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REF3364 deploys SANSAR Linux cryptominer with rootkit and NVML wrapper hiding GPU activity via exposed Ray job agents

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 16/11/2026 06:32 · coletado há 51 minutos

A financially motivated cluster tracked as REF3364 was observed in late October 2026 running a Linux cryptomining operation built on the SANSAR toolkit, according to Elastic Security Labs. Initial access came through an exposed Ray job agent that allowed command execution. The actor then installed a kernel rootkit, a modified NVML wrapper that falsifies GPU readings, and the netns backdoor. Attribution is unknown, but Turkish-language comments were found in the rootkit source. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was run.

Detalhes técnicos

  • Access: Jobs on the exposed Ray agent ran nvidia-smi to collect the GPU inventory. A Python reverse shell job followed, and an SSH key was added to authorized_keys for persistence.
  • Install: After obtaining root, the actor staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module through DKMS and added an initramfs loader so the rootkit reloads at boot.
  • NVML wrapper: It hooks NVML calls so that GPU utilization reads 0%. Temperature is replaced with random values of 36–46 °C and power with random values of 100–200 W.
  • SANSAR: This Rust orchestrator checks TracerPid to detect debugging. It communicates with a TOR onion service through Arti and launches the miners. The CPU branch runs kurt (XMRig 6.25.0) and the GPU branch runs tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9). It can also spawn shells and launch a TCP SYN traffic task. The lyrebird TOR proxy is also delivered.
  • Rootkit: It uses ftrace to hide processes, files and sockets by intercepting system calls.
  • netns: This systemd-registered backdoor reads the controller IP from an Ethereum smart contract (0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349). It then opens a reverse shell over TCP port 8080.

Remediação

Elastic advises restricting who can submit jobs to Ray and checking whether GPU monitoring libraries have been tampered with.

Linha do tempo

  1. thehackernews.com ↗ · pub. 16/11/2026 06:32 · coletado 16/11 08:00 primeiro registro

    REF3364 deploys SANSAR Linux cryptominer with rootkit and NVML wrapper hiding GPU activity via exposed Ray job agents

    ler a análise desta fonte

    A financially motivated cluster tracked as REF3364 was observed in late October 2026 running a Linux cryptomining operation built on the SANSAR toolkit, according to Elastic Security Labs. Initial access came through an exposed Ray job agent that allowed command execution. The actor then installed a kernel rootkit, a modified NVML wrapper that falsifies GPU readings, and the netns backdoor. Attribution is unknown, but Turkish-language comments were found in the rootkit source. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was run.

    Technical Details

    • Access: Jobs on the exposed Ray agent ran nvidia-smi to collect the GPU inventory. A Python reverse shell job followed, and an SSH key was added to authorized_keys for persistence.
    • Install: After obtaining root, the actor staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module through DKMS and added an initramfs loader so the rootkit reloads at boot.
    • NVML wrapper: It hooks NVML calls so that GPU utilization reads 0%. Temperature is replaced with random values of 36–46 °C and power with random values of 100–200 W.
    • SANSAR: This Rust orchestrator checks TracerPid to detect debugging. It communicates with a TOR onion service through Arti and launches the miners. The CPU branch runs kurt (XMRig 6.25.0) and the GPU branch runs tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9). It can also spawn shells and launch a TCP SYN traffic task. The lyrebird TOR proxy is also delivered.
    • Rootkit: It uses ftrace to hide processes, files and sockets by intercepting system calls.
    • netns: This systemd-registered backdoor reads the controller IP from an Ethereum smart contract (0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349). It then opens a reverse shell over TCP port 8080.

    Remediation

    Elastic advises restricting who can submit jobs to Ray and checking whether GPU monitoring libraries have been tampered with.