BlackNevas ransomware destroys an organization's VMware ESXi estate and backups in 10 days via stolen credentials and vCenter
Matéria consolidada. Reúne 4 matérias que o Tifon tinha publicado separadamente sobre a mesma história. A IA reescreveu o relatório com o que as 3 fontes trouxeram em 17/11/2026 12:08; os links antigos trazem para cá.
Fontes: securityonline.info ↗ gbhackers.com ↗ securelist.com ↗
The BlackNevas ransomware group destroyed an organization's entire VMware ESXi virtualization infrastructure over about ten days, including hosts, virtual machines, vCenter Server Appliances and backup environments. The case was analyzed by Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team (securelist.com), covered again a day later (gbhackers.com) and summarized on 2026-11-17 (securityonline.info). The victim lost four ESXi hosts, two vCenter Server Appliances and all guest VMs (securityonline.info). The attackers exploited no ESXi hypervisor vulnerabilities and no memory corruption. They used legitimate VMware management interfaces and stolen administrative credentials (securelist.com, gbhackers.com). Initial access came from credential reuse on compromised Windows systems and from backup infrastructure abuse (securelist.com). The attackers reached Domain Admin in about five hours on Day 2 and compromised the backup server and both vCenter appliances on Day 3 (securityonline.info). Attribution to BlackNevas rests on the ransom notes, and the link to the Trigona lineage is only suspected (securityonline.info). The incident shows how weakly the virtualization layer is monitored, and how reachable vCenter and backup systems are once credentials are stolen.
Entenda a falha
A vulnerabilidade
CVE-2025-64393 is a deserialization flaw in the Backup Viewer role of Veeam Backup & Replication. According to gbhackers.com, a single low-privilege role can lead to SYSTEM-level code execution on the backup server. The articles give no affected or fixed versions and no CVSS score, and they do not say what network access or other conditions an attacker needs. It is cited only as context on backup-software risk. Neither source says it was exploited in the BlackNevas intrusion, which used stolen valid credentials and legitimate VMware management interfaces.
Como funciona
The articles do not describe the internal flow of CVE-2025-64393. They say only that a Backup Viewer role can yield SYSTEM execution on the backup server through deserialization. gbhackers.com separately mentions a BinaryFormatter deserialization RCE in Veeam Backup & Replication that lets low-privileged domain users run code, as a similar flaw, without saying whether it is the same bug. In the BlackNevas incident the attackers gained administrative execution on the backup servers by other means. They extracted stored service accounts, hypervisor credentials and repository access, then pivoted to vCenter and ESXi.
Por que é vulnerável
The articles name the class of flaw, deserialization, and say one low-privilege role is enough to reach SYSTEM execution. They do not explain why it went unnoticed or what the fix changes. gbhackers.com stresses that patching alone is not enough when a recovery system shares the production identity plane, and recommends separating backup authority from production Active Directory.
Como foi descoberta
The articles do not say how or by whom CVE-2025-64393 was found or reported. The BlackNevas intrusion was documented by Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team (GERT), which found no hypervisor exploitation, only valid accounts and legitimate management interfaces. gbhackers.com cites the CVE only as context.
Explicação gerada por IA a partir da matéria e dos artigos, em 17/11/2026 12:23.
Detalhes técnicos
- Access: Valid credentials (MITRE ATT&CK T1078) came from non-virtualization systems and backup servers, and were used for lateral movement to vCenter and connected backup environments (gbhackers.com). The credentials were harvested from the Windows estate and backup systems (securityonline.info).
- Privilege escalation and spread: Domain Admin was reached in about five hours on Day 2. The backup server and both vCenter appliances were compromised on Day 3 (securityonline.info).
- Persistence: The attackers used common management and tunneling tools, MeshAgent and Ligolo-ng reverse tunnels (securelist.com, gbhackers.com). On the disaster-recovery vCenter appliance they logged in as root over SSH and installed MeshAgent (MeshCentral) within 43 seconds, then switched to MeshAgent access (securityonline.info). They registered a Ligolo-ng v0.8.2 reverse tunnel as the systemd service vmware-vdma.service, with the binary placed in a VMware directory. The tunnel ran over TCP 443 to a lookalike Cloudflare domain (securityonline.info).
