APT41 deploys BlackX UEFI bootkit, a BlackLotus copycat exploiting Baton Drop, against Central Asian diplomatic agencies
Kaspersky GReAT identified an APT campaign in early 2026 targeting diplomatic agencies in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The attackers used a UEFI bootkit dubbed BlackX, which closely resembles BlackLotus (advertised on underground forums for $5,000 in October 2022 and confirmed by ESET in March 2023, per gbhackers.com) and bypasses Secure Boot by exploiting Baton Drop (CVE-2022-21894). Kaspersky attributes the activity to APT41 with medium confidence. The targeted machines were fully patched, because the Baton Drop fix requires manual steps to revoke the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate, and Microsoft's automatic "Enforcement Phase" has not been implemented. BlackX delivers a kernel driver that tampers with security products, followed by cyberespionage payloads: a cloud-storage-based RAT and a Rust implant loaded via OxiDLLRunner. The initial intrusion method is unspecified, and Microsoft's earlier assessment is that such bootkits are persistence and defense evasion tools, not initial access vectors (thehackernews.com). Kaspersky notes it rarely sees APT actors borrow ideas or code from cybercrime actors (thehackernews.com).
Entenda a falha
A vulnerabilidade
Baton Drop (CVE-2022-21894, CVSS 4.4 per The Hacker News) is a Windows Secure Boot bypass. The BlackX UEFI bootkit abuses it. The attacker needs administrator privileges or physical access, so Microsoft calls it a persistence and defense-evasion step, not initial access. They enroll their own Machine Owner Keys (MOK) and load arbitrary EFI files, which gives persistence below the OS and a kernel driver that tampers with security products. The story also lists CVE-2023-24932, another Secure Boot bypass linked to BlackLotus. ESET suggested an unspecified bootkit might exploit it, and Kaspersky ties BlackX to that only by inference. Fully patched machines were still compromised, because the fix does not revoke the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate unless an administrator activates it manually. The articles give no version numbers.
Como funciona
After gaining administrator rights, the attackers drop a clean installer and an RC4-encrypted file that holds all the installation components, so the installer carries no embedded blobs. The installer writes files to the system and UEFI partitions. At boot, the Baton Drop chain lets older, legitimately signed components that were never revoked run even with Secure Boot on, and it enrolls attacker-controlled MOK keys so arbitrary EFI files can load. The UEFI payload then injects a malicious driver into the Windows kernel. The driver disables security-related process, thread and registry callbacks and tampers with ETW providers. It protects the bootkit files by returning a calc.exe handle on open requests. It also deploys user-mode espionage payloads: a RAT that uses cloud storage for C2, and OxiDLLRunner, which is sideloaded by a legitimate executable.
Por que é vulnerável
The root problem is incomplete revocation, not missing patches. Secure Boot still trusts older boot components signed with the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate, and Baton Drop abuses that trust. The patch is built to be applied manually and does not revoke the certificate on install. An administrator must set a registry flag under the Secureboot key and create the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task, which adds the certificate to the forbidden-signature database (DBX). Kaspersky says automatic revocation could break dual-boot systems that rely on the certificate. Microsoft's mitigations are not enabled by default, and the automatic Enforcement Phase has not been implemented. The certificate's expiry on 19 October 2026 does not block vulnerable binaries. Kaspersky first assumed the victims were unpatched, which proved wrong.
Onde está
The articles name no code location for the flaw itself, only the mitigation settings: a registry flag under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Secureboot and the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task, which revoke the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate.
Como foi descoberta
Kaspersky GReAT found BlackX in early 2026 while analysing an APT campaign against diplomatic agencies in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and published its report on 22 October 2026. Baton Drop was already known: ESET confirmed BlackLotus exploiting it in March 2023, after a forum advertisement in October 2022. Kaspersky says Microsoft then released several updates, while gbhackers.com says the fix dates from January 2022. Kaspersky attributes BlackX to APT41 with medium confidence. The attribution rests partly on the "xdd" identifier also seen in ESET's June 2026 FishMonger report, which mentioned an unspecified UEFI bootkit possibly exploiting CVE-2023-24932. The link is inferential. How the victims were first breached is not stated.
Explicação gerada por IA a partir da matéria e dos artigos, em 23/10/2026 17:16.
