Aokigahara infostealer targets AI applications, developer tools and cloud credentials alongside traditional data theft
Check Point Research describes Aokigahara, a newly observed Windows infostealer that may have appeared in earlier versions as Kamidere or Stygian. It combines standard theft of browser, cryptocurrency wallet, VPN, FTP/SFTP, password manager and email data with a dedicated aisessions handler. That handler collects authentication, session and configuration files for Claude, ChatGPT Desktop, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, GitHub Copilot and Gemini CLI. It also collects Git credentials, SSH private keys, and AWS, Azure and Google Cloud credential files. Stolen tokens could allow unauthorized use or resale of paid AI accounts, exposure of private conversations and source code, and data extortion. The report does not confirm how the operators actually monetize the data. The stealer is under active development, and the latest samples use the User-Agent Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0.
Detalhes técnicos
- Capabilities include screenshot and clipboard capture, browser credential and cookie theft, wallet theft, file grabbing and a clipper handler that drops a separate component. It also targets Discord, Telegram, Steam, Roblox and Minecraft.
- Anti-analysis: API hashing, control-flow flattening around configuration decryption, and optional checks (each enabled by a configuration flag). The checks cover keyboard layout and UI language (bitmask
0x6C0400C8601), debugger detection (PEB, debug port and object, DR0–DR3), and VM and sandbox detection (CPUID, registry, processes, SMBIOS, usernames, hardware resources, cursor movement). - Configuration: an AES-256-CBC encrypted blob in the
.stgcfgsection with magicSTGC. The key is derived from a seed with an FNV-style routine. The configuration holds the C&C URL, the server X25519 public key, build ID, gate token, module bitmask, TLS pinning settings and up to three fallback URLs. All modules stay embedded in the executable even when disabled. - C&C protocol: an X25519 key exchange, with the AES-GCM key derived via SHA-256 and the string
aokigahara. The malware sendsPOST /gate/handshake, then uploads AES-GCM-encrypted ZIP archives per module to/gate/chunkwithX-Chunklabels such as sysinfo, browsers, firefox and aisessions. It ends withPOST /gate/completecarrying the bodyCOMPLETE. - Check Point published a YARA rule keyed on strings such as
AKGRES,AISessions/,aokigahara,kamidereand the pipe name\\.\pipe\akg_%lx_%lx.
Remediação
- Treat AI application credentials and session tokens as sensitive assets, equal to browser sessions, cloud credentials and developer keys.
- Rotate AI service tokens, API keys, SSH keys and cloud credentials on hosts suspected of infection, and use the published YARA rule and network indicators for hunting.
Linha do tempo
-
Aokigahara infostealer targets AI applications, developer tools and cloud credentials alongside traditional data theft
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Check Point Research describes Aokigahara, a newly observed Windows infostealer that may have appeared in earlier versions as Kamidere or Stygian. It combines standard theft of browser, cryptocurrency wallet, VPN, FTP/SFTP, password manager and email data with a dedicated
aisessionshandler. That handler collects authentication, session and configuration files for Claude, ChatGPT Desktop, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, GitHub Copilot and Gemini CLI. It also collects Git credentials, SSH private keys, and AWS, Azure and Google Cloud credential files. Stolen tokens could allow unauthorized use or resale of paid AI accounts, exposure of private conversations and source code, and data extortion. The report does not confirm how the operators actually monetize the data. The stealer is under active development, and the latest samples use the User-AgentMicrosoft-CryptoAPI/10.0.Technical Details
- Capabilities include screenshot and clipboard capture, browser credential and cookie theft, wallet theft, file grabbing and a clipper handler that drops a separate component. It also targets Discord, Telegram, Steam, Roblox and Minecraft.
- Anti-analysis: API hashing, control-flow flattening around configuration decryption, and optional checks (each enabled by a configuration flag). The checks cover keyboard layout and UI language (bitmask
0x6C0400C8601), debugger detection (PEB, debug port and object, DR0–DR3), and VM and sandbox detection (CPUID, registry, processes, SMBIOS, usernames, hardware resources, cursor movement). - Configuration: an AES-256-CBC encrypted blob in the
.stgcfgsection with magicSTGC. The key is derived from a seed with an FNV-style routine. The configuration holds the C&C URL, the server X25519 public key, build ID, gate token, module bitmask, TLS pinning settings and up to three fallback URLs. All modules stay embedded in the executable even when disabled. - C&C protocol: an X25519 key exchange, with the AES-GCM key derived via SHA-256 and the string
aokigahara. The malware sendsPOST /gate/handshake, then uploads AES-GCM-encrypted ZIP archives per module to/gate/chunkwithX-Chunklabels such as sysinfo, browsers, firefox and aisessions. It ends withPOST /gate/completecarrying the bodyCOMPLETE. - Check Point published a YARA rule keyed on strings such as
AKGRES,AISessions/,aokigahara,kamidereand the pipe name\\.\pipe\akg_%lx_%lx.
Remediation
- Treat AI application credentials and session tokens as sensitive assets, equal to browser sessions, cloud credentials and developer keys.
- Rotate AI service tokens, API keys, SSH keys and cloud credentials on hosts suspected of infection, and use the published YARA rule and network indicators for hunting.