- SSH enablement: They manipulated vCenter Host Profiles to enable SSH on ESXi hosts, which gave direct remote access and a route to deploy the ransomware payloads (securelist.com, gbhackers.com). On Day 10 a Host Profile was modified to start the TSM-SSH service on the managed ESXi hosts. vCenter pushed the profile and SSH was running 33 seconds later (securityonline.info).
- Payload delivery: The attackers connected over SSH from the trusted vCenter IP and uploaded the locker to the temporary folder by SFTP with a Bitvise FlowSsh client (securityonline.info).
- Removing recovery options: Before detonation, antivirus and backup services were disabled and backup repositories were encrypted (gbhackers.com). On Day 11 backup services were stopped and the backup server was encrypted. SMB shares were hit at 52 minutes and administrators were locked out at 2h08 (securityonline.info).
- Payload: The ransomware is described as related to the Trigona-derived BlackNevas family (gbhackers.com). It damaged virtual disks and crippled recovery (securelist.com, gbhackers.com). The locker (esx64) was first run with /selftest, then with forward-slash arguments against /vmfs/ in wipe and detached mode. It overwrote the first 2 KB of VMDK files and created ._wipe markers, leaving every guest VM unbootable in about three hours (securityonline.info).
- Attribution confidence: Attribution to BlackNevas rests on the ransom notes. The code link to the Trigona lineage is suspected at medium-to-high confidence because the locker binary was not recovered (securityonline.info).
- Underground chatter: Brandefense telemetry recorded 12 dark-chat posts mentioning BlackNevas between August and November 2026 (securityonline.info).
- Logging: ESXi logs live in volatile memory, so remote logging is required to preserve evidence (gbhackers.com).
Remediação
- Treat vCenter as a Tier 0 asset and restrict administrative accounts (securelist.com, gbhackers.com). Keep its identities separate from corporate AD (securityonline.info).
- Enable multi-factor authentication and keep lockdown mode enabled on ESXi hosts (gbhackers.com). Keep execInstalledOnly enabled (securityonline.info).
- Isolate backup infrastructure and segregate it from production domains (securelist.com, gbhackers.com), on a separate identity plane (securityonline.info).
- Implement comprehensive detection and logging, including remote logging of ESXi logs (securelist.com, gbhackers.com). Forward ESXi auth.log, shell.log, vpxa.log and vobd.log to an external syslog server (securityonline.info).
- Alert on Host Profile remediations that enable TSM-SSH outside maintenance windows, especially when followed by SSH from the vCenter IP (securityonline.info).
- Defenders should also watch for MeshAgent or Ligolo-ng activity. This item is inferred from the described tactics, not listed as a recommendation in the sources.
Relatos divergentes
- Payload effect: securelist.com, the more detailed and primary source, says the payloads partially overwrote virtual disk metadata. gbhackers.com says the payload wiped virtual machine disks by destroying critical boot records. securityonline.info, which says it is based on the article alone, says the locker overwrote the first 2 KB of VMDK files, which is consistent with the securelist.com wording. The gbhackers.com description may not be equivalent, and the securelist.com wording should be preferred.
- Veeam CVE: gbhackers.com cites CVE-2025-64393 in Veeam Backup & Replication as a critical flaw commonly exploited in such attacks. Neither source says it was exploited in this incident, and securityonline.info does not mention it. securelist.com attributes backup access to abuse of the backup infrastructure, without naming a CVE.
- Trigona link: gbhackers.com describes the ransomware as related to the Trigona-derived BlackNevas family. securityonline.info, the more recent source, says the code link to Trigona is only suspected at medium-to-high confidence because the locker binary was not recovered.
Linha do tempo
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BlackNevas ESXi ransomware abuses vCenter Host Profiles to enable SSH and wipe virtualized infrastructure after backup compromise
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Kaspersky GERT investigated a 10-day intrusion in which BlackNevas ransomware destroyed an organization's whole virtualized estate: four ESXi hosts, two vCenter Server Appliances and all guest VMs. No hypervisor vulnerability was exploited. The attackers used credentials harvested from the Windows estate and backup systems, reached Domain Admin in about five hours on Day 2, and compromised the backup server and both vCenter appliances on Day 3. Attribution to BlackNevas rests on the ransom notes. The code link to the Trigona lineage is suspected, at medium-to-high confidence, because the locker binary was not recovered. This summary is based on the article alone; no vendor or primary-source research was done.