Detalhes técnicos
- Attackers deploy BlackX after compromising the network and obtaining administrator privileges. They drop
inst.exe(a clean installer with no embedded blobs) andPVMDIJGKAX2, an RC4-encrypted file holding all installation components. The launch command isC:\ProgramData\Intel\inst.exe PVMDIJGKAX2 Q46F6MDLI3RX2KV1, where the last argument is the RC4 key. - The installer writes files to the system and UEFI partitions to exploit Baton Drop and enroll custom Machine Owner Keys (MOK), allowing arbitrary EFI files to load. The exploit is very similar to BlackLotus's but not identical. The BlackLotus source code was never published, so the authors either reverse-engineered it or obtained the source.
- The UEFI payload injects a kernel driver signed with a certificate issued to 温江区明宇网络技术服务工作室 (Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology Service Studio, serial
0bcdf5e0da32d68900b8b7638459d072), since revoked. The driver disables process, thread and registry callbacks, tampers with ETW providers, and includes routines aimed at Kaspersky and Avast that proved ineffective against Kaspersky products. It also redirects kernel open requests for bootkit files to a handle forcalc.exe. - User-mode payload 1: a RAT that loads further .NET payloads and uses Google Drive, OneDrive or Yandex.Disk for C2, interpreting files by suffix (instructions and results, .NET execution, file transfers, initial system-information reporting).
- User-mode payload 2: OxiDLLRunner, an OLLVM-obfuscated DLL sideloaded by the legitimate
googleupdate.exe(original namejcef_helper.exe, MD5 AF8A983B9ADA07EAE1259BF2953ABD40). It decryptsv8_context_snapshot.bininto shellcode plus a Rust PE that talks towww[.]archivetj[.]comand runs received DLLs exportingcreate_pluginin separate threads. - Attribution to APT41 (medium confidence) rests on: the "xdd" identifier in BlackX payloads matching the PDB path
C:\Users\xdd\Desktopin ESET's June 2026 FishMonger report (FishMonger is assumed related to APT41), which mentioned an unspecified UEFI bootkit possibly exploiting CVE-2023-24932; DLL sideloading with an encrypted file; and OLLVM use. Kaspersky assesses BlackX could explain ESET's observations, but the link is inferential (gbhackers.com). - ESET's June 2026 report documented FishMonger (aka Aquatic Panda, Earth Lusca, assessed to operate under the APT41 umbrella) using the SprySOCKS Windows backdoor against government entities in Honduras, Taiwan, Thailand and Pakistan between 2023 and 2024, with "limited indications" of a UEFI bootkit component likely exploiting CVE-2023-24932. DLL sideloading is also a pattern common among Chinese-origin threat actors (thehackernews.com).
- The Baton Drop patch requires setting a registry flag under
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Securebootand creating a scheduled taskSecure-Boot-Update. Microsoft's mitigations are not enabled by default (gbhackers.com). The "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate expired on 19 October 2026, but this does not stop vulnerable binaries from loading unless the certificate is blocklisted.
Remediação
- Do not treat installing the Baton Drop update as sufficient. Complete the manual activation steps (registry flag and Secure-Boot-Update task) so the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate is revoked and added to the DBX, accounting for dual-boot systems.
- Follow Microsoft's staged deployment guidance: update recovery media and test boot compatibility. Applying revocations without first preparing trusted replacement components can prevent systems from booting, so use a controlled rollout with verification (gbhackers.com).
- Deploy security solutions with exploit prevention on all machines and monitor their alerts.
- Hunt for the listed file names, the RC4-key command line, the revoked certificate serial and the C2 domain.
Linha do tempo
-
APT41-linked BlackX UEFI bootkit, a BlackLotus copycat, bypasses Secure Boot at Central Asian diplomatic entities
The article adds detail on the FishMonger link: aliases Aquatic Panda and Earth Lusca, the SprySOCKS backdoor, and ESET's 2023-2024 victims in Honduras, Taiwan, Thailand and Pakistan. It also cites Microsoft's earlier statement that BlackLotus is a persistence and defense evasion mechanism and not an initial access vector, and Kaspersky's remark that APT actors rarely borrow code from cybercrime actors.
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
The article adds detail on the FishMonger link: aliases Aquatic Panda and Earth Lusca, the SprySOCKS backdoor, and ESET's 2023-2024 victims in Honduras, Taiwan, Thailand and Pakistan. It also cites Microsoft's earlier statement that BlackLotus is a persistence and defense evasion mechanism and not an initial access vector, and Kaspersky's remark that APT actors rarely borrow code from cybercrime actors.
Kaspersky reports that diplomatic organizations in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were targeted in early 2026 with BlackX, a new UEFI bootkit suspected to be operated by the China-linked APT41. BlackX is assessed to be an updated copycat of BlackLotus and abuses the Secure Boot bypass Baton Drop (CVE-2022-21894). Systems that have the patch installed remain exposed when organizations skip the manual Secure Boot revocation steps, in particular blocklisting the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate in the DBX. The bootkit gives persistence and defense evasion, and it delivers a kernel driver that tampers with security products plus cyber-espionage payloads. The BlackLotus source code was never public, so the authors either reverse-engineered it or bought the code.
