REF3364 deploys SANSAR Linux cryptominer with rootkit and NVML wrapper hiding GPU activity via exposed Ray job agents
A financially motivated cluster tracked as REF3364 was observed in late October 2026 running a Linux cryptomining operation built on the SANSAR toolkit, according to Elastic Security Labs. Initial access came through an exposed Ray job agent that allowed command execution. The actor then installed a kernel rootkit, a modified NVML wrapper that falsifies GPU readings, and the netns backdoor. Attribution is unknown, but Turkish-language comments were found in the rootkit source. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was run.
Detalhes técnicos
- Access: Jobs on the exposed Ray agent ran nvidia-smi to collect the GPU inventory. A Python reverse shell job followed, and an SSH key was added to authorized_keys for persistence.
- Install: After obtaining root, the actor staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module through DKMS and added an initramfs loader so the rootkit reloads at boot.
- NVML wrapper: It hooks NVML calls so that GPU utilization reads 0%. Temperature is replaced with random values of 36–46 °C and power with random values of 100–200 W.
- SANSAR: This Rust orchestrator checks TracerPid to detect debugging. It communicates with a TOR onion service through Arti and launches the miners. The CPU branch runs kurt (XMRig 6.25.0) and the GPU branch runs tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9). It can also spawn shells and launch a TCP SYN traffic task. The lyrebird TOR proxy is also delivered.
- Rootkit: It uses ftrace to hide processes, files and sockets by intercepting system calls.
- netns: This systemd-registered backdoor reads the controller IP from an Ethereum smart contract (0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349). It then opens a reverse shell over TCP port 8080.
Remediação
Elastic advises restricting who can submit jobs to Ray and checking whether GPU monitoring libraries have been tampered with.
Linha do tempo
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REF3364 deploys SANSAR Linux cryptominer with rootkit and NVML wrapper hiding GPU activity via exposed Ray job agents
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
A financially motivated cluster tracked as REF3364 was observed in late October 2026 running a Linux cryptomining operation built on the SANSAR toolkit, according to Elastic Security Labs. Initial access came through an exposed Ray job agent that allowed command execution. The actor then installed a kernel rootkit, a modified NVML wrapper that falsifies GPU readings, and the netns backdoor. Attribution is unknown, but Turkish-language comments were found in the rootkit source. This summary rests on the article alone, because no web research was run.
Technical Details
- Access: Jobs on the exposed Ray agent ran nvidia-smi to collect the GPU inventory. A Python reverse shell job followed, and an SSH key was added to authorized_keys for persistence.
- Install: After obtaining root, the actor staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module through DKMS and added an initramfs loader so the rootkit reloads at boot.
- NVML wrapper: It hooks NVML calls so that GPU utilization reads 0%. Temperature is replaced with random values of 36–46 °C and power with random values of 100–200 W.
- SANSAR: This Rust orchestrator checks TracerPid to detect debugging. It communicates with a TOR onion service through Arti and launches the miners. The CPU branch runs kurt (XMRig 6.25.0) and the GPU branch runs tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9). It can also spawn shells and launch a TCP SYN traffic task. The lyrebird TOR proxy is also delivered.
- Rootkit: It uses ftrace to hide processes, files and sockets by intercepting system calls.
- netns: This systemd-registered backdoor reads the controller IP from an Ethereum smart contract (0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349). It then opens a reverse shell over TCP port 8080.
Remediation
Elastic advises restricting who can submit jobs to Ray and checking whether GPU monitoring libraries have been tampered with.