Technical Details
- On the disaster-recovery vCenter appliance, the attackers logged in as root over SSH and installed MeshAgent (MeshCentral) within 43 seconds. They then switched to MeshAgent access.
- They registered a Ligolo-ng v0.8.2 reverse tunnel as the systemd service vmware-vdma.service, with the binary placed in a VMware directory. The tunnel ran over TCP 443 to a lookalike Cloudflare domain.
- On Day 10 they modified a vCenter Host Profile to start the TSM-SSH service on the managed ESXi hosts. vCenter pushed the profile and SSH was running 33 seconds later.
- They then connected over SSH from the trusted vCenter IP and uploaded the locker to the temporary folder by SFTP with a Bitvise FlowSsh client.
- On Day 11 they stopped backup services and encrypted the backup server. SMB shares were hit at 52 minutes and administrators were locked out at 2h08.
- The locker (esx64) was first run with /selftest. It then ran with forward-slash arguments against /vmfs/ in wipe and detached mode. It overwrote the first 2 KB of VMDK files and created ._wipe markers, leaving every guest VM unbootable in about three hours.
- Brandefense telemetry recorded 12 dark-chat posts mentioning BlackNevas between August and November 2026.
Remediation
- Treat vCenter as a Tier 0 asset with identities separate from corporate AD.
- Keep execInstalledOnly enabled.
- Forward ESXi auth.log, shell.log, vpxa.log and vobd.log to an external syslog server.
- Alert on Host Profile remediations that enable TSM-SSH outside maintenance windows, especially when followed by SSH from the vCenter IP.
- Isolate backup servers on a separate identity plane.
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BlackNevas ransomware group destroys VMware ESXi virtual machines and backup infrastructure via legitimate management interfaces
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
The BlackNevas ransomware group executed a destructive 10-day intrusion targeting VMware ESXi virtualization infrastructures. Using legitimate administrative VMware management interfaces and stolen credentials, they accessed vCenter Server Appliances and connected backup environments without exploiting hypervisor flaws or memory corruption. The attackers leveraged valid credentials (MITRE ATT&CK T1078) obtained from non-virtualization systems and backup servers to move laterally, deploying tools such as MeshAgent and Ligolo-ng reverse tunnels to maintain persistence. They manipulated vCenter Host Profiles to enable SSH on ESXi hosts, facilitating further access. Prior to payload detonation, antivirus and backup services were disabled and backup repositories encrypted, effectively removing recovery options. The ransomware payload, related to the Trigona-derived BlackNevas family, wiped virtual machine disks by destroying critical boot records. Defense recommendations include treating vCenter as a Tier 0 asset, enabling multi-factor authentication, maintaining system lockdown modes, and segregating backup from production domains. ESXi logs reside in volatile memory requiring remote logging. This incident underscores the risk posed by credential compromise and backup environment vulnerabilities, especially critical flaws like CVE-2025-64393 in Veeam Backup & Replication, commonly exploited in such attacks.
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BlackNevas ransomware destroys ESXi virtualization estate via legitimate management interfaces
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
In a detailed investigation, Kaspersky’s Global Emergency Response Team analyzed a devastating ransomware campaign by the BlackNevas group that destroyed an organization's entire VMware ESXi virtualization infrastructure, including hosts, virtual machines, vCenter Server Appliances, and backup environments over ten days. Notably, the attackers did not exploit any ESXi hypervisor vulnerabilities; instead, they used legitimate VMware management interfaces and stolen administrative credentials to gain access and persist within the environment. The initial access vectors included credential reuse from compromised Windows systems and backup infrastructure abuse, with the adversaries establishing persistence via common management tools like MeshAgent and Ligolo-ng. The attackers manipulated vCenter Host Profiles to enable SSH on ESXi hosts, allowing direct remote access and subsequent deployment of ransomware payloads that partially overwrote virtual disk metadata, crippling recovery capabilities. The attack underscores the challenges in monitoring and securing virtualization layers, emphasizing the need to treat vCenter as a Tier 0 asset, restrict administrative accounts, isolate backup infrastructure, and implement comprehensive detection and logging strategies.