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Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 reports active exploitation of CVE-2026-0257, an authentication bypass in the portal and gateway components of PAN-OS GlobalProtect. The flaw lets unauthorized attackers circumvent security controls and open VPN connections. The October 19 update says Unit 42 continues to see exploitation attempts by ransomware …
Unit 42 published research showing that an attacker with root access on a compromised Kubernetes node can misuse SPIFFE/SPIRE workload attestation to impersonate co-located workloads and harvest their SVIDs. The attacker spoofs the Linux cgroup information the SPIRE agent uses to identify callers, so the agent issues a victim workload's i…
Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) published research on a behavioral clustering model that maps cloud identities to functional roles from audit log activity. The model covered more than 40,000 identities across 125 cloud environments over two months. It groups identities such as administrators, backup services, security tooling and DevOps by t…
Unit 42 analyzed an Atomic macOS (AMOS) stealer infection generated in a lab on Aug. 5, 2026, starting from a fake "macOS toolkit" instruction page hosted at getmacouscloud.com. The page tells victims to paste a command into Terminal, a ClickFix-style copy/paste technique, which downloads a Zsh script and then installs a Mach-O AMOS paylo…
Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) describes how adversaries move beyond the initial foothold and pivot across the enterprise, exploiting the visibility gaps left by disconnected security tools. The 2026 Unit 42 Global Incident Response Report found that 43% of attacks involved activity across four or more attack surfaces, and some cases spanne…
Unit 42 researchers found that in default AWS AgentCore Harness deployments, prompt injection can steer the agent's built-in shell tool to exfiltrate plaintext credentials resolved from AgentCore Identity. The shell tool is enabled by default and runs as root, in the same UID as the harness runtime (PID 1, python3.10 -m loopy.server). Tha…
Unit 42 analyzed how AWS neutralizes publicly exposed IAM access keys by automatically attaching the AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantine managed policy, and how that policy has changed since its release on Aug. 11, 2020. The mechanism relies on the GitHub secret scanning partner program, which alerts AWS when long-term keys appear in public repos…
Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) consultants describe three misconceptions they see repeatedly in customer casework. The first is that more security tools always mean better protection. The second is that small and mid-sized organizations are safe from major threat actors. The third is that security controls and GRC exist only to check compli…
Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) released OperTraitor, an open-source, LLM-powered tool that ingests RBAC configurations from installed Kubernetes operators and the OperatorHub catalog. It compares an operator's documented function with its granted privileges and assigns a 1-10 risk score. The research found abandoned, overly permissive opera…
Unit 42 attributes with high confidence to an Iranian state-aligned actor, tracked as CL-STA-1178, a campaign called Blinder Tunnel. In March 2026 it targeted an individual in Iraq's critical infrastructure sector, after infrastructure staging that began as early as November 2025. The actor impersonated the Dubai Airports IT department an…
Unit 42 reports that threat actors are moving supply chain malware C2 from hardcoded endpoints to Web3 mechanisms, so an entire botnet or worm infrastructure can be re-pointed with a single blockchain transaction. The ChainDrop npm worm (Shai-Hulud family, 400+ npm packages) and the PolinRider campaign (npm, Go modules, Packagist) target …
Unit 42 investigated a months-long intrusion against a European bank, which began with unauthorized VPN-based access through a third-party-managed external gateway appliance that did not enforce strict authentication. Using compromised credentials, the attacker ran noisy, high-volume internal reconnaissance and brute-force campaigns again…
Unit 42 detailed a multi-stage intrusion in September 2024 against a telecommunications managed service provider, tracked as CL-STA-0954 (aka UNC5820). The attackers gained initial access by exploiting CVE-2024-47575 (FortiJump) on a central FortiManager and exfiltrated an archive with running configurations, credentials and private keys …
Unit 42 reports a campaign, tracked as CL-UNK-1211, that targeted government entities and state-affiliated infrastructure between October 2025 and April 2026. The cluster has not been attributed to a nation-state or to cybercrime. The attackers focused on Linux servers for reconnaissance, persistence and intelligence collection, including…
Unit 42 Threat Intelligence published its overview of the top five initial access threat vectors observed in September 2026. Adversary activity relied heavily on external edge exploitation and identity compromise, with public-facing infrastructure and legitimate credential abuse as the primary footholds for intrusion campaigns. Social eng…