Technical Details
- Attackers first breach the network through an unspecified method and gain administrator privileges, then drop
inst.exeand the encrypted filePVMDIJGKAX2. The installer runs asC:\ProgramData\Intel\inst.exe PVMDIJGKAX2 Q46F6MDLI3RX2KV1, where the last argument is the RC4 key. - The installer writes files to the system and UEFI partitions to exploit CVE-2022-21894 in a way "remarkably similar" to BlackLotus, and enrolls Machine Owner Keys (MOK) to load arbitrary EFI files.
- The UEFI payload injects a kernel driver signed with a certificate of Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology Service Studio, since revoked. The driver tampers with endpoint security software; some routines run only when Kaspersky or Avast products are present, but Kaspersky found them ineffective.
- Payload 1: a RAT that loads .NET payloads and uses Google Drive, OneDrive and Yandex.Disk for C2.
- Payload 2: OxiDLLRunner, sideloaded by the legitimate
googleupdate.exe. It launches a Rust payload that contactsarchivetj[.]comto fetch DLL plugins. - The PCA 2011 certificate expired on 19 October 2026, but this does not stop vulnerable binaries from loading unless the certificate is blocklisted.
- The APT41 link rests on an ESET June 2026 report on FishMonger (aka Aquatic Panda, Earth Lusca), which documented the SprySOCKS backdoor against government entities in Honduras, Taiwan, Thailand and Pakistan in 2023-2024, with limited indications of a UEFI bootkit component likely exploiting CVE-2023-24932. The "xdd" string overlap with FishMonger's kernel implant and the use of DLL sideloading support the link.
Remediation
- Installing the Baton Drop patch is not enough. Apply Microsoft's manual Secure Boot revocation mitigations, including adding "Windows Production PCA 2011" to the DBX.
- Hunt for the listed file names, the RC4-key command line and the C2 domain.
- Attackers first breach the network through an unspecified method and gain administrator privileges, then drop
-
APT41-linked BlackX UEFI bootkit bypasses Secure Boot at Central Asian diplomatic organizations via Baton Drop
The article adds background on BlackLotus (sold for $5,000 in October 2022, confirmed by ESET in March 2023) and stresses operational cautions for remediation: revocations applied before trusted replacement components are ready can prevent systems from booting, so recovery media must be updated and boot compatibility tested in a staged rollout.
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
The article adds background on BlackLotus (sold for $5,000 in October 2022, confirmed by ESET in March 2023) and stresses operational cautions for remediation: revocations applied before trusted replacement components are ready can prevent systems from booting, so recovery media must be updated and boot compatibility tested in a staged rollout.
Suspected Chinese APT41 operators have deployed BlackX, a UEFI bootkit, against diplomatic organizations in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Kaspersky discovered the campaign in early 2026 and attributes it to APT41 with medium confidence. BlackX closely resembles BlackLotus, which was sold on underground forums for $5,000 in October 2022, and abuses Baton Drop (CVE-2022-21894) to bypass Secure Boot. Even fully patched systems stay exposed unless administrators have explicitly enabled bootloader revocations.
Technical Details
- The attackers deploy BlackX after compromising the network and gaining administrator privileges. The installer
inst.exeruns with an RC4-encrypted, extensionless container,PVMDIJGKAX2, and the keyQ46F6MDLI3RX2KV1. Keeping the components outside the executable complicates analysis when responders recover only the installer. - The installer places components on the Windows and EFI partitions, then exploits Baton Drop to enroll attacker-controlled Machine Owner Keys, which allow malicious EFI applications to load.
- Kaspersky sees substantial similarities to BlackLotus alongside implementation differences. This suggests reverse engineering or access to the source code, not a confirmed development relationship.
- The kernel driver is signed with a certificate belonging to Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology Service Studio, since revoked. It disables process, thread and registry callbacks, interferes with ETW providers, and redirects attempts to open bootkit files toward
calc.exe. Its product-specific tampering routines failed against Kaspersky software in testing. - User-mode payload 1 is a RAT that uses Google Drive, OneDrive or Yandex.Disk for C2. File suffixes identify instructions and results, supporting .NET execution, file transfers and system-information reporting.
