution rests on four points. A Dropbox account was registered to [email protected], which was used in 2025 phishing. NAVER MYBOX phishing kits on 185.27.134.0/24 matched a December 2024 Kimsuky campaign. The three XenoRAT samples share the project GUID 200b1ad6-f1ff-49de-aa9c-b07d2615cdec. The operators also used the NAVER-lookalike domain nid.weffm.p-e.kr.
- Three victim identifiers on the September 18 note page indicate several victims were managed at once.
Remediação
- Hunt for the CommonMaintenanceHost scheduled task.
- Check %LOCALAPPDATA%\MEGAcmd for unauthorized installs.
- Audit C:\Users\Public\Music for njs folders, unins000.dat and teamview.js.
- Retain PowerShell logs.
- Use behavior-based EDR to flag scripts that periodically poll note-sharing sites such as anotepad.com.
Linha do tempo
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Suspected Kimsuky Uses Reply-Based Spearphishing and aNotepad C2 to Deliver XenoRAT and New NodeLinkRAT Against South Korean Target
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Genians Security Center (GSC) reports a campaign that ran from June to October 2026. It is linked with moderate confidence to North Korea's Kimsuky group. On September 12, 2026, an actor impersonating an aide to a South Korean National Assembly member emailed a seminar attendee and deliberately omitted the attachment. After the victim replied that nothing was attached, the actor sent a ZIP archive containing a malicious .hwp.lnk shortcut. The shortcut started a chain that polled anotepad.com for Base64 commands. By editing the note, the operators switched payloads five times, from XenoRAT to cloud-exfiltration scripts and finally to the Node.js implant NodeLinkRAT on October 16. This article is the only source, and no vendor advisory or other source was consulted.
Technical Details
- The LNK's remote icon path points to the GitHub repository norrisk983/hukushima. It runs a hidden PowerShell that rebuilds an obfuscated command, then uses curl.exe to fetch a second stage from epaper.dothome.co.kr.
- The script opens an HWP decoy, deletes the LNK, and drops the VBScript j1u3ulqPQeRHnA.Jcu and the PowerShell script UPA.ps1 into %APPDATA%.
- A scheduled task named CommonMaintenanceHost runs UPA.ps1 every 38 minutes. It pulls Base64 text between the markers 887wgJs8 and nfJgcBI from anotepad.com and runs it in memory.
- On June 18 the note delivered an in-memory XenoRAT variant disguised as MSOfficeServer (Updater.exe), with C2 at 103.81.116.10.
- On September 18 and 27 the scripts enumerated antivirus products, Telegram folders and recent files. They uploaded the results to Dropbox and MEGA via an unattended MEGAcmd install.
- On September 28 the note switched to stealing Office, PDF, HWP and image files, sent to oppsite.dothome.co.kr.
- On October 16 NodeLinkRAT was deployed. It downloads node-v24.21.0-win-x64.zip from nodejs.org into C:\Users\Public\Musicjs and installs the npm packages socket.io-client, screenshot-desktop and ps-node. It creates the marker unins000.dat and drops teamview.js.
- NodeLinkRAT connects to 207.148.112.166:3000 over Socket.IO with a hardcoded AES-256-GCM key. It supports shell commands, file theft and screenshots.
- Attribution rests on four points. A Dropbox account was registered to [email protected], which was used in 2025 phishing. NAVER MYBOX phishing kits on 185.27.134.0/24 matched a December 2024 Kimsuky campaign. The three XenoRAT samples share the project GUID 200b1ad6-f1ff-49de-aa9c-b07d2615cdec. The operators also used the NAVER-lookalike domain nid.weffm.p-e.kr.
- Three victim identifiers on the September 18 note page indicate several victims were managed at once.
Remediation
- Hunt for the CommonMaintenanceHost scheduled task.
- Check %LOCALAPPDATA%\MEGAcmd for unauthorized installs.
- Audit C:\Users\Public\Music for njs folders, unins000.dat and teamview.js.
- Retain PowerShell logs.
- Use behavior-based EDR to flag scripts that periodically poll note-sharing sites such as anotepad.com.