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Former AT&T store employee sentenced to 16 months for insider role in SIM-swap bank fraud ring targeting $594K

1 fonte(s) · 1 atualização(ões) · publicado 15/09/2026 06:43 · coletado há 1 dia

Kenneth Carter, 44, of Portland, Oregon, a former AT&T retail store employee, was sentenced to 16 months in federal prison for acting as the inside man for a SIM-swap gang. According to his plea agreement, the scheme ran from May 2018 to November 2019 and involved at least three co-conspirators. Carter used privileged store access to move victims' numbers onto SIM cards controlled by himself or accomplices. This let the gang intercept two-factor codes and password-reset links for victims' online banking accounts. Prosecutors put the three victims' combined intended losses at US $593,963.77, though only one attempt succeeded, draining US $99,528.33.

Technical Details

  • Carter swapped victims' numbers onto attacker-controlled SIMs, including an Alcatel handset in Portland and a swap at an AT&T store in Lancaster, California.
  • Co-conspirators triggered password resets on the victims' banking accounts. SMS codes and reset links were forwarded to a gang member, who logged in and attempted wire transfers, usually to a bank account in Portugal.
  • May 2018: an attempted wire of US $247,652.74 was blocked by the bank's fraud checks.
  • November 2018: an attempted transfer of US $246,782.70 was also blocked.
  • December 2018: a victim identified as "S.Q.T" in Portland was drained of US $99,528.33.
  • Carter was paid roughly US $1,000 to $2,000 per swap. A search of his home in November 2019 found victims' sensitive personal data, including social security numbers. He was not indicted until 2023 and admitted to swapping other AT&T customers' numbers as well.

Remediation

  • Replace SMS-based authentication with an authentication app or hardware security key.
  • Ask the mobile carrier to require a PIN or passcode before any SIM change is processed.
  • Carriers should tightly control and monitor privileged SIM-change access in retail stores to limit insider abuse.

Linha do tempo

  1. bitdefender.com ↗ · pub. 15/09/2026 06:43 · coletado 19/10 17:56 primeiro registro

    Former AT&T store employee sentenced to 16 months for insider role in SIM-swap bank fraud ring targeting $594K

    ler a análise desta fonte

    Kenneth Carter, 44, of Portland, Oregon, a former AT&T retail store employee, was sentenced to 16 months in federal prison for acting as the inside man for a SIM-swap gang. According to his plea agreement, the scheme ran from May 2018 to November 2019 and involved at least three co-conspirators. Carter used privileged store access to move victims' numbers onto SIM cards controlled by himself or accomplices. This let the gang intercept two-factor codes and password-reset links for victims' online banking accounts. Prosecutors put the three victims' combined intended losses at US $593,963.77, though only one attempt succeeded, draining US $99,528.33.

    Technical Details

    • Carter swapped victims' numbers onto attacker-controlled SIMs, including an Alcatel handset in Portland and a swap at an AT&T store in Lancaster, California.
    • Co-conspirators triggered password resets on the victims' banking accounts. SMS codes and reset links were forwarded to a gang member, who logged in and attempted wire transfers, usually to a bank account in Portugal.
    • May 2018: an attempted wire of US $247,652.74 was blocked by the bank's fraud checks.
    • November 2018: an attempted transfer of US $246,782.70 was also blocked.
    • December 2018: a victim identified as "S.Q.T" in Portland was drained of US $99,528.33.
    • Carter was paid roughly US $1,000 to $2,000 per swap. A search of his home in November 2019 found victims' sensitive personal data, including social security numbers. He was not indicted until 2023 and admitted to swapping other AT&T customers' numbers as well.

    Remediation

    • Replace SMS-based authentication with an authentication app or hardware security key.
    • Ask the mobile carrier to require a PIN or passcode before any SIM change is processed.
    • Carriers should tightly control and monitor privileged SIM-change access in retail stores to limit insider abuse.