- User-mode payload 2, OxiDLLRunner, uses OLLVM obfuscation and DLL sideloading through a legitimate executable renamed
googleupdate.exe. It decryptsv8_context_snapshot.bininto shellcode and a Rust payload that communicates withwww[.]archivetj[.]com. Downloaded DLL plugins exportcreate_pluginand run in separate threads. - Attribution partly rests on the identifier "xdd", also present in a driver development path in ESET's June 2026 FishMonger research. ESET noted an unspecified bootkit possibly exploiting CVE-2023-24932; the link to BlackX is inferential.
- The root weakness is incomplete revocation, not missing patches. Microsoft's mitigations are not enabled by default and require updating the Secure Boot databases and revoking Windows Production PCA 2011 through the DBX. That certificate expired on October 19, 2026, but expiration alone does not block vulnerable binaries.
Remediation
- Validate revocation status and follow Microsoft's staged deployment guidance.
- Update recovery media and test boot compatibility.
- Applying revocations without first preparing trusted replacement components can leave systems unable to boot, so use a controlled rollout with verification.
- The attackers deploy BlackX after compromising the network and gaining administrator privileges. The installer
-
APT41 deploys BlackX UEFI bootkit, a BlackLotus copycat exploiting Baton Drop, against Central Asian diplomatic agencies
ler a análise desta fonte ocultar
Kaspersky GReAT identified an APT campaign in early 2026 targeting diplomatic agencies in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The attackers used a UEFI bootkit dubbed BlackX, which closely resembles BlackLotus and bypasses Secure Boot by exploiting Baton Drop (CVE-2022-21894). Kaspersky attributes the activity to APT41 with medium confidence. The targeted machines were fully patched, because the Baton Drop fix requires manual steps to revoke the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate, and Microsoft's automatic "Enforcement Phase" has not been implemented. BlackX delivers a kernel driver that tampers with security products, followed by cyberespionage payloads: a cloud-storage-based RAT and a Rust implant loaded via OxiDLLRunner.
Technical Details
- Attackers deploy BlackX after compromising the network and obtaining administrator privileges. They drop
inst.exe(a clean installer with no embedded blobs) andPVMDIJGKAX2, an RC4-encrypted file holding all installation components. The launch command isC:\ProgramData\Intel\inst.exe PVMDIJGKAX2 Q46F6MDLI3RX2KV1, where the last argument is the RC4 key. - The installer writes files to the system and UEFI partitions to exploit Baton Drop and enroll custom Machine Owner Keys (MOK), allowing arbitrary EFI files to load. The exploit is very similar to BlackLotus's but not identical. The BlackLotus source code was never published, so the authors either reverse-engineered it or obtained the source.
- The UEFI payload injects a kernel driver signed with a certificate issued to 温江区明宇网络技术服务工作室 (serial
0bcdf5e0da32d68900b8b7638459d072), since revoked. The driver disables process, thread and registry callbacks, tampers with ETW providers, and includes routines aimed at Kaspersky and Avast that proved ineffective against Kaspersky products. It also redirects kernel open requests for bootkit files to a handle forcalc.exe. - User-mode payload 1: a RAT that loads further .NET payloads and uses Google Drive, OneDrive or Yandex.Disk for C2, interpreting files by suffix.
- User-mode payload 2: OxiDLLRunner, an OLLVM-obfuscated DLL sideloaded by the legitimate
googleupdate.exe(original namejcef_helper.exe, MD5 AF8A983B9ADA07EAE1259BF2953ABD40). It decryptsv8_context_snapshot.bininto shellcode plus a Rust PE that talks towww[.]archivetj[.]comand runs received DLLs exportingcreate_pluginin separate threads. - Attribution to APT41 (medium confidence) rests on: the "xdd" identifier in BlackX payloads matching the PDB path
C:\Users\xdd\Desktopin ESET's June 2026 FishMonger report (FishMonger is assumed related to APT41), which mentioned an unspecified UEFI bootkit possibly exploiting CVE-2023-24932; DLL sideloading with an encrypted file; and OLLVM use. - The Baton Drop patch requires setting a registry flag under
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Securebootand creating a scheduled taskSecure-Boot-Update. The "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate expired on 19 October 2026, but this does not stop vulnerable binaries from loading unless the certificate is blocklisted.
Remediation
- Do not treat installing the Baton Drop update as sufficient. Complete the manual activation steps (registry flag and Secure-Boot-Update task) so the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate is revoked, accounting for dual-boot systems.
- Deploy security solutions with exploit prevention on all machines and monitor their alerts.
- Hunt for the listed file names, the RC4-key command line, the revoked certificate serial and the C2 domain.
- Attackers deploy BlackX after compromising the network and obtaining administrator privileges. They drop