CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect host clients exploited via guest file-transfer spray to compromise MSP technician workstations
Huntress reports that CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9, disclosed by ConnectWise on September 8, 2026 and added to CISA KEV on September 11) is being exploited against MSP technicians. A malicious guest in a Support or Access session can push a file to the technician's ScreenConnect host client, which runs it with elevated rights and no prompt. ConnectWise lists 26.6.5 as the fixed version for host clients and Access agents. Huntress observed a full compromise on November 12, in which a guest-pushed update_224ac089.bat led to a rogue rebranded ScreenConnect client connecting to masterdarky[.]com. The attacker also sprayed 688,000 run-file requests across 42 MSP servers and tried a path-traversal drop into a technician's Startup folder. Huntress says the SCKit campaign is distinct and does not directly exploit this CVE.
Entenda a falha
A vulnerabilidade
CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9) is a flaw in the ConnectWise ScreenConnect host client and Access agents. In Support and Access sessions, a malicious guest can trigger file-transfer actions that the technician's host client processes without authorization or confirmation, including running the file with elevated rights. The attacker needs a guest session on the MSP's server, either their own or one slipped into a real customer session, and the technician must join it. No prompt appears. The result is code execution on the technician's workstation. ConnectWise lists 26.6.5 as the fixed version for host clients and Access agents; a server-side update alone does not fix it.
Como funciona
A technician joins a Support or Access session, and the host client and the guest machine can then exchange files. Normally the technician decides what moves and what runs. Here, the guest sends a file-transfer or run-file request and the technician's host client carries it out on its own, without asking. In the observed attack, the client ran a guest-pushed update_224ac089.bat, which fetched and unpacked an MSI and started a rebranded ScreenConnect client connected to the attacker's relay. The whole sequence took about 9 seconds.
Por que é vulnerável
According to ConnectWise's advisory as quoted by Huntress, the host client handles guest-initiated file-transfer actions without authorization or confirmation from the technician. In effect it trusts the guest side of the session and runs the file with elevated rights. The articles do not explain why this went unnoticed. The fix is in the host client and Access agent, in 26.6.5. Removing the TransferFiles permission is the interim mitigation.
Como foi descoberta
ConnectWise disclosed CVE-2026-84869 on September 8, 2026, and CISA added it to the KEV catalog on September 11. The articles do not say who found the flaw or how. Huntress, whose Rapid Response work covered related ScreenConnect activity, reported the exploitation. It saw a technician compromise on November 12 in process telemetry from the workstation. It also saw the spray of run-file requests in the server databases of 42 MSP servers, between October 20 and November 16.
PoC existente, privada
O exploit existe, mas quem o tem não o publicou.
No published exploit is mentioned, but the flaw is exploited in the wild. Huntress observed a working chain from a guest-pushed batch file to a rogue ScreenConnect client on a technician's machine, as well as a harmless marker.txt canary pushed as a test. The attackers also made 688,000 run-file requests across 42 servers and tried a path-traversal drop into a Startup folder. This is a working, in-use exploit with no public copy, and the KEV listing makes patching urgent. Patch host clients and Access agents to 26.6.5.
Explicação gerada por IA a partir da matéria e dos artigos, em 16/11/2026 21:17.
Detalhes técnicos
- The chain starts when the technician joins a session. The host client runs update_<8hex>.bat, which relaunches hidden via PowerShell and reports to a Telegram bot. It then downloads WindowsUpdate.msi with curl and unpacks it with msiexec /a. It enables seclogon, launches the payload with runas /trustlevel:0x20000, and starts WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe pointing at masterdarky[.]com:8041. The whole sequence took about 9 seconds.
- Between October 20 and November 16, 29 source IPs made 688,000 run-file requests on 42 servers. The five sessions that sprayed update_224ac089.bat carried the Company property "crypto client".
- A canary file, marker.txt, was pushed from 91.224.92[.]167. A Startup-folder traversal for Sync.bat came from 193.26.115[.]63 and 57.128.131[.]66. Run-Lateral.bat and svc_payload.cmd were also pushed, from 91.224.92[.]83 and 107.148.223[.]37.
- Huntress assesses with high confidence that the spray operator and the masterdarky[.]com operator are the same.
Remediação
- Update technician host clients and Access agents to 26.6.5 or later. A server-side update alone does not fix this. If patching is not possible, remove the TransferFiles permission.
- Check Session.db for RanFiles and SentFiles events from guests that overlap with an open host connection.
- Isolate affected workstations, remove wclient_ and wupdate_.msi, restore seclogon, and rotate all credentials reachable from the workstation.
Linha do tempo
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CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect host clients exploited via guest file-transfer spray to compromise MSP technician workstations
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Huntress reports that CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9, disclosed by ConnectWise on September 8, 2026 and added to CISA KEV on September 11) is being exploited against MSP technicians. A malicious guest in a Support or Access session can push a file to the technician's ScreenConnect host client, which runs it with elevated rights and no prompt. ConnectWise lists 26.6.5 as the fixed version for host clients and Access agents. Huntress observed a full compromise on November 12, in which a guest-pushed update_224ac089.bat led to a rogue rebranded ScreenConnect client connecting to masterdarky[.]com. The attacker also sprayed 688,000 run-file requests across 42 MSP servers and tried a path-traversal drop into a technician's Startup folder. Huntress says the SCKit campaign is distinct and does not directly exploit this CVE.
Technical Details
- The chain starts when the technician joins a session. The host client runs update_<8hex>.bat, which relaunches hidden via PowerShell and reports to a Telegram bot. It then downloads WindowsUpdate.msi with curl and unpacks it with msiexec /a. It enables seclogon, launches the payload with runas /trustlevel:0x20000, and starts WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe pointing at masterdarky[.]com:8041. The whole sequence took about 9 seconds.
- Between October 20 and November 16, 29 source IPs made 688,000 run-file requests on 42 servers. The five sessions that sprayed update_224ac089.bat carried the Company property "crypto client".
- A canary file, marker.txt, was pushed from 91.224.92[.]167. A Startup-folder traversal for Sync.bat came from 193.26.115[.]63 and 57.128.131[.]66. Run-Lateral.bat and svc_payload.cmd were also pushed, from 91.224.92[.]83 and 107.148.223[.]37.
- Huntress assesses with high confidence that the spray operator and the masterdarky[.]com operator are the same.
Remediation
- Update technician host clients and Access agents to 26.6.5 or later. A server-side update alone does not fix this. If patching is not possible, remove the TransferFiles permission.
- Check Session.db for RanFiles and SentFiles events from guests that overlap with an open host connection.
- Isolate affected workstations, remove wclient_ and wupdate_.msi, restore seclogon, and rotate all credentials reachable from the workstation.